在我国市场经济体制深入发展的大环境下，企业并购重组热情高涨，很多企业希望通过 并购的方式实现产业结构优化升级，扩大企业规模，获取超额收益，提高市场地位，应对日 益激烈的市场竞争。随着并购活动的繁荣，并购商誉的规模也呈现逐年上升趋势，对资本市 场的影响可想而知。审计师是上市公司并购商誉信息的重要使用者之一，上市公司并购活动 和并购商誉会对审计师的决策和行为产生重要影响，同时，审计师作为资本市场的“守门人”， 可通过提供专业、公允、客观的审计服务，有效监督市场运行，促进资本市场健康发展，探 讨并购商誉与审计师行为之间的关系具有重要意义。 本文首先阐述了相关理论基础，接着对并购商誉、审计师行为的重要研究成果进行文献 综述，然后，以我国2012-2017年A股非金融保险行业上市公司为研究样本，实证检验并购 商誉对审计师行为的影响，以及产权性质在两者中的调节作用，进一步地，运用中介效应模 型检验并购商誉影响审计师行为的具体路径，以及并购商誉发生减值时对审计师行为造成的 影响，丰富并购商誉与审计师行为方面的研究。 本文得出以下结论：（1）并购商誉影响审计师行为，对于存在并购商誉的上市公司，审 计师会收取更多的审计费用、延长审计报告时滞；（2）在不同的产权性质下，并购商誉对审 计师行为的影响有所不同，具体表现为并购商誉在国有企业中对审计师行为的影响有所弱化； （3）并购商誉对审计师行为的影响呈现阶段性特征，在其引发的可能风险还没有显性化之前， 即并购商誉还未发生减值时，并购商誉增加上市公司经营风险，使得审计师提高审计收费、 延长审计报告时滞；而在并购商誉风险显性化为商誉减值之后，则还会导致审计师出具非标 准无保留审计意见。 关键词:并购商誉，审计收费，审计报告时滞，审计意见，审计师行为 II Abstract In the context of the in-depth development of China's market economic system, the enthusiasm for corporate M & A activities has increased. Many companies hope to optimize and upgrade the industrial structure through M & A activities, expand the scale of the enterprise, obtain excess returns, improve their market position, and respond to increasingly fierce market competition. With the prosperity of M & A activities, the scale of merger goodwill also shows an upward trend year by year, and the impact on the capital market can be imagined. The auditor is one of the important users of the information on merger goodwill of listed companies. M & A activities and merger goodwill of listed companies will have an important impact on the decision-making and behavior of the auditors. At the same time, As the "gatekeeper" of the capital market, auditors can effectively monitor market operations, and promote the healthy development of the capital market, by providing professional, fair and objectiveand audit services. It is important to explore the relationship between merger goodwill and auditor behavior. Firstly, this article elaborates the relevant theoretical basis. Secondly, it conducts a literature review of important research results of merger goodwill and auditor behavior. Then, it takes China's A-share non-financial and non-insurance listed companies from 2012 to 2017 as research samples to empirically test the impact of merger goodwill on auditors' behavior and the moderating role of property rights. Furthermore, the intermediary effect model is used to test the specific path that merger goodwill affects the behavior of auditors, and the impact of merger goodwill on auditors 'behavior when it is impaired, which will enrich the research on merger goodwill and auditors' behavior. This article draws the following conclusions: (1) Merger goodwill affects the behavior of auditors. For listed companies with merger goodwill, auditors will charge more audit fees and extend the time lag of audit reports; (2) Under different property rights, the impact of merger goodwill on auditors 'behavior is different, which is specifically manifested in state-owned enterprises, where the impact of merger goodwill on auditors' behavior is weakened; (3) The impact of merger goodwill on the auditor's behavior is characterized by stage. Before the possible risk caused by merger goodwill has not been made explicit, that is, when the merger goodwill has not been impaired, merger goodwill leads to an increase in business risk, which makes auditors increase audit fees and extend the audit report time lag; and after the merger reputation risk is manifested as III goodwill impairment, it will lead to non-standard audit opinions. Keywords: merger goodwill, audit fee, audit report time lag, audit opinion, auditor behavior IV 目录 第一章 绪论 ..............................................................................................................................................................1 研究背景 .....................................................................................................................................................1 研究意义 .....................................................................................................................................................2 1.2.1 理论意义 ..........................................................................................................................................2 1.2.2 实践意义 ..........................................................................................................................................2 研究内容 .....................................................................................................................................................3 研究方法 .....................................................................................................................................................4 可能的创新点 .............................................................................................................................................5 第二章 理论基础与文献综述 ..................................................................................................................................6 理论基础 .....................................................................................................................................................6 2.1.1 信号传递理论 ..................................................................................................................................6 2.1.2 委托代理理论 ..................................................................................................................................6 2.1.3 社会责任理论 ..................................................................................................................................6 并购商誉的文献综述 .................................................................................................................................7 2.2.1 并购商誉概念及影响因素 ..............................................................................................................7 2.2.2 并购商誉经济后果 ..........................................................................................................................9 2.2.3 并购商誉减值 ................................................................................................................................10 审计师行为的文献综述 ........................................................................................................................... 11 2.3.1 审计收费 ........................................................................................................................................ 11 2.3.2 审计意见 ........................................................................................................................................12 2.3.3 审计报告时滞 ................................................................................................................................13 研究评述 ...................................................................................................................................................14 第三章 研究设计 ....................................................................................................................................................15 理论分析 ........................................................