山东工商学院硕士学位论文
摘要
在企业资产中，现金是流动性最强的资产，丰富的现金持有量能够满足企业日
常生产经营活动和投资性需求。现金的重要性在 2020年的新冠疫情期间得到了较好
体现。但持有现金的收益性较低，且较多的现金为管理层的自利行为提供了操作空
间。故企业需要权衡现金持有的收益和成本，确定最佳的现金持有量。我国民营企
业大多以家族的形式存在，学者们普遍认为家族企业相较其他类型的企业具有更高
的融资约束，且家族企业是企业和家族的结合体，在追逐经济目标的同时，也重视
家族之间非经济目标的最大化。那么家族企业这种非经济目标是否影响企业的现金
持有决策呢？两者之间是否受到某种调节因素的影响？因此，理解家族企业的现金
持有行为以及影响机制是一项重要内容。
本文以 2013—2020年中国 A股上市家族企业为研究样本，主要以社会情感财富
理论这一贴合家族企业研究领域的专门理论为依据，集中讨论家族控制权与企业现
金持有之间的相关关系以及存在的调节作用，并进一步验证家族控制权对企业现金
持有的中介渠道以及经济后果。所得研究结论如下：（1）基础回归表明，家族控制
权越高，企业现金持有越多；（2）控制类型的调节作用表明，家族控制权与企业现
金持有的正向关系在创业型家族企业中更显著；（3）政治关联和分析师关注度具有
负向调节作用，即当企业建立政治联系或受证券分析师关注越多时，家族控制权与
企业现金持有的正向关系会减弱；（4）机制检验得到，增加融资约束、降低风险承
担能力以及实施更多的社会责任战略是家族控制权影响企业现金持有的中介路径；
（5）价值检验发现，家族控制权的增强并未带来企业现金持有价值的提升，反而降
低了其持有价值。
在理论层面，本文丰富了家族企业现金持有影响因素的研究，为家族控制权如
何影响企业现金持有的理论分歧提供了新的解释思路。以往文献基于持有现金的代
理动机探讨第二类代理冲突，从而形成“联盟效应”和“掏空效应”两种不同的解
释依据，却忽视了对家族企业社会情感财富多维度的考虑。本文深化了对家族企业
非经济目标的理解，系统地阐述家族控制权的强化如何使社会情感财富目标具体渗
透到企业现金持有决策中，为进一步理解家族企业现金持有决策的影响因素提供理
论和实证依据。此外，本文从家族获取控制权的方式出发，引入控制类型作为调节
变量，探究不同类型控制下家族企业的现金持有有何差异，并分析政治关联和分析
师关注度在二者关系中所起到的调节作用，以此丰富研究内容。在实践层面，本文
对于家族企业兼顾经济目标和非经济目标、提高现金的配置效率以重视企业的长远
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摘要
发展、理性看待政治关系并不断强化自身能力、以及发挥证券分析师在资本市场中
的重要作用等方面具有启示意义。
关键词：家族控制权；现金持有；社会情感财富
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山东工商学院硕士学位论文
Abstract
Among enterprise assets, cash is the most liquid asset. Holding more cash can meet
the daily production and operation activities and investment needs of enterprises. The
importance of cash was better reflected in the 2020 COVID-19. However, the profitability
of holding cash is low, and more cash provides operation space for the self-interest
behavior of the management. Therefore, enterprises need to weigh the benefits and costs
of cash holdings to determine the best cash holdings. Most private enterprises in China
exist in the form of families. Scholars generally believe that family firms have higher
financing constraints than other types of enterprises, and family firms are the combination
of enterprises and families. While pursuing economic goals, they pay more attention to the
maximization of non-economic goals among families. So, does the non-economic goal of
family firms affect the cash holding decision of firms? Are the two variables influenced by
other moderating variables? Therefore, understanding the cash holding behavior and
influence mechanism of family firms is an important content.
This paper takes Chinese A-share listed family firms from 2013 to 2020 as the
research sample, primarily based on the distinct theory of socioemotional wealth, which
fits the research field of family firms, and focuses on the relationship between family
control and enterprise cash holding and the existing moderating mechanism, and further
verify the influence channels and economic consequences of family control on enterprise
cash holdings. The conclusions are as follows: (Ⅰ) the basic regression shows that the
higher the family control, the more cash the enterprise holds; (Ⅱ) The moderating effect of
control type shows that the positive relationship between family control and cash holding
is more significant in found-family firms; (Ⅲ) Political connection and analyst attention
have a significant and negative moderating effect. That is, when enterprises establish
political connection or are paid more attention by securities analysts, the positive
relationship between family control and enterprise cash holdings will weaken; (Ⅳ) The
mechanism test shows that increasing financing constraints, reducing risk-taking ability
and implementing more social responsibility strategies are the intermediary paths for
family control to affect enterprise cash holdings; (Ⅴ) The value test found that the
enhancement of family control did not improve the cash holding value of the enterprise,
but reduced its holding value.
At the theoretical perspective, this paper supplements the research on the factors
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