高科技企业是国家自主创新的重要推动力，是国民经济的支柱，对国家的发 展尤为关键。董事会治理是公司治理的核心，是提升企业竞争优势的制度保证， 对高科技企业而言更是如此。目前，我国高科技企业董事会治理的合规性明显改 善，但有效性偏低。所以，如何提高高科技企业的董事会治理绩是国家及企业亟 须解决的重要难题。高科技企业具有高知识性、高技术性、高成长性等特点，董 事会资本这种稀缺、重要资源对高科技企业的发展非常重要。鉴于此，本文以高 科技企业为研究对象，基于董事会治理相关理论，研究董事会资本与董事会治理 绩效之间的关系及高管激励的调节作用。 本文选择2014-2018年沪深上市的高科技企业为样本，基于董事会治理相关 理论，研究董事会资本对董事会治理的作用机制，进一步构建理论模型，提出研 究假设，运用Stata15.1等计量软件工具，对样本数据进行实证检验。研究发现： （1）高科技企业董事会资本深度正向影响董事会治理绩效；高科技企业董事会 学历越高，董事会治理绩效越大；高科技企业董事会行业嵌入度越高，董事会治 理绩效越大；高科技企业董事会兼职连锁度越高，董事会治理绩效越大。（2）董 事会资本广度正向影响董事会治理绩效，即董事会资本的广度越大，董事会治理 绩效越高；高科技企业董事会职能背景异质性越大，董事会治理绩效越大；高科 技企业董事会职业背景异质性越大，董事会治理绩效越大；高科技企业董事会兼 职行业异质性越大，董事会治理绩效越大。（3）高科技企业高管薪酬激励水平正 向调节董事会资本深度与董事会治理绩效的关系，高科技企业高管股权激励水平 正向调节董事会资本深度与董事会治理绩效的关系。但高科技企业高管薪酬激励 水平对董事会资本广度与董事会治理绩效的正向调节、高科技企业高管股权激励 水平对董事会资本广度与董事会治理绩效的正向调节并未得到验证。最后，本文 提出以下管理建议：(1) 构建合理、有效的董事会治理绩效评价机制，提升董事 会治理绩效；（2）聘请行业内的专家，实施专业化管理；（3）配置相关行业的专 家，打造生态型企业；（4）抑制CEO对董事会治理决策的干预，避免董事会成为 一言堂；（5）适当引入投资机构，充分发挥风险投资机构的优势；（6）建立事业 合伙人制度，实现利益共享、风险共担。 本文存在以下贡献：（1）构建了高科技企业董事会资本与董事会治理模型。 本文选取董事会治理绩效作为被解释变量，从董事会资本深度及董事会资本广度 分析董事会资本的作用，更加系统而全面，且董事会治理绩效采用的指标更加合 理，并不是和以往相同，采用企业绩效作为衡量指标；（2）引入高管激励这一调 II 节变量，探究及改进高管激励机制；（3）考虑到高科技企业的高知识性、高风险 性、高成长性等特点，专门研究高科技企业董事会资本与董事会治理的关系，以 探究高科技企业的董事会治理机制及激励机制的特殊性。 关键词：高科技企业；董事会资本；高管激励；董事会治理绩效 III Abstract High-tech enterprises are the important driving force of national independent innovation, the pillar of national economy, and the key to national development. Board governance is the core of corporate governance and the institutional guarantee to enhance the competitive advantage of enterprises, especially for high-tech enterprises. At present, the compliance of board governance in China's high-tech enterprises is obviously improved, but the effectiveness is low. In particular, how to improve the performance of the board of directors of high-tech enterprises is an important problem that the country and enterprises need to solve urgently. High-tech enterprises are characterized by high knowledge, high technology and high growth. Board capital, a scarce and important resource, is very important for the development of high-tech enterprises. In view of this, taking high-tech enterprises as the research object, this paper studies the relationship between board capital and board governance performance and the regulatory role of executive incentives based on relevant theories of board governance. In this paper, high-tech enterprises listed in Shanghai and shenzhen from 2014 to 2018 were selected as samples. Based on the relevant theories of board governance, the mechanism of board capital's effect on board governance was studied. Then, the theoretical model was further constructed and the research hypothesis was proposed. The findings are as follows :(1) the depth of board capital in high-tech enterprises positively affects the performance of board governance; The higher the educational background of the high-tech enterprise board, the greater the governance performance of the board; The higher the degree of embedding in the board of directors of high-tech enterprises, the greater the governance performance of the board of directors; The higher the linkage degree of the board of directors of high-tech enterprises, the greater the governance performance of the board of directors. (2) the breadth of board capital positively affects the governance performance of the board, that is, the greater the breadth of board capital, the higher the governance performance of the board; The greater the heterogeneity of the functional background of the board of directors in high- tech enterprises, the greater the governance performance of the board of directors. The greater the heterogeneity of the occupational background of the board of directors in high-tech enterprises, the greater the governance performance of the board of directors. The greater the heterogeneity is, the greater the governance performance is. (3) the IV incentive level of executive compensation in high-tech enterprises positively regulates the relationship between the capital depth of the board of directors and the governance performance of the board of directors, and the equity incentive level of senior executives positively regulates the relationship between the capital depth of the board of directors and the governance performance of the board of directors. However, the positive adjustment of the level of executive compensation incentive to the breadth of board capital and the performance of board governance, and the positive adjustment of the level of executive equity incentive to the breadth of board capital and the performance of board governance have not been verified. Finally, this paper proposes the following management Suggestions :(1) to build a reasonable and effective performance evaluation mechanism of board governance to improve the performance of board governance; (2) invite experts in the industry to implement professional management; (3) deploy experts in related industries to build an eco-type enterprise; (4) restrain CEO's intervention in board governance decisions to prevent the board of directors from becoming a one-line discussion; (5) appropriately introduce investment institutions to give full play to the advantages of venture investment institutions; (6) establish the business partnership system to realize the sharing of high interests and risks. This paper has the following contributions :(1) constructed the board capital and board governance model of high-tech enterprises. In this paper, the board governance performance is selected as the explained variable, and the role of board capital is investigated. (2) introduce the moderating variable of executive incentive to explore and improve the executive incentive mechanism; (3) considering the characteristics of high-tech enterprises such as high knowledge, high risk and high growth, the relationship between board capital and board governance of high-tech enterprises is specially studied to explore the particularity of board governance mechanism and incentive mechanism of high-tech enterprises. Key words: high-tech enterprises; Board capital; Executive incentives; Board governance performance V 目 录 摘要.. I Abstract ....................... III 目 录. V 第1章 绪论 .................... 1 1.1研究背景及意义.. 1 1.1.1研究背景.... 1 1.1.2研究意义.... 2 1.2研究动态.............. 3 1.2.1董事会治理绩效研究动态....... 3 1.2.2高科技企业董事会治理绩效研究动态.................. 4 1.2.3高科技企业董事会资本与董事会治理绩效的研究动态..................... 5 1.2.4高科技企业高管激励与董事会治理绩效的研究动态......................... 6 1.2.5研究述评.... 7 1.3研究思路与框架.. 7 1.4研究方法.............. 8 1.5研究创新点与不足............................. 8 1.5.1研究创新点 9 1.5.2研究不足.... 9 第2章 理论分析 .......... 10 2.1基本内涵............ 10 2.1.1高科技企业内涵..................