Historical perspective of Japanese product development The post-war Japanese competitive strategy evolved from one of low wages (1945-1950s; labor-intensive industries such as textiles), to capital-intensive scale economies as rising wage rates eroded the advantage of low labor rates (1960s–early 1970s; market penetration and automation-steel, shipbuilding, autos, consumer electronics), to focussed production (late 1970s and 1980s; high-volume segments and establishing a production facility that minimized complexity), to flexible production (producing a range of products on the same production line using just-in-time inventory techniques to provide both lower cost and greater variety in a shorter time and with a shorter life cycle) (Musselwhite, 1990). This was done by absorbing foreign technologies and making continuous improvements while maintaining quality consciousness (Best, 1990). Taiichi Ohno, Chief Engineer at Toyota during the 1950s, learned many valuable lessons from Detroit which would later be instrumental in the way the Japanese economy prospered. He found a way to reduce the time required to change dies from a day to three minutes. He discovered that it cost less to make small batches, since making small batches eliminated the carrying costs of huge inventories required by mass production techniques. Making only a few parts before assembling them caused mistakes to show up almost immediately. This caused Ohno to concentrate on quality to eliminate the waste of large numbers of defective parts. To make this system work, Ohno needed both an extremely skilled and a highly motivated workforce. As a result of a post-war strike, an agreement was worked out between the company and the union: employees were guaranteed lifetime employment and their pay would be steeply graded by seniority rather than by specific job function and was to be tied to company profitability through bonus payments. This essentially made the employees members of the Toyota family, with rights of access to Toyota facilities (housing, recreation, clubs, etc.). The employees also agreed to be flexible in work assignments and to initiate improvements rather than merely respond to problems. Hence, the Japanese labor policy was born (Womack et al., 1990). 汉译： 战后的日本人具有竞争性的策略从低薪之一进化 诸如纺织品)的(1945-1950s;劳动强烈工业，对于首都强烈 规模经济当升起的工资率腐蚀低的劳动率的优势时 ( 1960s–early七十年代； 市场突破和自动化钢，shipbuilding， 汽车，消费者电子学)，对于集中的生产(晚七十年代和八十年代； 高的卷片断和建立最大限度地减少的一种生产方便 复杂性)，对于灵活的生产(生产上的产品的一个范围 使用公正没有时间总量技术来两个都提供的同样的生产线 不久以及带有一个较短的生命周期)的低的费用和较更大的品种 ( Musselwhite，1990 )。 这被吸收外国的技术完成和 当保持优质的意识时制定连续的改进 (最好，1990年)。 Taiichi Ohno，Toyota的总工程师在五十年代期间，学习许多 来自将稍晚按照方式是仪器的的底特律的有价值的课 日本的经济繁荣。 他发现一种方式减少时间 需要改变向三分钟死于一天。 他发现它 较少耗费做小的批，自从成为小的批以来除去 携带被大批量的生产技术要求的巨大的总量的费用。 在集合他们之前做仅仅几部分使错误显示 几乎立即。 这使Ohno把质量集中于到 除去大的若干数字的有缺点的部分的浪费。 为了做这系统 工作，Ohno需要极端熟练和高度激发的workforce。 由于一种战后的打击，一个协议在之间被制定 公司和联合： 雇员寿命得到保证 就业和他们的报酬将是陡峭的由资历分等级而非 具体的工作发挥作用并且是通过牵制于公司收益 红利付款。 这实质上做的雇员成员 Toyota家庭，接触Toyota设施(住房，娱乐，的权力 俱乐部等等)。 雇员也同意在工作任务中是灵活的 同时，开始改进而非仅仅对问题作出反应。 因此， 日本人劳动政策出生( Womack et al.，1990年)。