自2010年以来，交通银行、工商银行、建设银行、农业银行、中国银行等 五大国有控股银行纷纷投资保险公司，我国银行系保险公司相继成立。截至2020 年3月，我国商业银行投资控股的保险公司已有11家。长期以来，作为控股股 东的商业银行将保险公司作为一家分支机构进行管理，使得银行系保险公司在 公司治理方面存在着明显的缺陷，特别是大股东操纵公司，内部代理人控制公司， “三会一层”运作不规范，信息披露不全面、不透明，董事、监事、高管等渎职、 失职问题时有发生，利益输送的关联交易频频发生等。 本文以KL人寿保险公司为研究对象，以公司治理理论为基础，对该公司董 事会、监事会、高级管理层的人员组成、履职情况、作用影响等方面进行剖析， 指出该公司在治理方面主要存在的股权结构过度集中影响公司全面健康发展， 董事会及专业委员会建设不合理导致董事会发挥作用有限，监事会形同虚设，监 督力度不足，高级管理人员履职动力不足及市场化选聘机制不充分等问题。针对 上述问题，本文进一步分析了问题背后的原因。一方面，KL人寿保险公司股权 结构高度集中，大股东完全拥有公司的决策权，甚至将该公司当作分支机构管理， 导致董事会、监事会、高级管理层之间未形成各司其职、协同合作、相互监督的 制约和平衡机制；另一方面，董事会成员缺乏专业性、独立性，董事会决策程序 缺乏科学性，监事会监督能力有限，监督力度不足，高级管理人员激励手段单一， 长期激励不足，未建立考核和问责的机制，高级管理人员市场化选聘不充分。此 两大方面的原因导致该公司董事会、监事会、高级管理层发挥作用有限，严重降 低了公司的治理水平。 为解决KL人寿保险公司治理方面存在的问题，本文提出了相应的改进对策， 一方面，适当降低大股东持股比例，积极引进民营资本参股，形成大股东控股， 稳定的、多元化的核心股东参股，员工也适当持股的合理股权结构。另一方面， 进一步加强董事会、监事会的独立性和专业性，提升董事会、监事会的履职能力； 进一步建立健全高级管理人员的激励和约束机制，进一步完善短期激励措施，采 取长期激励措施，建立健全高级管理人员考核和责任追究机制，加大高级管理人 员的市场化选聘力度。 II 关键词：保险公司；公司治理；对策 III Abstract Since 2010, five major state-owned banks, such as Bank of Communications, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China and Bank of China, have invested in insurance companies. So far, 11 insurance companies are invested by commercial banks in China until March 2020. For a long time, commercial banks, as controlling shareholders, manage insurance companies as a branch structure, which makes banking insurance companies have obvious defects in corporate governance. In particular, major shareholders manipulate the company. Internal agents control the company, and the operation of "three meetings and one layer " is not standard. What’s worse, information disclosure is not comprehensive and opaque. In addition, dereliction of duty and dereliction of duty problems caused by directors, supervisors and executives occur from time to time, and related party transactions of benefit transfer occur frequently. Taking KL Life Insurance Company as the research object, this paper is based on the theory of corporate governance, and it analyzes the personnel composition, performance and function of the board of directors, board of supervisors and senior management of the company. Furthermore, it also points out that the excessive concentration of ownership structure affects the overall and healthy development of the company. The unreasonable board of directors and professional committees lead to the limited role of the board of directors and the non-existence of the board of supervisors. There are some problems, such as insufficient supervision, such as insufficient motivation for senior managers to perform their duties and inadequate market-oriented selection and employment mechanism. In view of the above problems, this paper further analyzes the causes of the problems. On the one hand, the ownership structure of KL Life Insurance Company is highly centralized, and the major shareholders completely own the decision-making power of the company, and even manage the company as a branch, resulting in no restriction and balance mechanism among the board of directors, the board of supervisors and senior management to perform their duties, cooperate and supervise each other. On the other hand, some problems including the lack of professionalism and independence of the members of the board of directors, 学校代码 学号 密级公开 专业硕士学位论文 KL人寿保险公司治理现状及改进对策 作者姓名：苗晓伟 导师姓名：夏西强 专业学位名称：工商管理硕士 培养院系：商学院 完成时间：2020年4月 IV the lack of scientific decision-making process of the board of directors, the limited supervision capacity of the board of supervisors, the lack of supervision, the single incentive means for senior managers, the lack of long-term incentives, the lack of assessment and accountability mechanism, the inadequate market-oriented selection and recruitment of senior managers, and so on, also worsen the situation. These two major reasons lead to the limited role of the board of directors, the board of supervisors and senior management of the company. It has seriously reduced the level of corporate governance. In order to solve the problems existing in the corporate governance of KIL Life Insurance, this paper puts forward the corresponding improvement countermeasures. On the one hand, appropriately reduce the shareholding proportion of major shareholders, actively introduce several private capital to participate in shares, and form a reasonable shareholding structure of large shareholders, stable and diversified core shareholders, and appropriate shareholding by employees. On the other hand, further strengthen the independence and professionalism of the board of directors and the board of supervisors, enhance the ability of the board of directors and the board of supervisors to perform their duties, further establish and improve the incentive and restraint mechanism for senior managers, and further improve short-term incentive measures. implement long-term incentive measures, establish and improve the assessment and accountability mechanism of senior managers, and strengthen the market-oriented selection and recruitment of senior managers. Key words: insurance company;corporate governance; countermeasures I 目录 第一章 绪论 .............................................................. 1 第一节 研究背景与研究意义 ............................................ 1 一 研究背景 ......................................................... 1 二 研究意义 ......................................................... 2 第二节 研究方法与研究内容 ............................................ 3 一 研究方法 ......................................................... 3 二 研究内容 ......................................................... 4 第二章 KL人寿保险公司治理现状分析 ................................ 6 第一节 KL人寿保险公司简介 ........................................... 6 一 KL人寿保险公司的基本情况 ......................................... 6 二 KL人寿保险公司的经营情况 ......................................... 7 三 KL人寿保险公司的组织架构情况 ..................................... 8 第二节 KL人寿保险公司治理结构情况 ................................. 10 一 股东会情况 ...................................................... 10 二 董事会及专业委员会情况........................................... 12 三 监事会情况 ...................................................... 13 四 高级管理层情况 .................................................. 14 第三节 KL人寿保险公司治理结构和治理机制存在的问题 ............... 14 一 股权结构不合理影响公司全面健康发展 ............................... 15 二 董事会及专业委员会建设不完善导致董事会发挥作用有限 ............... 15 三 监事会设置不合理导致监督职责缺位 ................................. 15 四 高级管理人员履职动力不足 ......................................... 16 II 五 高级管理人员市场化选聘不充分影响公司竞争力 ....................... 16 第三章 KL人寿保险公司治理存在问题的原因分析 .................. 17 第一节 KL人寿保险公司股权结构过度集中 ............................. 17 一 KL人寿保险公司股权结构情况分析 .................................. 17 二 KL人寿保险