盈余管理一直是公司治理研究的热点话题。近年来，学者们逐渐加强了对消极盈 余管理的影响因素及防范策略的研究，以期将理论研究与实践相结合。公司高管是盈 余管理行为的主要实施者，他们自身的特征会对盈余管理产生影响。从心理学角度来 看，人的行为决策都受到其背景特征的影响，也就是说通常可以从一个人的背景特征 中推测出其可能的决策结果。基于此观点，笔者认为，高管团队特征会对他们的经营 决策过程产生影响，而盈余管理的行为决策过程必然包含其中，已有文献的研究成果 对这一假设提供了证明。上市公司中普遍存在着信息不对称现象，会滋生盈余管理动 机，进而导致公司盈余管理行为。为了解决这一问题，企业所有者和经营者之间签订 了以公司业绩为基础的薪酬契约，将高管个人利益与公司利益相结合，激励高管在追 求个人利益的同时增加公司的企业价值，减少盈余管理行为。 本文首先对盈余管理及高管团队特征相关研究进行文献回顾，并在分析信息不对 称理论、高层梯度理论和激励理论的基础上，提出本文的4项假设；以2012-2016年 A股上市公司为样本，实证检验高管团队特征对盈余管理的影响，并进一步讨论薪酬 激励对两者关系的调节作用。本文研究结论如下：（1）高管团队平均年龄、平均受教 育程度及平均任职时间均与盈余管理行为之间存在负相关关系。（2）薪酬激励对高管 团队特征与盈余管理间关系具有显著的正向调节作用，且对高管团队平均年龄与盈余 管理间关系的调节作用最为显著。最后参考本文的研究结果，对公司治理问题提出几 点相关建议，进一步优化公司高管结构，达到减少盈余管理行为的目的，促进公司长 远发展。 关键词：盈余管理；高管团队特征；薪酬激励 V Abstract Earnings management has always been a hot topic in corporate governance research. In recent years, scholars have gradually strengthened the research on the influencing factors and prevention strategies of earnings management, in order to combine theoretical research with practice. As the main controller of earnings management behavior, the senior manager of the company has become one of the important factors affecting earnings management. From a psychological point of view, people's behavioral decisions are influenced by their background characteristics, which means that they can usually infer their possible decision- making results from a person's background characteristics. Based on this point of view, the author believes that the background characteristics of executives will have an impact on their business decision-making process, and the behavioral decision-making process of earnings management must be included. The research results of the existing literature provide proof of this hypothesis. Information asymmetry is common in listed companies, which in turn breeds the incentives for earnings management. In order to solve this problem, the company owner and the operator signed a compensation contract based on the company's performance, combining the personal interests of the executives with the interests of the company, and encouraging the executives to increase the company's corporate value and reduce earnings management behavior while pursuing personal interests. This paper first reviews the literature on earnings management and executive team characteristics research, and based on the analysis of information asymmetry theory, high- level gradient theory and incentive theory, proposes four hypotheses; selecting the data of A- share listed companies in 2012-2016 as a sample, empirically tests the influence of top management team characteristics on earnings management, and further discusses the adjustment effect of compensation incentives on the relationship between the two. The results of this paper indicate that: (1) There is a significant negative correlation between the top management teams characteristics and earnings management behavior. (2) Compensation incentive has a significant positive adjustment effect on the relationship between top management teams characteristics and earnings management, and has the most significant effect on the relationship between executive team average age and earnings management. Finally, based on the research results of this paper, relevant suggestions are put forward to VI further optimize the company's senior management structure, achieve the purpose of reducing earnings management behavior, and promote the company's long-term development. Key words: Earnings Management; Top Management Team Characteristics; Compensation Incentives VII 目 录 摘要 ................................................................................................................................. I Abstract ................................................................................................................................ III 第一章 绪论 ...................................................................................................................... - 1 - 1.1 研究背景 ..................................................................................................................... - 1 - 1.2 研究意义 ..................................................................................................................... - 2 - 1.3 研究内容与方法 ......................................................................................................... - 3 - 1.3.1 研究内容 .......................................................................................................... - 3 - 1.3.2 研究方法 .......................................................................................................... - 5 - 第二章 文献综述 .............................................................................................................. - 7 - 2.1 盈余管理的相关研究 ................................................................................................. - 7 - 2.1.1 盈余管理的定义 .............................................................................................. - 7 - 2.1.2 盈余管理的动机 .............................................................................................. - 8 - 2.1.3 盈余管理的手段 ............................................................................................ - 11 - 2.2 高管团队特征的相关研究 ....................................................................................... - 12 - 2.2.1 高管团队的界定 ............................................................................................ - 12 - 2.2.2 高管团队特征与盈余管理的相关研究 ........................................................ - 13 - 2.3 高管薪酬激励与盈余管理的相关研究 ................................................................... - 14 - 2.4 文献评述 ................................................................................................................... - 16 - 2.5 本章小结 ................................................................................................................... - 17 - 第三章 理论基础及研究假设 ........................................................................................ - 19 - 3.1 理论基础 ................................................................................................................... - 19 - 3.1.1 信息不对称理论 ............................................................................................ - 19 - 3.1.2 高层梯队理论 ................................................................................................ - 19 - 3.1.3 激励理论 ........................................................................................................ - 20 - 3.2 研究假设 ................................................................................................................... - 21 - 3.2.1 高管团队特征与盈余管理 ............................................................................ - 21 - 3.2.2 薪酬激励的调节作用 .................................................................................... - 23 - 3.3 本章小结 ................................................................................................................... - 23 - 第四章 研究设计 ............................................................................................................ - 25 - 4.1 样本选择及数据来源 .......................................