2007年长江电力公司发行第一只公司债券，标志着我国债券市场正式成立。 虽然我国债券市场成立较晚，但是截至2019年8月我国债券市场规模排到全球 的第二位。控股股东股权质押会加剧控股股东与中小股东的利益冲突，控股股 东有更强的动机和能力侵占公司资源，损害公司业绩和价值，进而会影响到公 司偿债能力，增大债券违约风险。另一方面，控股股东股权质押会带来控制权 转移风险，控股股东为了规避股价崩盘带来的控制权转移风险会操纵信息，增 加信息风险，债券投资者会要求更高的债券收益率。公司控制股权质押比例、 提高信息质量和改善股权结构，可以抑制控制股权质押对公司债券信用利差的 影响。 本文基于信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、信号传递理论以及债券定价模 型，考虑数据的可获取性和变量的特征，以沪深A股上市公司2007-2017年发 行的公司债券为研究样本，运用实证研究方法，研究以下问题：第一，控股股 东股权质押对公司债券信用利差的影响；第二，公司的信息质量对控股股东股 权质押与公司债券信用利差的关系的影响；第三，控股股东的持股比例和控股 股东的性质对控股股东股权质押与公司债券信用利差的关系的影响。得到以下 结论： （1）控股股东进行股权质押会导致更高的债券信用利差。本文分别探究控 股股东股权质押行为、股权质押比例与公司债券信用利差的关系，发现股权质 押行为和股权质押比例会导致公司债券的信用利差增加。 （2）信息质量会对控股股东股权质押与公司债券信用利差的关系有影响。 具体表现为，高质量的信息可以抑制控股股东股权质押对债券信用利差的正向 影响。 （3）第一大股东持股比例较集中时，控股股东股权质押对债券信用利差的 正向影响更显著。与非国有企业相比，国有企业的控股股东股权质押会更显著 增加债券信用利差。 最后，本文分别从股权质押的上市公司、质权人、监管层三方提出建议。 关键词：控股股东；股权质押；债券信用利差；信息质量 II ABSTRACT The first corporate bond issued by Yangtze Power in 2007 marked the official establishment of Chinese bond market. Although Chinese bond market was established relatively late, as of August 2019, the size of Chinese bond market ranks second in the global bond market. The shares pledge of the controlling shareholder will aggravate the conflict of interest between the controlling shareholder and the small and medium shareholders. The controlling shareholder has stronger motivation and ability to encroach on the company's resources, damage the company's performance and value, and then affect the company's ability to pay debts and the risk of bond default. On the other hand, the shares pledge of the controlling shareholder will bring the risk of control transfer. In order to avoid the risk of stock price crash, the controlling shareholder will manipulate information and increase the degree of information asymmetry. Bond investors will demand higher bond yields. The company can improve the quality of information, improve equity structure and eliminate the problem of information asymmetry, it can restrain the influence of controlling equity pledge on the credit spread of corporate bonds. This thesis is based on the information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory, signal transmission theory, and bond pricing theory. Considering the availability of data and the characteristics of variables. Based on the research sample of corporate bonds issued by Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017, The empirical research method studies the following issues: first, the impact of the shares pledge of the controlling shareholder on corporate bond pricing; second, the company's information quality affecting the relationship between the shares pledge of the controlling shareholder and corporate bond credit spread; third, The influence of the controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio and the nature of the controlling shareholder on the relationship between the controlling shareholder's shares pledge and the corporate bond credit spread. The following conclusions were reached: (1) Equity pledge by controlling shareholders will result in higher bond credit spreads. This thesis explores the relationship between controlling shareholder's shares III pledge behavior (shares pledge ratio) and corporate bond pricing, and finds that shares pledge behavior and shares pledge ratio are significantly positively related to bond pricing. (2) The quality of information will affect the relationship between controlling shareholder's shares pledge and corporate bond credit spreads. Specifically, high-quality information can inhibit the positive correlation between controlling shareholder equity pledge and bond credit spreads. (3) Compared with the low degree of equity concentration, in the case of high equity concentration he positive correlation between the controlling shareholder's shares pledge and the bond credit spread is more obvious. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the positive correlation between shares pledge of controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises and bond credit spreads is more significant. Finally, this paper puts forward suggestions from listed companies of shares pledges, pledgees, and regulators. Key Words: Controlling Shareholder; Shares Pledge; Credit Spread; Information Quality IV 目录 摘要 ................................................................................................................................... I ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... II 第1章 导论 ...................................................................................................................... 6 1.1 研究目的和意义 ................................................................................................. 6 1.1.1 研究目的 .................................................................................................. 6 1.1.2 研究意义 .................................................................................................. 7 1.2 国内外研究现状 ................................................................................................. 8 1.2.1 大股东行为的影响研究 .......................................................................... 8 1.2.2 控股股东股权质押的经济后果研究 .................................................... 11 1.2.3 债券信用利差的影响因素研究 ............................................................ 12 1.2.4 国内外研究现状评述 ............................................................................ 14 1.3 研究内容和研究方法 ....................................................................................... 15 1.3.1 研究内容 ................................................................................................ 15 1.3.2 研究方法 ................................................................................................ 15 第2章 相关概念界定及理论基础 ................................................................................ 18 2.1概念界定 ............................................................................................................ 18 2.1.1 股权质押 ................................................................................................ 18 2.1.2 债券信用利差 ........................................................................................ 19 2.1.3 信息质量 ................................................................................................ 19 2.2理论基础 ............................................................................................................ 20 2.2.1 信息不对称理论 .................................................................................... 20 2.2.2 委托代理理论 ........................................................................................ 21 2.2.3 债券定价模型 ........................................................................................ 23 2.2.4 信号传递理论 ........................................................................................ 23 第3章 实证研究设计 .................................................................................................... 25 3.1 研究假设 ...........................................................................................................