回顾改革开放四十二年，社会主义现代化建设取得长足进展，但生态环境面 临的重重威胁随之而来，环境保护和污染治理的紧迫感和责任感油然而生。我国 有关政府部门自本世纪初接连制定与公布多个与环境信息披露相关的文件。加 之，企业作为市场经济活动的参与者，与之相关的生产经营活动也成为导致环境 污染与恶化的重要因素之一，所以也应主动承担起相应的环境信息披露等主体责 任。企业内部遵循绿色发展理念，披露环境信息，不仅向媒体等公众传递自身积 极参与环境保护的相关信息，进一步提升其环境绩效和企业声誉；而且媒体等公 众的外部监督，也倒逼企业更加主动地向外部披露其生产经营活动对环境造成影 响的信息，从而提升自身环境行为水平；这更是企业对环境保护法律与环境信息 披露制度的遵从与奉行。 高管被认为是企业披露环境信息的内部利益相关者之一，与其相关的激励也 会主导企业的环境信息披露质量，但大量理论与实践表明，高管激励具有明显的 福利动机和高管自利倾向。作为在内部层面的一个重要尝试，高管激励将给环境 信息披露质量带来怎样的影响？引入媒体关注这一外因，以探究该因素在高管激 励与环境信息披露质量影响机制中起到怎样的调节作用？ 根据题目逻辑关系，通过搜集与整理国内外文献，为本文研究提供相应的理 论支撑。以沪、深二市A股制造业行业的上市公司的2010年——2016年共7年 的数据为样本，依据提出的高管激励与环境信息披露质量的关系、媒体关注对于 其二者关系调节作用的假设，进行相关实证分析，得到以下结论：（1）给予高 管以股权激励和薪酬激励，有利于提高上市公司环境信息披露的质量。（2）媒 体关注对高管股权激励与环境信息披露质量之间的关系具有正向调节作用。（3） 媒体关注对高管薪酬激励与环境信息披露质量之间的关系具有正向调节作用。最 后立足于以上结论，针对高管与媒体等主体提出相关建议。 关键词：高管激励，媒体关注，环境信息披露质量 II EXECUTIVEINCENTIVES,MEDIAATTENTIONAND ENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONDISCLOSURE QUALITY Abstract Lookingbackonthe42yearsofreformandopeningup,China'ssocialist modernizationhasmadegreatprogress,butitisfollowedbymanythreatstothe ecologicalenvironment,whichmustbeasenseofurgencyandresponsibilityfor environmentalprotectionandpollutioncontrol.Sincethebeginningofthiscentury, China'srelevantgovernmentdepartmentshavesuccessivelyformulatedandpublished afewdocumentsrelatedtoenvironmentalinformationdisclosure.Atthesametime, enterprises,especiallylistedcompanies,astheparticipantsofmarketeconomic activities,theirrelatedproductionandoperationactivitieshavealsobecomeoneof theimportantfactorsthatleadtoenvironmentalpollutionanddeterioration,andthey shouldalsotaketheinitiativetobearthecorrespondingenvironmentalinformation disclosureandothermainresponsibilities.Followingtheconceptofgreen developmentanddisclosingenvironmentalinformationwithintheenterprise,notonly cantheenterpriseconveyinformationaboutitsactiveparticipationinenvironmental protectiontothemediaandotherpublic,andfurtherimproveitsenvironmental performanceandcorporatereputation,butalsotheexternalsupervisionofthemedia andotherpublic,willforcetheenterprisetomoreactivelydiscloseinformationabout theimpactofitsproductionandoperationactivitiesontheenvironment,soasto improvetheirownenvironmentalbehaviorlevel。Moreimportantly,theenterprise abidesbyandpursuestheenvironmentalprotectionlawandenvironmental informationdisclosuresystem. Executivesareconsideredtobeoneoftheinternalstakeholdersofthelisted companiestodiscloseenvironmentalinformation,andexecutiveincentiveisthe qualityofenvironmentalinformationdisclosureoftheleadingcompanies.However,a largenumberoftheoriesandpracticesshowthatexecutiveincentivehasobvious welfaremotivationandexecutiveself-interesttendency.Asanimportantattemptat III theinternallevel,howwillexecutiveincentiveaffectthequalityofenvironmental informationdisclosure?Theintroductionofmediaattentiontothisexternalcause confirmshowthisfactorregulatesthemechanismofexecutiveincentiveand environmentalinformationdisclosurequality? Accordingtothelogicalrelationshipofthetopic,theauthorcollectsandarranges theliteratureathomeandabroadtoprovidethecorrespondingtheoreticalsupportfor thestudyofthispaper.Basedontheseven-yeardataofListedCompaniesinShanghai andShenzhenA-sharemanufacturingindustryfrom2010to2016,andbasedonthe hypothesisthatexecutiveincentive,environmentalinformationdisclosurequalityand mediaattentionregulatetherelationshipbetweenthem,thispapermakesanempirical analysis,anddrawsthefollowingconclusions:(1)Givingexecutiveequityincentive andsalaryincentiveisconducivetoimprovingtheenvironmentoflistedcompanies thequalityofinformationdisclosure.(2)Mediaattentionhasapositiveregulatory effectontherelationshipbetweenexecutiveequityincentiveandthequalityof environmentalinformationdisclosure.(3)Mediaattentionhasapositiveregulatory effectontherelationshipbetweenexecutivecompensationincentiveand environmentalinformationdisclosurequality.Finally,basedontheaboveconclusions, thepaperputsforwardrelevantsuggestionsforortheenterprisesandmedia. Keywords:executiveincentives,mediaattention,environmentalinformation disclosurequality IV 目录 中文摘要......................................................................................................I Abstract........................................................................................................II 目录..........................................................................................................IV 第一章绪论..............................................................................................1 1.1研究背景和研究意义.....................................................................................1 1.1.1研究背景..................................................................................................1 1.1.2研究意义..................................................................................................2 1.2研究方法与研究思路.....................................................................................3 1.2.1研究方法..................................................................................................3 1.2.2研究思路..................................................................................................4 1.3研究的创新点.................................................................................................6 第二章概念界定与文献综述.................................................................7 2.1概念界定.........................................................................................................7 2.1.1高管激励..................................................................................................7 2.1.2媒体关注..................................................................................................8 2.1.3环境信息披露..........................................................................................8 2.2文献综述.........................................................................................................9 2.2.1环境信息披露质量相关文献综述..........................................................9 2.2.2高管激励与企业信息披露质量的相关研究........................................15 2.2.3媒体关注与企业信息披露质量的相关研究........................................17 2.3文献述评.......................................................................................................18 第三章理论基础与研究假设...............................................................19 3.1相关理论基础...............................................................................................19 3.1.1利益相关者理论....................................................................................19 V 3.1.2信息不对称理论....................................................................................19 3.1.3委托代理理论........................................................................................20 3.1.4可持续发展理论....................................................................................21 3.2研究假设.......................................................................................................21 3.2.1高管激励对环境信息披露质量的影响................................................21 3.2.2媒体关注对高管激励与环境信息披露质量影响的调节作用............22 第四章研究设计...................