无论是共时性低横向观察，抑或是历时性低纵向观察，在任何寡头垄断市场 的激烈竞争环境下，原在位企业都容易在新挑战者进入后面临竞争过程中带来的 悖论和困境：或市场份额减少，陷入“困境”；或是经营模式改变，面临“变革”； 更有可能诱发恶性竞争，“万劫不复”，这些都有可能会阻碍市场的健康发展。当 一个新的企业进入现有市场一方面会对原在位企业的市场份额以及相关企业的 利润造成冲击；另一方面，也就激活在位企业的“鲶鱼效应”让其更具有竞争力。 当前我国由于巡游车公司制的经营模式缺乏一定合理性，因此很容易造成各利益 相关者的利益分配不均，存在经营模式改变的可能性。尽管网约车的兴起会在一 定程度上解决原来巡游车服务以及数量上的一些问题，但也同时会对巡游车造成 冲击。作为社会公共交通的补充，其市场中的主体利益相互纠缠，因此，需要考 虑巡游车企业内部、巡游车企业与网约车企业、网约车企业之间，对其策略选择 和影响因素进行思考和研究。 本研究从巡游车企业角度出发，主要通过网约车对巡游车的持续冲击之下， 对巡游车企业与其利益相关者之间的博弈进行分析，并研究在持续冲击下利益相 关者的博弈选择对巡游车企业带来的影响。最终达到分析和解决持续冲击下巡游 车企业可能将面临的新问题。 研究结果表明：研究主要分为巡游车企业在实际冲击下的影响以及在预期冲 击下的影响两部分。其中对现实冲击的影响研究表明网约车对巡游车的市场影响 巨大，无论在市场份额或者巡游车驾驶员收入来看都在持续下降且巡游车企业员 工对巡游车行业多数是持悲观态度。对预期冲击的影响研究表明（1）通过演化 博弈策略的研究以及协同博弈的思考可知网约车企业之间的补贴博弈在同时补 贴点是稳定点，网约车企业之间的补贴策略是博弈必然结果，从而对巡游车市场 进一步挤压。（2）动态博弈中风险应对策略是挂靠员工随着行业竞争的加剧的必 然结果，巡游车企业和挂靠员工演化策略体现企业固有机制和挂靠员工的营业压 力之间的矛盾。（3）挂靠员工事件树是不可能无限次的进行，最终会随风险信息 的积累把退出风险转移至巡游车企业。（4）巡游车企业会随着对某些利益相关者 利益的忽视，使得挂靠员工运用风险应对策略致使经营模式发生改变，最终导致 企业经营风险的上升。 关键词 网约车；巡游车；博弈策略；利益相关者：期望值 ABSTRACT No matter synchronic low horizontal observation or diachronic low vertical observation, in the fierce competition environment of any oligopoly market, the former incumbent enterprises are easy to face the paradox and dilemma brought by the competition process after the new challenger enters: or the market share is reduced, falling into the "dilemma"; or the business model is changed, facing the "change"; it is more likely to induce vicious competition, "Irreparable", these may hinder the healthy development of the market. When a new enterprise enters the existing market, it will impact the market share of the former incumbent enterprise and the profits of related industries; on the other hand, it will activate the "catfish effect" of the incumbent enterprise to make it more competitive. At present, due to the lack of certain rationality in the operation mode of cruiser company system in China, it is easy to cause the uneven distribution of interests of all stakeholders, and there is the possibility of changing the operation mode. Although the rise of online car Hailing will solve some problems of the original cruiser service and quantity to a certain extent, it will also impact the cruiser. As the supplement of social public transport, the main interests in the market are intertwined. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the internal of patrol car enterprises, between patrol car enterprises and network car Hailing enterprises, and between them, and to think and study their strategic choice and influencing factors. From the perspective of cruiser enterprises, this study mainly analyzes the game between cruiser enterprises and their stakeholders under the continuous impact of online car hailing, and studies the impact of game selection of stakeholders on cruiser enterprises under the continuous impact. Finally, to analyze and solve the new problems that cruiser enterprises may face under the continuous impact. The results show that: the research is mainly divided into two parts: the impact of cruiser enterprises under the actual impact and the impact under the expected impact. Among them, the impact on the reality shows that online car Hailing has a great impact on the market of cruiser. Both in terms of market share and cruiser driver's income, the cruiser enterprise employees are pessimistic about the cruiser industry. The research on the impact of expected impact shows that (1) through the research of evolutionary game strategy and the thinking of collaborative game, the subsidy game between online car Hailing enterprises is stable at the same time, and the subsidy strategy among online car Hailing enterprises is the inevitable result of the game, thus further squeezing the cruiser market. (2) In the dynamic game, the risk response strategy is the inevitable result of the industry competition of affiliated employees. The evolution strategy of cruise car enterprises and affiliated employees reflects the contradiction between the inherent mechanism of enterprises and the business pressure of affiliated employees. (3) Affiliation with employee event tree is impossible to be carried out indefinitely, and the exit risk will be transferred to cruiser enterprise with the accumulation of risk information. (4) With the neglect of the interests of some stakeholders, patrol car enterprises will make affiliated employees use risk coping strategies to change the business model, and eventually lead to the rise of business risk. Keywords Online car Hailing; cruiser; game strategy; stakeholders: expected value 目录 摘要 ...... 目 录 ...... Abstract ...... 第一章 绪论 ........................... 1 1.1研究背景及意义 ............... 1 1.1.1研究背景 ........................... 1 1.1.2研究意义 ...................... 2 1.2研究内容与研究方法 ...... 2 1.2.1研究目标 ........................... 3 1.2.2研究内容 ........................... 3 1.2.3研究方法 ...................... 4 1.3研究思路与论文框架 ...... 5 1.3.1技术路线 ........................... 5 1.3.2研究思路 ........................... 6 1.3.3论文组织架构 .............. 7 第二章 文献综述与理论基础 ...................... 9 2.1文献综述 ........................... 9 2.1.1国内外研究现状 .............. 9 2.1.2研究述评 ........................ 11 2.2理论基础以及重要概念界定 ..................... 11 2.2.1理论基础 ......................... 11 2.2.1.1博弈论 ......................... 11 2.2.1.2演化博弈 ..................... 12 2.2.1.3利益相关者理论 ......... 13 2.2.2概念界定 .................... 13 2.2.2.1风险应对 ................ 14 2.2.2.2巡游车 ......................... 15 2.2.2.3网约车 .................... 15 2.2.2.4冲击 ............................. 15 2.3本文重要假设 ................ 16 2.4本章小结 ......................... 16 第三章 网约车对巡游车的冲击分析 ..... 17 3.1网约车对巡游车实际冲击分析 ................. 17 3.1.1网约车实际冲击分析调查 ............................ 18 3.1.2网约车实际冲击对利益相关者的决策影响 20 3.2网约车冲击的持续性分析 .......................... 20 3.2.1网约车竞争状况分析 ..... 20 3.2.2网约车企业-网约车企业演化博弈分析 ...... 22 3.2.3 A企业与B企业博弈系统的均衡稳定性分析......................... 29 3.3本章小结 ......................... 33 第四章 巡游车企业与挂靠员工动态博弈及事件树分析 ........................... 35 4.1巡游车企业-挂靠员工动态博弈 ................ 35 4.1.1巡游车企业-挂靠员工博弈假设及描述 ...... 35 4.1.2巡游车企业-挂靠员工动态博弈及稳定性分析 ......................... 37 4.2挂靠员工事件树演化 ... 38 4.2.1挂靠员工事件树风险决策模型假设及描述 39 4.2.2挂靠员工事件树风险决策模型演化与分析 ............................ 40 4.3本章小结 ......................... 44 第五章 巡游车企业现存经营模式与经营模式转变模型分析 ................. 46 5.1巡游车企业现存经营模式分析 ................. 46 5.1.1公司化模 ......................... 46 5.1.2个体化模式 ..................... 48 5.2巡游车企业经营模式转变模型 ................. 49 5.2.1巡游车企业经营模式转变模型假设及描述 51 5.2.2巡游车企业经营模式转变模型演化与分析 ............................ 51 5.2.3巡游企业在行业竞争加剧后的模式转