2002 年起，一些上市公司开始实施并披露高管现金薪酬激励方案，使得高管薪 酬制定有章可循并且更加透明化，这是上市公司高管薪酬制度建设上的一大进步。 本文重点研究了上市公司实施并披露高管现金薪酬激励方案对高管薪酬制定的影响 以及方案的激励效果。 本文分析了现有实证研究采用的间接证明方法存在的不足，在高管薪酬与业绩 敏感性越高则高管越有激励去提高公司业绩的隐含假定下，通过检验高管薪酬与公 司业绩的敏感性来证明高管薪酬的激励效果，但没有直接回答高管薪酬激励究竟是 否提高了公司业绩。本文的研究思路是通过直接证明的方法去检验国内上市公司高 管现金薪酬激励方案的激励效果。 实证结果显示，第一，对于披露高管现金薪酬激励方案的公司，其高管的现金 薪酬水平以及薪酬业绩敏感性显著高于其他公司；第二，民营企业披露方案的概率 低于国有企业、第一大股东持股比例越高的企业披露方案的概率越小；第三，实施 并披露方案能够显著提升公司中短期的财务业绩；最后，实施并披露方案的公司在 盈利质量指标、盈余管理程度上与对照样本公司并不存在显著差异。 上述结果表明高管薪酬制定的制度化、透明化有助于增加薪酬与业绩的敏感性 并提高公司业绩。因此本文认为应该要求上市公司披露更多高管薪酬制定的信息， 同时应该鼓励上市公司实施并披露高管现金薪酬激励方案。 关键词，现金薪酬激励方案，薪酬业绩敏感性，薪酬激励效果，薪酬方 案披露上海交通大学硕士毕业论文 2 AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON TOP MANAGEMENT CASH COMPENSATION INCENTIVE SCHEMES OF CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES ABSTRACT Some listed companies of China began to implement and disclose top management cash compensation incentive schemes since 2002, which is an important progress of top management compensation systems. This paper examines the impact of these top management cash compensation incentive schemes on the compensation setting and their incentive effects. This paper analyzes the shortcoming of indirect demonstration of the empirical study in existing literature. Under the hypothesis that top management have incentive to improve corporate performance if their compensations are highly related to corporate performance, the incentive effect of top management compensation is indirectly tested through testing the sensitivity between top management compensations and corporate performance. However, whether top management compensation incentive can really improve corporate performance is not proven. Differently, this paper is to directly prove the incentive effect of top management cash compensation incentive schemes of China’s listed companies. Empirical results suggest that: (1) companies that disclose top management cash compensation incentive schemes have significant higher top management compensation and higher compensation performance sensitivity; (2) private companies and companies with higher largest shareholder’s share percentage are less likely to implement and disclose cash compensation incentive schemes; (3) implementing and disclosing cash compensation incentive schemes can improve corporate performance; (4) there are no上海交通大学硕士毕业论文 3 significant evidences that companies that implement and disclose cash compensation incentive schemes have lower earning quality or higher discretionary accruals. This paper concludes that the systematization and transparency of top management compensation policies will increase top management compensation performance sensitivity and corporate performance. Thus, listed companies should disclose more information about top management compensation policies, and implementing top management cash compensation scheme should be encouraged. KEY WORDS: cash compensation scheme, compensation performance sensitivity, compensation incentive effect, compensation scheme disclosure上海交通大学硕士毕业论文 4 目 录 第一章 前言 .................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 研究背景 ................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 本文选题及研究意义 ............................................................................................... 4 1.3 章节安排 ................................................................................................................... 5 第二章 文献综述及研究思路 ....................................................................................... 7 2.1 文献综述 ................................................................................................................... 7 2.1.1 高管激励的基本理论 ........................................................................................ 7 2.1.2 最优契约理论 .................................................................................................... 8 2.1.3 管理层权力理论 .............................................................................................. 10 2.1.4 薪酬激励与盈余管理 ...................................................................................... 12 2.2 现有实证方法的不足 ............................................................................................. 13 2.3 本文的研究思路 ..................................................................................................... 14 2.4 本章小结 ................................................................................................................. 15 第三章 制度背景与研究框架 ..................................................................................... 16 3.1 制度背景 ................................................................................................................. 16 3.1.1 国内高管薪酬制度的发展历程 ...................................................................... 16 3.1.2 我国高管薪酬制度存在的问题 ...................................................................... 17 3.1.3 上述薪酬制度问题对本文研究的影响 .......................................................... 19 3.2 研究框架 ................................................................................................................. 20 3.3 本章小结 ................................................................................................................. 22 第四章 研究设计 ........................................................................................................ 23 4.1 研究样本与数据来源 ............................................................................................. 23 上海交通大学硕士毕业论文 5 4.2 变量说明 ................................................................................................................. 24 4.3 检验模型设计 ......................................................................................................... 27 4.3.1 披露方案与高管现金薪酬水平的检验模型 .................................................. 27 4.3.2 披露方案与高管现金薪酬业绩敏感性的检验模型 ...................................... 27 4.3.3 披露方案的公司特征的检验模型 .................................................................. 28 4.3.4 披露方案是否提高公司业绩的检验模型 ...................................................... 28 4.3.5 盈利质量与盈余管理的检验模型 .................................................................. 29 4.4 本章小结 ................................................................................................................. 30 第五章 实证结果及分析 ............................................................................................. 31 5.1 主要变量的描述性统计 ......................................................................................... 31 5.2 实证结果分析 ......................................................................................................... 32 5.2.1 披露方案与高管现金薪酬水平的检验 .......................................................... 32 5.2.2 披露方案与高管现金薪酬业绩敏感性的检验 .............................................. 38 5.2.3 披露方案的公司特征的检验 .......................................................................... 40 5.2.4 披露方案是否提高公司业绩的检验 .............................................................. 43 5.2.5 盈利质量与盈余管理的检验 .......................................