I 政治关联、高管激励与企业创新效率 ——基于民营上市企业的实证分析 摘要 改革开放以来，我国靠着物质要素投入推动的经济增长方式实现了跨越式的 发展，然而这种方式正在面临资源匮乏和环境不可持续供给的问题，因此我国经 济发展正由物资要素驱动转向创新驱动阶段。创新作为引领发展的第一动力，是 建设现代化经济体系的战略支撑，企业作为创新的主体，在创新活动中扮演着重 要角色，而民营企业本身具有思维活力，能积极主动地对经济环境变化做出反应， 使其在创新中尤为突出，目前已成为各个行业创新的主力。 中国正处于经济转型和产业结构升级的大背景之下，各项经济制度和政策还 不够完善，民营企业在创新活动中还存在着一定困难。由于政府在经济发展中掌 握了大量的资源，因而相比于国有企业，民营企业会更积极地寻求政治关联以谋 求创新资源，从而获得更稳定和长远的发展。民营企业的发展创新不仅仅依赖于 外部的政治环境，其内部治理也至关重要。企业创新活动具有风险大、周期长等 特点，高管会为了企业短期效益而会减少创新项目，因此企业所有者开始实施一 些高管激励措施，从而促使高管加大对创新发展战略的重视。 国内外关于企业创新的研究成果颇多，但大多以创新投入水平来衡量企业创 新，与创新效率相关的研究较少，对企业创新活动直接产出成果关注不够。创新 效率作为创新投入要素的成果转化体现，其转化效率代表着企业的核心竞争力。 本文以民营上市企业2011—2018年的相关数据为样本，运用DEA模型来测算企 业创新效率，然后采用面板回归方法实证分析了政治关联、高管激励与企业创新 效率的相关关系，结果发现二者对民营上市企业创新效率的提高具有促进作用， 而政治关联在股权激励与创新效率之间有显著的正向调节作用，在薪酬激励与创 新效率之间具有负向调节作用。文章最后在如何提高民营企业创新效率方面提供 相关建议，以希望对民企的创新发展提供帮助。 关键词：政治关联；股权激励；薪酬激励；创新效率；民营企业 ABSTRACT III POLITICALCONNECTION,EXECUTIVE INCENTIVEANDINNOVATIONEFFICIENCY --EMPIRICALANALYSISBASEDONPRIVATE LISTEDENTERPRISES ABSTRACT Sincethereformandopeningup,Chinahasachievedleapfrogdevelopmentby relyingontheeconomicgrowthmodepromotedbymaterialfactorinput.However, thismodeisfacingtheshortageofresourcesandunsustainablesupplyofenvironment. Therefore,China'seconomicdevelopmentisshiftingfrommaterialfactordrivento innovation-drivenstage.Astheprimarydrivingforcefordevelopment,innovationis thestrategicsupportforbuildingamoderneconomicsystem.Andasthemainbodyof innovation,enterprisesplayanimportantroleininnovationactivities.Private enterpriseshavethevitalityofthinking,whichcanactivelyrespondtochangesinthe economicenvironment,sothattheyareparticularlyprominentininnovation,andhas becomethemainforceofinnovationinvariousindustries. Inthebackgroundofeconomictransformationandindustrialstructureupgrading Chinesevariouseconomicsystemsandpoliciesarenotperfect.Andprivate enterprisesstillhavesomedifficultiesininnovationactivities.Asthegovernmenthas alargeamountofresourcesintheeconomicdevelopment,comparedwith state-ownedenterprises,privateenterpriseswillactivelyseekpoliticalconnectionsto seekinnovativeresources,soastoachievemorestableandlong-termdevelopment. Thedevelopmentandinnovationofprivateenterprisesnotonlydependonthe externalpoliticalenvironment,butalsotheirinternalgovernanceiscrucial.Enterprise innovationactivitiesarecharacterizedbyhighriskandlongcycle.Executiveswill reduceinnovationprojectsforthesakeofshort-termbenefitsofenterprises.Therefore, enterpriseownersstarttoimplementsomeincentivemeasuresforexecutives,soasto urgeexecutivestopaymoreattentiontoinnovationdevelopmentstrategy. Therearealotofresearchachievementsonenterpriseinnovationathomeand abroad,butmostofthemaremeasuredbythelevelofinnovationinput.Asthe 华北水利水电大学硕士学位论文 IV achievementtransformationofinnovationinputfactors,innovationefficiency representsthecorecompetitivenessofenterprises.Basedontherelevantdataof 2011-2018privatelistedcompaniesassamples,usingDEAmodeltomeasurethe efficiencyofenterpriseinnovation,andthenusepanelregressionmethodtoempirical analysisonthepoliticalrelation,thecorrelationbetweenexecutiveincentiveand enterpriseinnovationefficiency,andtheresultsshowedthatbothforprivatelisted enterprisesinnovationefficiencyhasapromotingeffect,whilepoliticalassociation betweentheequityincentiveandinnovationefficiencyhasasignificantpositive adjustment,betweensalaryincentiveandinnovationefficiencyhasanegative regulatoryrole.Attheendofthepaper,someSuggestionsareprovidedonhowto improvetheinnovationefficiencyofprivateenterprisesinthehopeofprovidinghelp totheinnovationdevelopmentofprivateenterprises. Keywords：Politicalconnection;Equityincentive;Salaryincentive;Innovation efficiency;Theprivateenterprise 目录 V 目录 摘要....................................................................................................................I ABSTRACT........................................................................................................III 目录...................................................................................................................V 1绪论....................................................................................................................1 1.1研究背景.................................................................................................1 1.2研究意义.................................................................................................3 1.2.1理论意义......................................................................................3 1.2.2现实意义......................................................................................3 1.3研究思路与内容.....................................................................................3 1.4研究方法与技术路线.............................................................................4 1.4.1研究方法......................................................................................4 1.4.2技术路线图..................................................................................4 1.5研究创新点.............................................................................................5 2文献综述............................................................................................................7 2.1相关概念界定.........................................................................................7 2.1.1政治关联......................................................................................7 2.1.2高管激励....................................................................................11 2.1.3企业创新效率............................................................................13 2.2政治关联与企业创新效率...................................................................14 2.3高管激励与企业创新效率...................................................................15 2.3.1货币薪酬激励与企业创新效率.................................................15 2.3.2股权激励与企业创新效率.........................................................15 3理论基础与研究假设......................................................................................17 3.1理论基础...............................................................................................17 3.1.1寻租理论....................................................................................17 3.1.2委托代理理论............................................................................18 3.1.3创新理论....................................................................................19 3.1.4资源基础理论............................................................................19 3.2研究假设...............................................................................................20 3.2.1政治关联对企业创新效率的影响............................................20 3.2.2高管激励对企业创新效率的影响............................................20 3.2.3政治关联的调节效应................................................................21 4研究设计与实证研究......................................................................................23 华北水利水电大学硕士学位论文 VI 4.1实证研究设计.......................................................................................23 4.1.1样本选取与数据来源..................