摘要 中国A股上市公司在2014年末开启牛市之后，2015年至2017年上市公司 并购事件频频出现，并购金额也不断增加。公司并购伴随着产生商誉，然而随 着国民经济面临下行周期，中美贸易摩擦加剧，居民消费能力由增长趋于平稳， 因前期并购产生的商誉如同悬挂在A股市场的“达摩克利斯之剑”。2018年， 多家上市公司对商誉计提了减值准备，商誉减值损失的金额和计提商誉减值的 上市公司数量创下新高，上市公司是否通过商誉减值准备进行“洗大澡”，公 司治理如何影响商誉减值，是本文关注与研究的重点。 为了回答以上提出的问题，本文选取了自2007年实行《企业会计准则》以 来至2018年上市公司商誉减值余额与商誉减值损失额的数据，对此进行了统计 分析。本文分别统计了2007年至2018年存在商誉余额的上市公司数量、累计 的商誉余额、上市公司计提的商誉减值损失累计发生额和计提商誉减值损失的 上市公司数量。本文研究发现，在主板上市公司比创业板上市公司计提的商誉 减值损失额要更多一些，但平均商誉减值损失比例要更低。国有企业计提的商 誉减值损失金额要低于个人控制的民营企业，计提的减值损失占原值的比例也 更低一些。由“四大”审计的上市公司计提的商誉减值损失金额要小于非“四 大”审计的上市公司，计提的比例也低一些。为了进一步研究上述现象产生的 原因，本文选取了上市公司长电科技的案例进行细致的分析研究。 本文比较了证监会、交易所、财政部会计准则委员会对于商誉减值问题的 规范和指引，发现监管部门主要通过制定审议程序和信息披露规则对商誉减值 进行管理。股东主要通过提名董事、监事、高管实现对上市公司的控制，本文 分析发现在长电科技董事长和多名高管发生变动的当年，上市公司计提了巨额 减值准备，也导致了当年巨额亏损。在长电科技的股东由民营企业变为国有企 业后，有财务背景的独立董事达到了独董的三分之二，说明国有企业对于财务 事项的关注要更为严格，国有企业管理层在进行商誉减值时更加谨慎。长电科 技改聘“四大”作为审计机构后，审计费明显上升。新任会计师事务所安永在 管理层计提商誉减值的2018年也采取了更为谨慎的审计程序，对商誉减值的信 息披露较为完整充分，但对于财务报表使用者来说，商誉信息披露的价值仍然 较为有限。另外，本文发现保荐机构对于商誉减值的影响较为有限，保荐机构 摘要 仅在上市公司持续督导期间内有督导义务，对督导期外的事项没有检查义务。 通过上述案例分析，本文归纳出，市场监管机构对于商誉减值所要求的信 息披露仍存在进一步完善空间，现有的信息披露内容完整性和有效性不足。在 由个人控制的民营企业变为国有企业后，长电科技计提商誉减值时更为谨慎， 尤其是被收购企业连续3年亏损的情况下仍未计提过商誉减值。即使是国有企 业，在董事长及多名高管改换的当年，公司也通过商誉减值进行了盈余管理， 且审计机构为“四大”仍不能完全遏制这种现象。公司非公开发行股票的保荐 机构也未谨慎履行对商誉减值导致的业绩大幅下滑进行专项现场检查的持续督 导义务。 本文选取了集成电路封测行业的龙头企业长电科技作为研究案例，在国家 集成电路产业基金的助力下，长电科技并购了星科金朋，一跃成为世界第三大 集成电路封测企业，该案例具有较高的研究价值。在2018年众多上市公司计提 商誉减值进行盈余管理的大背景下，本文选择了市场监管、内部治理、外部审 计、保荐机构监督等多个因素如何影响商誉减值进行研究，研究的方向有一定 的创新性，对未来改善治理因素有较高的实用价值。通过对案例的分析研究， 本文提出建立上市公司监管信息平台，对达到监管预警标准的重大事项，要求 上市公司按照标准格式进行信息披露，研究建议具有一定的创新性。 关键词：商誉减值，公司治理，信息披露 ABSTRACT TITLE Research on the Influence of Corporate Governance on Goodwill Impairment of Listed Companies - Based on the Case Study of Changjiang Electronics Technology ABSTRACT After the bull market of A-share listed companies started at the end of 2014, mergers and acquisitions of listed companies occurred frequently from 2015 to 2017, and the amount of mergers and acquisitions continued to increase. Company mergers and acquisitions are accompanied by goodwill. However, as the national economy faces A downward cycle, Sino-US trade frictions increase, and household consumption power tends to stabilize from growth. The goodwill generated by earlier mergers and acquisitions is like the "Sword of Damocles" hanging in the A-share market. In 2018, a number of listed companies have made provision for goodwill impairment. The amount of goodwill impairment loss as well as the number of listed companies making provision for goodwill impairment have reached a new peak. This paper focuses on whether listed companies have taken a Big Bath through goodwill impairment preparation and how corporate governance affects goodwill impairment. In order to answer the questions raised above, this paper selects the data of goodwill impairment balance and goodwill impairment loss of listed companies from the implementation of accounting standards for business enterprises in 2007 to 2018 for statistical analysis. The number of listed companies with goodwill balance from 2007 to 2018, the accumulated goodwill balance, the accumulated amount of goodwill impairment loss accrued by listed companies and the number of listed companies with goodwill impairment loss accrued were respectively counted. It is found that companies listed on the main board have more goodwill impairment losses than those listed on the growth enterprise board, while the average proportion of goodwill ABSTRACT impairment losses is lower. The amount of impairment loss of goodwill withdrawn by state-owned enterprises is lower than that by private enterprises controlled by individuals, and the proportion of impairment loss in the original value is also lower. The amount of goodwill impairment loss accrued by listed companies audited by the "Big Four" is less than that of listed companies not audited by the "Big Four", and the proportion of goodwill impairment loss accrued is also lower. In order to study further on the causes of the above phenomenon, this paper selects the listed company Changjiang Electronics Technology case for detailed analysis and research. This paper compares the supervision of the Securities Regulatory Commission, the Stock Exchange and the accounting standards board of the Ministry of Finance on goodwill impairment, indicating that the goodwill impairment is mainly supervised by review procedures and information disclosure rules. Shareholders mainly achieve the control of listed companies by nominating directors, supervisors and senior executives. This paper finds that in the year when Changjiang Electronics's chairman and several senior executives changed, the company calculated huge impairment provisions, led to huge losses in that year. After the shareholders of Changjiang Electronics changed from private enterprises to state-owned enterprises, the number of independent directors with financial background reached 2/3. This reveals that state-owned enterprises should pay more attention to financial matters, and the management of state-owned enterprises should be more cautious when carrying out goodwill impairment. Changjiang Electronics hired the "Big Four" as audit institutions, led to significantly increase on audit fees. The new accounting firm EY also adopted a more cautious audit process in 2018 when the management recorded the impairment of goodwill, and disclosed more complete and sufficient information about the impairment of goodwill. However, for users of financial statements, the value of goodwill information disclosure is still limited. In addition, the paper claims that sponsor organizations have a relatively limited impact on goodwill impairment. Sponsor organizations only have supervision obligations during the continuous supervision period of listed companies, and have no inspection obligations for matters outside the supervision period. Through the analysis of above cases, this paper concludes that there is still room for ABSTRACT further improvement of information disclosure required by market regulators for goodwill impairment, and the existing information disclosure content integrity and effectiveness are insufficient. After the private enterprises controlled by individuals become state-owned enterprises, Changjiang Electronics is more cautious when calculating goodwill impairment, especially when the acquired enterprises have been in deficit for 3 consecutive years without calculating goodwill impairment. Even state-owned enterprises managed e