摘要
企业并购是企业实现成本优化配置，促进企业资本有效整合的常见方式。关联并购的
数量与规模在整个并购中占有很大比重，且这种并购常常伴随着高额的溢价。近年来，随
着高溢价并购后的商誉频频“爆雷”，企业之间并购活动中可能隐藏的隧道挖掘行为所带
来的利益侵占问题也日益引起了学术界的广泛关注。尽管《公司法》规定了很多相关的法
律法规旨在对隧道挖掘行为进行约束，但因我国的利益侵占途径多种多样，法律规定也相
对滞后，无法从根本上解决问题。国外学者在此基础上进行了大量的理论探讨，但大多建
立在资本主义国家的市场经济基础之上，我国的上市公司在股权结构、政府关系等方面有
其特殊性，因此对我国上市公司关联并购过程中的隧道挖掘行为进行分析就显得尤为重要。
本文通过奥马电器关联并购中融金公司的案例，从信息不对称、隧道效应和控制权私
有收益理论出发，以关联并购为核心，对大股东实施隧道挖掘的过程和所带来的经济效应
进行了较为详细的分析，通过对其过程的剖析和公司产生的经济效应论证隧道挖掘行为的
存在，并对其成因进行总结以及提出几点可供参考的建议。
本文首先整理并阅读了国内外学者对大股东隧道效应、关联并购与其两者关系的相关
研究，紧接着阐述了本文的研究内容、研究方法以及创新点和不足之处，其次界定本文涉
及的相关概念、对所依赖的理论进行阐述，概念包括关联交易、关联并购与隧道效应，主
要的三个理论分别为信息不对称理论、隧道效应理论和控制私有收益理论，接着对案例中
交易双方奥马电器的发展历程、股权变动和中融金的基本情况进行介绍，对奥马电器关联
并购中融金的具体过程和时间线进行分析与梳理。在分析关联并购的过程中发现中融金被
高溢价评估，在高溢价的情况下奥马电器对中融金进行了两次收购，最后因业绩断崖式下
滑又将中融金以低价卖出，接着分析了奥马电器关联并购中融金后对上市公司产生的隧道
效应以及对中小股东产生的影响，首先使用事件研究法分析其产生的短期经济效应，其次
通过对关联并购前后财务指标的搜集和整理，对奥马电器的成长、盈利、运营以及偿债能
力变化进行了分析，最后通过对研究结果的分析可知奥马电器在首次收购后短期内会带来
较好的市场反应，但从二次收购、最后低价卖出和整个长期效应来看会影响公司的经济效
益以及损害中小股东的利益，论证了隧道挖掘行为的存在，最后根据整个案例分析过程及
结果总结大股东成功进行隧道挖掘行为的成因，并针对其成因提出几点可供参考的建议。
关键词：
关联并购；隧道挖掘；利益侵占；隧道效应
I

Abstract
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are a common way for companies to achieve optimal
cost allocation and promote effective integration of corporate capital. The number and scale of
affiliated mergers and acquisitions account for a large portion of the overall M&A, and such
mergers and acquisitions are often accompanied by high premiums. In recent years, with the
frequent "explosion" of goodwill after high-priced M&As, the issue of misappropriation of
benefits arising from possible hidden tunneling behavior in M&As between enterprises has also
drawn increasing attention from academic circles. Although the Company Law provides for a
number of laws and regulations aimed at regulating tunneling behavior, it is impossible to solve
the problem at root because of the various ways of benefit appropriation in China and the
lagging legal provisions. Foreign scholars have conducted a lot of theoretical discussions on this
basis, but most of them are based on the market economy of capitalist countries, and China's
listed companies have their own special characteristics in terms of shareholding structure and
government relations, so it is especially important to analyze the tunneling behavior in the
process of connected mergers and acquisitions of listed companies in China.
In this paper, we analyze the process of tunneling and the economic effects brought about
by the major shareholder through the case of Omar Homa 's affiliated merger with Zhong Rong
jin Company, and summarize the causes and make some suggestions for reference from the
theory of information asymmetry, tunneling effect and private gain of control.
This paper firstly collates and reads the relevant studies of domestic and foreign scholars
on the tunnel effect of major shareholders, connected mergers and acquisitions and their
relationship, followed by an explanation of the research content, research methods, innovations
and shortcomings of this paper, followed by a definition of the relevant concepts involved in this
paper, an explanation of the theories relied on, the concepts include connected transactions,
connected mergers and acquisitions and tunnel effect, the main three theories are information
asymmetry theory, tunnel effect theory and control private gain theory. Then, we introduce the
development history, shareholding changes and the basic information of Zhong Rong jin, and
analyze and sort out the process and timeline of the affiliated merger and acquisition of Zhong
Rong jin by Omar Homa. In the process of analyzing the affiliated M&A, we found that Zhong
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