摘要
近年来，股权质押作为一种便捷融资工具得到了越来越多上市公司股东尤其是控股股
东的青睐。但股权质押有其两面性，一方面，因其具有获得资金成本低、获得资金时间短
和不需严格审批等特点可以帮助上市公司拓宽融资渠道以及盘活控股股东存量资产。另一
方面，如果上市公司股价在股权质押期间跌破预警线，控股股东又无法补充质押品而导致
质权人即银行或证券公司等金融机构将质押股票进行平仓，这将使得控股股东控制权发生
转移。为防止此类情况发生，控股股东在股权质押期间有强烈动机进行市值管理，而现金
股利政策正是控股股东进行市值管理的一种常用方式。另外，现金股利政策也是投资者关
注的重点。所以，本文研究上市公司控股股东股权质押对现金股利的影响具有很强现实意
义。
本文通过选取 2016至 2020年我国上海和深圳证券交易所部分上市公司作为研究对象
来进行实证分析，以此检验上市公司控股股东股权质押如何影响现金股利支付，并且通过
加入调节变量即审计质量与控股股东股权质押变量的交乘项来检验审计质量是否会对控
股股东股权质押与现金股利之间的关系产生影响，从而为相关研究开拓一个新视角。本文
通过实证研究，得出以下几个主要结论：（1）通过对模型进行回归分析，本文发现上市公
司控股股东股权质押行为以及质押比率与现金股利支付意愿呈显著正相关关系，但与现金
股利支付水平呈负相关关系。（2）在回归模型中加入审计质量与控股股东股权质押的交乘
项进行分析后发现，审计质量越高，发挥的监督作用越大，越能抑制发生在控股股东与中
小股东之间的代理冲突，也越能抑制控股股东通过不支付或少支付现金股利而从剩余现金
流中获取控制权私益，从而越能缓解控股股东股权质押与现金股利支付水平的负相关关系。
因此可以认为高审计质量能对控股股东股权质押和现金股利支付水平之间的关系起到有
效调节作用。（3）本文经过进一步地研究不同产权性质的上市公司控股股东股权质押与现
金股利支付意愿之间的关系发现，民营上市公司控股股东股权质押与现金股利支付意愿呈
显著正相关关系，而这一关系在国有上市公司中并不显著。
关键词：控股股东；股权质押；现金股利
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Abstract
In recent years, as a convenient financing tool, equity pledge has been favored by more and
more shareholders of listed companies, especially the controlling shareholders. However, equity
pledge has two sides. On the one hand, because it has the characteristics of low cost, short time
and no strict approval, it can help listed companies broaden financing channels and revitalize the
stock assets of controlling shareholders. On the other hand, if the share price of the listed
company falls below the early warning line during the equity pledge period, and the controlling
shareholder is unable to supplement the pledge, resulting in the pledgee, that is, financial
institutions such as banks or securities companies, closing the pledged shares, which will
transfer the control of the controlling shareholder. In order to prevent this kind of situation, the
controlling shareholders have strong motivation to carry out market value management during
the period of equity pledge, and the cash dividend policy is a common way for the controlling
shareholders to carry out market value management. In addition, cash dividend policy is a focus
of investors. Therefore, this paper has a strong practical significance to study the impact of
controlling shareholders' equity pledge on cash dividends.
This paper selects the data of some listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges from 2016 to 2020 as the research object for empirical analysis, so as to test how the
equity pledge of controlling shareholders of listed companies affects the payment of cash
dividends,and by adding the adjustment variable, that is, the intersection of audit quality and
controlling shareholder's equity pledge variable, to test whether audit quality will have an
impact on the relationship between controlling shareholder's equity pledge and cash dividend, so
as to open up a new perspective for relevant research.Through empirical research, this paper
draws the following main conclusions: (1) through regression analysis of the model, this paper
finds that the equity pledge behavior and pledge ratio of controlling shareholders of listed
companies are significantly positively correlated with the willingness to pay cash dividends, but
negatively correlated with the level of cash dividend payment. (2) After adding the
multiplication term of audit quality and controlling shareholder's equity pledge to the regression
model, it is found that the higher the audit quality, the greater the supervision role, the more it
can restrain the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and
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