创新是引领发展的第一动力。过去三四十年里，我国经济发展保持了较高的 增长速度，但高速度背后是以牺牲质量为代价的，真正的“好增长”一定是以技 术创新为基础，通过技术创新实现企业可持续发展。目前制造业企业仍存在创新 积极性不高、能力不足以及粗放式经济带来的大量资源冗余问题。冗余资源作为 企业创新活动的重要支撑，是否将不同类型的冗余资源合理配置到创新活动中将 对增强企业创新能力产生重要影响。 鉴于此，论文选取2014-2018年沪深两市的制造业公司为研究对象，以委托 代理理论、组织理论、资源基础理论以及创新理论为理论基础，论文首先确立了 制造业企业冗余资源、股权结构与研发投入的研究范式，并提出研究假设，构建 多元回归模型。随后，运用Stata14.0等计量软件对数据进行了实证检验，得到 一系列研究结论。研究发现：制造业企业已吸收冗余资源与研发投入之间呈现倒 U型曲线关系,且存在门槛效应；而未吸收冗余资源对研发投入表现为正向促进 关系。加入调节变量之后发现，股权集中度和管理者持股都会强化已吸收冗余资 源与企业研发投入的倒U型关系，不同在于股权集中度对未吸收冗余资源与企 业研发投入关系的负向调节作用存在滞后效应，而管理者持股未发挥调节作用； 无论是已吸收冗余资源还是未吸收冗余资源，其与研发投入的关系均会因企业股 权性质的不同而表现出明显差异。最后，论文提出相应的对策和建议：第一，正 确认识不同类型的冗余资源，结合实际情况确立资源的最佳储备点；第二，优化 股权结构，防止股权过度集中；第三，完善股权激励方案，健全股权激励的政策 与制度体系；第四，结合企业自身资源条件作出调整，为创新活动提供支持和保 障。 论文的研究结论有助于深化对冗余资源与企业研发投入关系的认识，可以为 制造业上市企业制定资源配置决策和创新投资决策提供一定的参考，也可为完善 企业股权结构提供一定的理论参考和经验证据。 关键词：冗余资源；股权结构；研发投入 II Abstract Innovationisthefirstdrivingforcefordevelopment.Inthepast30to40years, China'seconomicdevelopmenthasmaintainedahighgrowthrate,butbehindthehigh speedisattheexpenseofquality.Thereal"goodgrowth"mustbebasedon technologicalinnovation,andrealizethesustainabledevelopmentofenterprises throughtechnologicalinnovation.Atpresent,manufacturingenterprisesstillhavethe problemsoflowinnovationenthusiasm,insufficientcapacityandlargeamountof resourceredundancybroughtbyextensiveeconomy.Asanimportantsupportof innovationactivities,therationalallocationofdifferenttypesofslackresourcesto innovationactivitieswillhaveanimportantimpactonenhancingtheinnovation abilityofenterprises. Inviewofthis,thispaperselectsmanufacturingcompaniesinShanghaiand Shenzhenstockmarketsfrom2014to2018asresearchobjects,andtakes principal-agenttheory,organizationtheory,resource-basedtheoryandinnovation theoryastheoreticalbasis,theresearchparadigmofslackresource,ownership structureandR&Dinvestmentisdetermined,andresearchhypothesesareproposedto buildmultipleregressionmodels.Then,thedatawereempiricallytestedbyStata14.0, andaseriesofresearchconclusionswereobtained.Itisfoundthatthereisaninverted U-curverelationshipbetweentheabsorbedslackresourcesandR&Dinvestment,and thereisathresholdeffect;Thereisapositiverelationshipbetweenunabsorbedslack resourceandR&Dinvestment.Furtherresearchshowsthatbothownership concentrationandmanagerialownershipwillstrengthentheinvertedU-shaped relationshipbetweentheabsorbedslackresourcesandtheR&Dinvestmentofthe enterprise,Thedifferenceliesinthelageffectofequityconcentrationonthenegative regulationoftherelationshipbetweentheunabsorbedslackresourcesandtheR&D investmentofenterprises,However,themanagerialownershipdidnotplaya regulatoryrole;Whetherithasabsorbedslackresourcesornot,therelationship betweenitandR&Dinvestmentwillshowobviousdifferencesduetothedifferent natureofenterpriseequity.Finally,thispaperprovidethecorrespondingmeasuresand advice:First,correctlyunderstanddifferenttypesofslackresourcesandestablishthe bestreservepointofresourcesincombinationwiththeactualsituation;Second, optimizetheownershipstructuretopreventexcessiveconcentrationofequity;Third, III improvetheequityincentiveschemeandimprovethepolicyandsystemofequity incentive;Fourth,makeadjustmentsincombinationwiththeenterprise'sown resourceconditionstoprovidesupportandguaranteeforinnovationactivities. Theconclusionofthispaperishelpfultodeepentheunderstandingofthe relationshipbetweenredundantresourcesandR&Dinvestment.Itcanprovidesome referenceformanufacturinglistedenterprisestomakeresourceallocationdecision andinnovationinvestmentdecision.Itcanalsoprovidesometheoreticalreferenceand verifiedevidenceforimprovingtheownershipstructureofenterprises. KeyWords：SlackResource;OwnershipStructure;R&DInvestment IV 目录 摘要...........................................................................................................................I Abstract..........................................................................................................................II 第1章绪论................................................................................................................1 1.1研究背景.............................................................................................................1 1.2研究意义.............................................................................................................3 1.2.1理论意义......................................................................................................3 1.2.2现实意义......................................................................................................3 1.3文献综述.............................................................................................................4 1.3.1冗余资源与研发投入的研究动态..............................................................4 1.3.2股权结构与研发投入的研究动态..............................................................6 1.3.3对现有文献的评述......................................................................................9 1.4研究内容与基本框架.......................................................................................10 1.5研究方法与创新之处.......................................................................................11 1.5.1研究方法....................................................................................................11 1.5.2创新之处....................................................................................................12 第2章相关概念界定与理论基础..........................................................................13 2.1相关概念界定...................................................................................................13 2.1.1冗余资源....................................................................................................13 2.1.2研发投入....................................................................................................15 2.1.3股权结构....................................................................................................16 2.2理论基础...........................................................................................................17 2.2.1委托代理理论............................................................................................17 2.2.2组织理论....................................................................................................18 2.2.3资源基础理论............................................................................................19 2.2.4创新理论....................................................................................................20 2.3研究范式...........................................................................................................21 第3章研究假设与模型设计..................................................................................23 3.1研究假设...........................................................................................................23 3.1.1已吸收冗余资源与研发投入关系假设....................................................23 3.1.2未吸收冗余资源与研发投入关系假设....................................................25 V 3.1.3股权集中度的调节作用假设....................................................................26 3.1.4管理者持股比例的调节作用假设.....................................