通过顶岗实习，学生可以提高自己的实践动手能力，酒店可以节省劳动力成本，
培养自己的员工。但在酒店与实习生之间形成的委托—代理关系中，无论是委托
人（酒店），还是代理人（实习生），都会出现道德风险行为，从而导致酒店在实
习生管理方面的低效率和酒店业人才的流失。

关于酒店实习生管理中道德风险的成因，本文认为，首先，由于实习生出于
学习的目的进店顶岗实习，而酒店是出于节省成本的目的接收实习生，双方都追
求各自利益最大化，从而导致实习生与酒店间主体利益不一致；其次，由于酒店
在实习生面试时简单随意和实习生入职后与酒店之间缺少完善的信息沟通渠道，
而导致实习生与酒店间信息不对称；最后，由于客观存在的不确定因素导致了双
方无法订立完备的契约对双方行为进行有效约束。

本文以青岛酒店管理职业技术学院酒店管理专业实习生为调查对象，采取问
卷调查与访谈相结合的方法，收集大量数据进行实证分析，从实习生的角度出发，
了解酒店在实习生管理中存在的各种信息不对称问题，并对实习生的道德风险行
为进行分析。结果发现，实习生的信息获取情况对实习生道德风险行为影响最大，
而酒店主动与实习生的信息沟通情况则在很大程度上会影响到实习生日后在酒
店的就业意向。

据此本文认为，酒店应该转变观念，把实习生看作是酒店的“潜在竞争力”，
并与之建立良好的信息传播途径，以规避酒店与实习生间的信息不对称；整个酒
店行业要建立实习生市场声誉系统，以规避实习生的道德风险；学校可以代表实
习生与酒店建立激励合同，从而规避酒店管理者的道德风险。

本文的创新之处在于从企业管理的维度去研究顶岗实习，并将道德风险理论
有效应用于酒店顶岗实习管理领域之中。文章分别从实习生和酒店管理者两个角
度分析了信息不对称的情况下出现的道德风险问题，希望可以为酒店管理者提供
一种全新的思路。

关键词：酒店；实习生管理；道德风险；委托—代理
II
Research on Moral Rask in Hotel Trainee Management
Abstract
Hotel internship is a necessary way for higher vocational schools to train qualified
hotel waiters and managers. Through the hotel internship, not only students could
improve their practice ability, but also the hotel could save laber cost and develop its
empolee in advance. In the principal-agent between hotel and trainee, both of them
would have moral risk, which cost hotel trainee management inefficiently and hotel
brain drain.
According this thesis, the following three factors cost moral risk in hotel trainee
management. Firstly, for the trainee, the object of internship is study, but for the hotel,
it is cost saving. Both of them want the best benefit, so the interest is different
between them; Secondly, because of the simple trainee interview and imperfect
connection channel, the information between the hotel and trainee is anisomerous;
Thirdly, uncertain factors in the objective environment cost no perfect contract
between the hotel and trainee.
Based on the investigation and interview of the students majored in hotel
management in Qingdao Hotel Management College, this thesis makes an information
asymmetry analysis between the hotel and trainee. The conclusions are that the trainee
moral risk is effected most by how many information the trainee can get from the
hotel and the quantity of information the hotel want to deliver to trainee would effect
the trainee’s work willness in hotel in the future.
In a word, hotel managers should change their attitude to take the trainee as
potential competitive power and build a better connection channel, so that the
information asymmetry between hotel and trainee could be avoid. The whole
hospitality shoud build a trainee market reputation system to avoid trainee moral risk.
On behalf of the students, the college could sign a motivation contract with hotel to
avoid hotel managers moral aisk.
The innovation of this thesis is that the hotel internship management is studied
from business management angle, and moral risk theory is applied effectively. This
thesis analyses the moral risk cost by information asymmetry from trainee and hotel,
so that a new idea could be put forward for all of the hotel managers.
Keyword：Hotel, Trainee Management, Moral Risk, Principal-agent
III
目录
1绪论1
1.1 研究背景和现状 .......... 1
1.1.1研究背景... 1
1.1.2研究现状... 2
1.2 基本概念界定5
1.3 研究的方法和思路 ........ 6
1.3.1研究方法... 6
1.3.2研究思路... 7
1.4创新点....... 7
2酒店顶岗实习这一委托代理关系中存在的道德风险 ......... 8
2.1委托—代理关系中的道德风险 8
2.2实习生存在的道德风险.... 10
2.3实习生管理者存在的道德风险.......... 11
3酒店实习生管理中的道德风险成因分析 ...... 12
3.1实习生与酒店间主体利益不一致........ 12
3.2实习生与酒店间信息的不对称性........ 13
3.2.1实习生面试时，招聘过程简单随意.... 13
3.2.2实习生入职后，酒店与实习生之间缺少完善的信息沟通渠道...... 14
3.3实习生与酒店间契约的不完备性........ 15
4酒店实习生管理状况调查与实证分析 ........ 15
4.1问卷调查说明 15
4.2 研究的假设 . 16
4.3 研究样本与资料收集 ..... 17
4.3.1问卷设计.. 17
4.3.2样本选取.. 17
4.3.3样本资料的分析方法.... 18
4.4 数据分析与讨论 ......... 18
4.4.1问卷数据的检验........ 18
4.4.2问卷样本结构分析...... 21
4.4.3问卷数据均值分析...... 22
4.4.4问卷数据相关性分析.... 26
4.4.5问卷数据回归分析...... 28
5研究结论与建议 . 29
5.1 研究结论 ... 29
5.2 对实习生管理的建议 ..... 29
5.2.1转变观念，把实习生看作是酒店的“潜在竞争力”.. 29
IV
5.2.2建立良好的信息传递途径，规避酒店与实习生间的信息不对称.... 30
5.2.3建立实习生市场声誉系统，规避实习生道德风险.... 31
5.2.4建立激励合同，规避酒店管理者道德风险.......... 32
参考文献 ......... 33
附录35
致谢37
个人简历与发表的学术论文 ..... 38