基于上述理论思路,本文以沪深A股市场中我国2001—2013年制造业海
外投资企业为样本,借鉴组织控制理论的相关原理,将企业创新决策中的母国
政治关联作为高管的重要创新动力、东道国制度环境作为高管的关键风险意
识,对两者在高管权力配置与企业海外创新绩效之间的交互影响进行实证检
验,并重点揭示了国有企业与民营企业在上述问题中的显著差异。基于分类治
理背景,对制度双元性下的髙管权力与企业海外创新绩效之间关系进行了研
宄。主要的研究发现:
第一,无论是国有还是民营企业,董事会监控、高管任期总体上与企业海
外创新绩效显著负相关;相对于国有企业,高管两职兼任对民营企业海外创新
绩效有着更为显著的负面影响,而高管年薪的人力资本定价功能和股权比例的
管理防御效应对民营企业海外创新绩效分别起着更为显著的积极与消极影响
第二,相对于国有企业,民营企业中的母国政治关联在两职兼任、董事会
监管和海外创新绩效关系方面都发挥更显著的调节作用。其中,董事会监控力
in 度会因母国政治关联中高管权力强化效应而得到增加,不利于企业海外创新绩
效;两职兼任引发的管理防御效应对企业海外创新绩效的不利影响受到母国政
治关联反向积极的调节作用;相对于民营企业,国有企业高管连任所产生的对
企业海外创新绩效更为不利的特色影响受到了母国政治关联更为显著的反向调
节作用
第三,无论是国有企业还是民营企业,东道国制度完善性在董事会监管、
海外创新绩效和年薪报酬方面都有着显著的调节作用。其中,董事会监控的权
力约束效应对企业海外创新绩效的不利影响因东道国制度完善而得到强化;高
管年薪的人力资本定价功能对企业海外创新绩效的有利影响,受到东道国制度
完善性的正向强化的积极作用。相对于民营企业,国有企业中高管连任所产生
的对企业海外创新绩效更为不利的特色影响,被东道国制度环境完善性的创新
支持作用反向调节后更为显著
关键字:制度双元性;海外投资企业;高管权力特征;海外创新
IV Abstract
With the rapid development of economic globalization, more and more
enterprises in developing countries invest overseas directly to gain sustainable
competitiveness in a large market. Notably, the development rate of the investment
abroad of emerging economies9 enterprises is catching up with and surpass
developed countries’- In particular, Chinese enterprises overseas investment is
entering the accelerated stage, China has become the focus of global multinational
enterprises to investment. As the issue and chief executive of the investment strategy
decision of the overseas investment enterprises, the managers9 concept and behavior
play a key role in the development of enterprises. And they are the most important
resource of the enterprises. Their demographic characteristics, especially the
characteristics of power incentives in corporate governance, will have an important
impact on corporate innovation and external risk perception preferences. And then
affect tiieir behavior and enterprise innovation performance. In view of the current
changes and challenges faced by Chinese enterprises overseas investment. That is,
there is an urgent need for overseas innovation and they must face a high degree of
innovation risk in a multinational environment at the same time. Therefore,in the
new period of transformation and upgrading of Chinese manufacturing enterprises to
go out. It has great practical significance and academic value to explore the
relationship between the executive power and the performance of overseas
innovation.
Based on the above theoretical ideas, this paper takes the manufacturing
overseas investment enterprises in China from 2001 to 2013 of Shanghai and
Shenzhen A share market as samples .And we draw on the experiences of the related
principle of organizational control theory, with the overseas investment enterprises in
China^s listed companies as the object. We let the home country political association
in enterprise innovation decisions as an important innovation power of the executive
and the host country institutional environment as the key risk consciousness of
v executives, to examine their regulation effects between overseas innovation
performance of enterprise and managerial power allocation by empirical test. And
focus on revealing the significant differences between state-owned enterprises and
private enterprises at the above-mentioned problems. Based on the empirical
comparison of different ownership enterprises, this paper studies the relationship
between executive power and corporate overseas innovation performance under the
institutional duality. The main findings are as follows:
First, whether state-owned or private enterprises, board monitoring and
executive tenure are significantly negatively correlated with corporate overseas
innovation performance. Compared with state-owned enterprises, the two duties of
executives have a more significant negative impact on private enterprises&39; overseas
innovation performance. The human capital pricing flinction of executive salary and
the managerial entrenchment effect of equity ratio play a more significant positive
and negative impact on private enterprises&39; overseas innovation performance
respectively.
Second, compared with the state-owned enterprises, the home country political
association of private enterprises plays a more significant role on the board of
directors, two part-time and overseas innovation performance. Among them, the
supervision of the board of directors will be increased caused by the strengthening
effect of executive power in the home country political association, it’s not
conducive to the enterprise overseas innovation performance. The adverse effects on
overseas innovation performance of enterprises caused by management defensive
effect caused by two part-time are reverse regulated positively by the home country
political association. Compared with private enterprises, the adverse effects on the
overseas innovation performance of enterprises caused by executive re-election of
state-owned enterprises are reverse regulated more significant by the home country
political association.
Third, whether state-owned enterprises or private enterprises, the perfection of
host country system plays a significant regulation role in board regulation, annual
salary and overseas innovation performance. Among them, the adverse
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