I 摘要 2017年10月，十九大报告中明确指出“创新是引领发展的第一动力，是建 设中国现代化经济体系的战略支撑”，未来我国经济社会发展的主要趋势就是科 技创新，科技创新也是我国重要的生产力。 企业是我国国民经济发展的主体，技术创新是企业在市场中取胜的秘诀，也 是企业发展的核心竞争力，因此，技术创新受到越来越多企业家们的重视。而企 业技术创新最直观的表现就是企业对研发活动的投入。研发投入以及研发投入力 度（研发费用占营业收入的比例）是评价一个企业技术创新发展的重要指标，可 以反映出企业对技术创新的重视程度。资金投入巨大、投资周期长，研究成果不 确定、研发产出带来的效益有滞后性等是企业研发创新活动的几个重要特征，因 此对企业来说研发创新投入是一项高风险投资活动，于是在“两权分离”的企业 中，经营者可能会为了实现自己个人利益，追求短期企业效益而对企业的研发活 动持消极态度，做出不利于企业科技创新活动的决策，有碍企业的成长。企业的 所有权和经营权分离带来的信息不对称的问题导致企业所有者无法对管理层实 施有效的监督。因此，如何减少经营者的这种机会主义行为，有效缓和企业所有 者和经营者之间的利益冲突备受学者们关注。股权激励是一种公认有效的利于协 调所有者和经营者的利益冲突的措施，能够使企业的管理者从股东的角度出发， 积极参与到公司的经营管理活动中，帮助企业所有者克服经营者背离企业长期发 展战略的机会主义行为。 本文在委托代理理论、激励理论、技术创新理论等基础理论指导下，通过国 内外研究现状的梳理，分析了我国上市公司股权激励的现状以及研发投入现状。 选取了安防监控行业的龙头海康威视作为案例，在介绍了海康威视公司的基本情 况以后，通过统计分析法、比较分析法对海康威视的2012年和2014年的两次股 权激励计划进行了对比分析，并且进一步从研发人员情况、研发投入情况以及研 发产出成果几个角度分析研究了公司的股权激励计划对企业创新的影响。通过比 较分析得出以下结论：海康威视公司股权激励方案实施对企业人才的吸引和企业 核心技术研发队伍的稳定发挥了积极的作用。高管决定了企业的创新投入的力 度，在案例分析中我们可以明显看出实施股权激励对象包含高管对企业研发创新 摘要 II 投入有了大幅的提升。总体来看，实施股权激励计划对企业的技术创新活动有明 显的促进作用，尤其2014年的股权激励计划激励效果更为明显。 关键词：股权激励；研发投入；技术创新 Abstract III Abstract InOctober2017，thereportoftheNineteenthNationalCongressclearlystated that"innovationistheprimarydrivingforcefordevelopmentandthestrategic supportforbuildingChina'smoderneconomicsystem."ThemaintrendofChina's economicandsocialdevelopmentinthefutureisscientificandtechnological innovation.China'simportantproductivity. EnterprisesarethemainbodyofthedevelopmentofChina'snationaleconomy. Technologicalinnovationisthesecretforenterprisestowininthemarketandthe corecompetitivenessofenterprisedevelopment.Therefore，moreandmore entrepreneursattachimportancetotechnologicalinnovation.Themostintuitive manifestationofanenterprise'stechnologicalinnovationisitsinvestmentinR&D activities.ThetotalamountofR&DinvestmentandR&Dinvestmentstrengthare importantindicatorsforevaluatingthedevelopmentofanenterprise'stechnological innovation，whichcanreflectthedegreetowhichanenterpriseattachesimportance totechnologicalinnovation.Enterprisesconductingresearchanddevelopment activitieshavethecharacteristicsoflargecapitalinvestment，longinvestmentcycles， uncertainresearchresults，largerisks，andlaggingbenefitsfromresearchand developmentoutput.Therefore，in"separationoftworights"companies，operators mayRealizeone'sownpersonalinterests，pursueshort-termcorporatebenefitsand takeanegativeattitudetowardscorporateR&Dactivities，makedecisionsthatare notconducivetocorporatescientificandtechnologicalinnovationactivities，and hindercorporategrowth.Theproblemofinformationasymmetrycausedbythe separationoftheownershipandmanagementrightsoftheenterprisehasledtothe inabilityoftheownertoimplementeffectivesupervisionofthemanagement. Therefore，howtoreducethisopportunisticbehaviorofmanagersandeffectively mitigatetheconflictofinterestbetweenbusinessownersandmanagershasattracted muchattentionfromscholars.Equityincentiveisagenerallyrecognizedandeffective measurethatisbeneficialtothecoordinationofconflictsofinterestbetweenowners andoperators.Itenablesthemanagersofanenterprisetoactivelyparticipateinthe company'smanagementactivitiesfromtheperspectiveofshareholders，andhelps Abstract IV theownerstoovercometheoperators.Opportunisticbehaviorthatdeviatesfromthe long-termdevelopmentstrategyoftheenterprise. Undertheguidanceofbasictheoriessuchasprincipal-agenttheory，incentive theory，andtechnologicalinnovationtheory，thispaperanalyzesthestatusquoof equityincentivesandR&DinvestmentinChina'slistedcompaniesthroughareview ofthecurrentresearchsituationathomeandabroad.Hikvision，theleaderofthe securitymonitoringindustry，wasselectedasacase.Afterintroducingthebasic situationofHikvision，thetwoequityofHikvisionin2012and2014wereanalyzed throughstatisticalanalysisandcomparativeanalysis.Theincentiveplanwas comparedandanalyzed，andtheimpactofthecompany'sequityincentiveplanon corporateinnovationwasfurtheranalyzedfromtheperspectivesofR&Dpersonnel， R&Dinvestment，andR&Doutput.Throughcomparativeanalysis，thefollowing conclusionsaredrawn：TheimplementationofHikvision'sequityincentiveplanhas attractedcorporatetalentsandstabilizedthecompany'scoretechnologyresearchand developmentteam.Theexecutivesdeterminethestrengthofthecompany's innovationinvestment.Inthecaseanalysis，wecanclearlyseethatthe implementationofequityincentiveobjectsincludingexecutiveshassignificantly improvedthecompany'sinvestmentinresearchanddevelopmentandinnovation.In general，theimplementationofequityincentiveplanshasasignificantrolein promotingtechnologicalinnovationactivitiesofenterprises，especiallythe2014 incentiveeffectsofequityincentiveplans. Keywords：equityincentives;R&Dinvestment;technologicalinnovation 目录 V 目录 摘要............................................................................................................I Abstract......................................................................................................III 第一章绪论.............................................................................................1 第一节选题背景及研究意义................................................................................1 一、选题背景.............................................................................................................................1 二、研究意义.............................................................................................................................2 第二节国内外研究动态........................................................................................3 一、股权激励相关文献综述....................................................................................................3 二、技术创新绩效相关文献综述............................................................................................5 三、股权激励与研发投入相关文献综述................................................................................7 四、文献评述.............................................................................................................................8 第三节研究内容及创新点..................................................................................10 一、研究内容...........................................................................................................................10 二、创新点...............................................................................................................................10 三、研究方法和技术路线.......................................................................................................11 第二章相关概念及理论基础.................................................................13 第一节相关概念....................................................................................................13 一、股权激励...........................................................................................................................13 二、研发投入...........................................................................................................................15 三、