近年来，由于环境污染、资源匮乏、能源的不合理利用等问题日益严重， 绿色可持续发展已成为全球各界共同关注的焦点，许多国家和企业已经陆续开 展绿色经济实践。一方面政府制定补贴、税收等环境政策对企业生产运营进行 监督，引导和激励企业采取绿色行为；另一方面，随着消费者绿色消费意识和 对绿色产品认知力的不断提高，许多企业积极主动地投入到绿色实践中。但是 我国目前绿色发展仍处于起步阶段，企业实施绿色行为前期投入成本大，绿色 生产技术能力不足，因此政府有必要对企业提供合理的财政补贴，以激发企业 不断提高自身绿色化水平。同时，针对企业非绿色行为，也应当实施相应的经 济惩罚。 本文基于我国绿色供应链和绿色产品市场的发展现状，借鉴国内外环境规 制和企业绿色行为相关文献和实践经验，运用委托—代理理论、最优控制论、 微分博弈、演化博弈和系统动力学理论方法，考虑了绿色供应链运营中关于逆 向选择和长期动态的现实问题，构建了政企之间和供应链成员间的合作契约， 以探究政府环境规制下供应链的绿色决策问题，并为政府环境政策的制定和企 业绿色实践提供理论参考。本文主要内容如下： (1) 探究了政府采购中针对制造商绿色决策的激励机制设计。针对产品绿 色度信息的不对称问题，设计了政府与制造商之间一次性转移支付契约和收益 共享契约。通过显示原理得到各契约下政府转移支付、绿色产品订购量以及产 品绿色度的均衡解，并结合我国现阶段绿色产品发展情况，分析了各契约甄别 真实信息和激励制造商提高产品绿色度的实施条件和效果；进一步提出了基于 纳什协商模型的非线性协调契约，实现政府和企业收益的帕累托改进；在政府 采购再制造喷墨打印机过程中采取弹性比例收益共享契约，验证了弹性比例契 约对政府甄别产品真实绿色度、提升企业绿色水平的积极作用。 (2) 从长期动态角度研究政府不同补贴形式下的供应链绿色决策问题。基 于无政府参与、政府一次性补贴机制、政府单位补贴机制三种模式，构建了由 单个制造商和单个零售商组成的二级供应链系统，运用微分博弈研究制造商绿 浙江工业大学博士学位论文 II 色生产努力程度、产品定价以及零售商对绿色产品的广告宣传努力程度随时间 变化的轨迹，并对比分析了各模式下的产品绿色度、产品商誉和供应链收益； 针对我国新能源汽车行业现状展开研究，表明两种政府补贴形式对提高产品绿 色度、产品商誉和供应链收益均具有积极影响，且一次性政府补贴对新能源汽 车发展更具激励性。 (3) 探究了供应链上下游成员长期动态合作机制的设计。将制造商和零售 商独立决策扩展到制造商和零售商建立合作机制的研究，提出了制造商分担零 售商广告宣传成本契约，分析了政府不同补贴形式下的供应链决策问题。考虑 新能源汽车生产商和经销商建立长期成本分担契约，并就产品绿色度、产品商 誉和供应链收益与独立决策进行对比，表明成本分担契约有利于提高经销商广 告宣传的积极性，从而提高了产品商誉，促进供应链整体效益的提高。 (4) 探究了奖惩机制下政府监管与供应链绿色决策的演化过程。结合支付 矩阵和复制动态方程构建了上游供应商、下游制造商绿色行为决策和政府监管 的演化博弈模型，讨论了单方决策的演化稳定状态。建立系统动力学模型，结 合电子产品供应链案例分析局部均衡策略的稳定性，并探讨了初始策略的选 择、政府奖励和惩罚程度三个因素对各群体演化路径的影响。研究表明：在长 期博弈过程中，政府加大绿色补贴和惩罚力度，能激励企业采取绿色行为；在 对我国电子产品供应链的实践研究中发现，政府应首先对下游制造商进行激 励，其绿色行为会进一步影响上游供应商进行绿色原材料的生产。 本论文基于信息不对称、政府规制方式、供应链长期动态博弈三个视角， 重点探讨了政府环境规制下企业的绿色决策问题以及供应链企业之间、政府和 企业之间的合作和激励关系。将理论结果分别结合政府再制品采购、新能源汽 车行业以及电器电子产品产业的实践案例，为我国绿色产业的建设和发展、对 我国政府可持续发展战略的制定和实施提供了一些现实指导建议。 关键词：绿色决策，环境规制，激励机制，博弈分析，契约设计 基于政府规制的绿色供应链动态决策研究 III RESEARCH ON GREEN SUPPLY CHAIN DYNAMIC DECISION-MAKING BASED ON GOVERNMENT REGULATION ABSTRACT In recent years, the increasingly serious problems on environmental pollution, lack of resources, and irrational use of energy, sustainable development has attracted attention from all of the world, and many countries and enterprises have gradually carried out green practices. On the one hand, governments have formulated environmental policies such as subsidies and taxes in enterprises, so as to supervise the production and operation of enterprises, to guide and encourage them to adopt green behaviors. On the other hand, the improvement of consumers' awareness on green consumption and more acknowledge of green products stimulate enterprises to implement green practices. However, the development of green products and green supply chain in China are still in its infancy. Enterprises should bear high initial investment costs for taking green behaviors and have limited ability to adopt green production technology. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to provide enterprises with financial subsidies to improve their greening level. At the same time, for non-green enterprises, economic punishments should also be implemented. Based on the development status of China's green supply chain and green product market, and by reviewing domestic and foreign literature and practical experience about environmental regulations and corporates’ green behaviors, this article uses principal-agent theory, optimal control theory, differential game, evolutionary game and system dynamics to carry out the research. Taking adverse selection and long-term dynamics into consideration, the author constructs cooperative contracts between government and enterprises or members of the supply chain to explore the green behavior of enterprises and the decision-making of green 浙江工业大学博士学位论文 IV supply chains under different government environmental regulations. The results provide insights into the policy-making of governments and enterprises management on sustainable development. The main contents of this article are as follows. (1) The incentive mechanism on manufacturer’s green decision-making in the process of government procurement is explored. In view of asymmetric information about product greenness, lump-sum transfer and fixed- and flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contracts are developed. Furthermore, a non-linear coordination contract is proposed, in which manufacturers disclose their true private information and maximize members' own benefit as well as optimize overall benefit. Revelation principle is used to obtain the solutions of government transfer payments, ordering quantities for green products, and product greenness under the contracts. Combined with the green product development status in China, whether the contract could reveal true green-degree and impel manufacturers to improve their product's green-degree is examined. In the case of government procurement on remanufactured inkjet printers, the flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contract is adopted, which verifies the positive effect of the flexible proportional contract on the government to identify the true greenness of products and strengthen the green level of enterprises. (2) From the perspective of long-term dynamics, supply chain’s green decision- making under different forms of government subsidies is studied. A two-tier supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer without government participation, under lump-sum subsidy mechanism and under unit subsidy mechanism is constructed, separately. Differential game is used to obtain trajectories of manufacturer’s green production effort, pricing decision, and retailer’s effort to advertise green products. Product green-degree, product goodwill, and supply chain benefits under each model are also compared and analyzed. Combined with the development of new energy vehicle industry in China, the impacts of the two subsidy modes on the greenness, goodwill, and profits of manufacturer and dealer of new energy vehicles are compared. Research shows that two forms of government subsidies both have a positive impact on improving product greenness, product goodwill, and supply chain’s profit. In view of the current state of new energy vehicle industry in China, the lump-sum government subsidy can better stimulate the development of new energy vehicles. (3) Long-term dynamic cooperation mechanism between upstream and downstream members of the supply chain is designed. The independent decisions of 基于政府