上市公司控股股东股权质押下的利益侵占行为研究--以ST高升为例
摘要
纵观 A股近二十年的历史，股权质押逐渐变成上市企业控股股东融资的重
要渠道。2015年以来，股权质押更是表现出爆发性增长。然而，由于目前监管
措施尚未完善，股权质押成为大股东满足其个人私欲、掏空企业资源的方式，最
终引致企业股票价格下跌、股票被冠以 ST甚至引发强制退市，股权质押的风险
进一步爆发。大股东进行股权质押尽管只是股东个人的融资行为，但也会影响到
上市公司，尤其是控股股东股权质押后侵占公司利益的行为亟需注意。因此，深
度研究股权质押背后控股股东的利益侵占行为也显得更加重要。
本文首先分析了我国资本市场与案例企业的股权质押与利益侵占行为概况，
结合委托代理理论对控股股东股权质押可能引起的利益侵占行为做机理分析，运
用该理论分析 ST高升的利益侵占行为表现，同时对比分析股权质押前后的利益
侵占程度。其次，结合文献梳理出股权质押对利益侵占行为的影响路径，分析
ST高升利益侵占产生条件与行为动因。最后，运用财务指标法、Z值模型、CAR
模型与BHAR模型等方法对ST高升股权质押后引起利益侵占行为的经济后果做
全面分析。
本文采用理论与案例结合的方式进行研究发现：第一，ST高升控股股东韦
振宇确实存在关联担保、恶性占用资金等多项侵占行为，所谓业务转型不过是为
后续侵占提供便利；基于股权质押发生前后的侵占程度比照，股权质押后 ST高
升利益侵占程度有所加重。第二，ST高升控股股东进行股权质押后，降低了侵
占成本，加剧两权分离，同时未能缓解公司原有的财务危机，促使了实控人韦振
宇的利益侵占行为。第三，从财务绩效与市场股票收益率两方面，发现大股东韦
振宇质押后的利益侵占行为显著影响了公司的长期经营状况，提高了公司的财务
风险，同时也产生了严重的市场负面反应，但在短期内利益侵占行为具备隐蔽性
的特征。基于上述研究本文从公司经营管理、外部监督者、中小投资者角度提出
建议以供参考，以期能为股权质押、企业管理与利益侵占案例相关研究进一步提
供一些有价值的补充。
关键词：控股股东；股权质押；利益侵占；家族企业
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上市公司控股股东股权质押下的利益侵占行为研究--以ST高升为例
Abstract
Throughout the nearly 20-year history of A-shares, equity pledge has gradually
become an important channel for the financing of controlling shareholders of listed
enterprises. Since 2015, equity pledge has shown explosive growth. However, as the
current regulatory measures have not been improved, equity pledge has become a way
for major shareholders to meet their personal desires and empty enterprise resources,
which eventually led to the decline of enterprise stock price, the naming of stocks as
ST, and even forced delisting, and the risk of equity pledge further broke out.
Although the equity pledge by major shareholders is only the financing behavior of
individual shareholders, it will also affect listed companies, especially the behavior of
embezzling the interests of the company after the equity pledge of controlling
shareholders, which needs to be paid attention to. Therefore, it is more important to
deeply study the interest embezzlement of controlling shareholders behind equity
pledge.
Firstly, this paper analyzes the general situation of equity pledge and interest
embezzlement in China's capital market and case enterprises, combined with the
principal-agent theory, makes a mechanism analysis on the possible interest
embezzlement caused by the controlling shareholder's equity pledge, uses this theory
to analyze the expression of ST Gaosheng's interest embezzlement behavior, and
compares the degree of interest embezzlement before and after the equity pledge.
Secondly, combined with the literature, this paper combs out the impact path of equity
pledge on interest embezzlement, and analyzes the conditions and behavior
motivation of ST Gaosheng interest embezzlement. Finally, using the methods of
financial index method, Z-value model, CAR model and BHAR model, this paper
makes a comprehensive analysis on the economic consequences of interest
embezzlement caused by ST Gaosheng equity pledge.
This paper uses a combination of theory and cases to study and find that: first,
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上市公司控股股东股权质押下的利益侵占行为研究--以ST高升为例
Wei Zhenyu, the controlling shareholder of ST Gaosheng, does have a number of
embezzlement behaviors such as related guarantee and vicious occupation of funds,
and the so-called business transformation is just to facilitate subsequent
embezzlement; Based on the comparison of the embezzlement degree before and after
the equity pledge, the embezzlement degree of ST Gaosheng's interests has increased
after the equity pledge. Second, after the controlling shareholder of ST Gaosheng
pledged its equity, it reduced the occupation cost, exacerbated the separation of the
two rights, failed to alleviate the original financial crisis of the company, and
prompted the interest occupation of the actual controller Wei Zhenyu. Third, from the
two aspects of financial performance and market stock return, it is found that the
interest embezzlement behavior of the major shareholder Wei Zhenyu after pledge has
significantly affected the company's long-term operation, improved the company's
financial risk, and also produced serious negative market reactions, but the interest
embezzlement behavior has the characteristics of concealment in the short term.
Based on the above research, this paper puts forward suggestions from the perspective
of company management, external supervisors and small and medium-sized investors
for reference, in order to further provide some valuable supplements for the case
studies of equity pledge, enterprise management and interest encroachment.
Keywords: controlling shareholder; equity pledge; embezzlement of interests; family
firm
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