摘
要
随着我国住宅使用年限的增长，既有住宅存在的问题日益突出。老旧小区改造势
在必行，但是巨大的财政压力造成了政府虽有心改造却难以全面推进的局面。PPP模
式作为一种新型的建设模式，其优越性在于通过打造共同分享利益、共同承担风险、
共同开展合作的发展模式，在老旧小区改造项目中，采用PPP模式引入社会资本，不
仅能够缓解公共部门的财政压力，还能激励社会资本参与社会管理工作，推动社会发
展。
本文首先介绍了 PPP模式等核心概念以及理论基础，并对 PPP模式下老旧小区
改造的利益主体进行了详细的分析。其次，以 A老旧小区的 PPP改造模式为例，分
析了其现有利益均衡机制，剖析其应用的不足，探讨 A老旧小区现存利益失衡的原
因。然后，从 PPP模式角度出发，利用进化博弈论模型，对 A老旧小区改造工程中
的利益主体各自的博弈行为进行分析，探讨彼此之间的博弈均衡点，并收集 A老旧
小区改造的现状数据，进行博弈仿真分析，目的是通过仿真结果得到政府、改造方、
小区业主三方策略选择的主要影响因子。最后，在已有分析结果的基础上，对 A老
旧小区 PPP模式下改造的新的利益均衡理论框架进行构建，并提出准确定位政府在
改造中的角色和加强对老旧小区改造的政策支持的建议。
本文以老旧小区改造为研究对象，从 PPP模式的视角出发，对老旧小区改造过
程中各参与主体对项目产生的影响加以考虑，对 A老旧小区 PPP模式下改造的新的
利益均衡理论框架进行构建，并提出相应的建议，旨在为相关研究以及我国其他地区
的老旧小区改造提供一定的参考。
关键词：老旧小区改造；PPP模式；演化博弈；利益均衡

Abstract
With the increase in the service life of residential buildings in my country, the existing
problems of existing residential buildings have become increasingly prominent. The
transformation of old communities is imperative, but huge financial pressure has created a
situation in which the government is unable to fully advance the transformation despite its
intentions. As a new construction model, the advantage of the PPP model lies in the
development of a development model that shares benefits, bears risks, and cooperates
together. In the transformation of old communities, the PPP model is used to introduce
social capital, which can not only relieve the public Departmental financial pressure can
also encourage social capital to participate in social management work and promote social
development.
This article first introduces the core concepts and theoretical basis of PPP mode and
other core concepts, and analyzes the stakeholders of the old community reconstruction in
PPP mode in detail. Secondly, taking the PPP transformation mode of A old community as
an example, it analyzes its existing benefit balance mechanism, analyzes its application
deficiencies, and explores the reasons for the existing interest imbalance in A’ s old
community. Then, from the perspective of the PPP model, using the evolutionary game
theory model to analyze the respective game behaviors of the stakeholders in the A's old
community reconstruction project, explore the game equilibrium points between them, and
collect the current status of A's old community reconstruction Data, game simulation analysis is
carried out, the purpose is to obtain the main influence factors of the three-party strategy choice
of the government, the renovation party, and the community owner through the simulation results.
Finally, on the basis of the existing analysis results, construct a new theoretical framework of
interest balance for the transformation of the old community of A under the PPP mode, and
propose an accurate positioning of the government's role in the transformation and strengthen
policy support for the transformation of the old community Suggestions.
This article takes the transformation of the old community as the research object, from the
perspective of the PPP model, considers the impact of each participant on the project in the
process of the transformation of the old community, and discusses the new interest balance
theory of the transformation of the old community under the ppp mode of A The framework is
constructed and corresponding suggestions are put forward, aiming to provide a certain reference
for related research and the transformation of old communities in other regions of China.
Key words: Reconstruction of old communities; PPP model; evolutionary game;
balance of interests
。。。以下略