要在日益激烈的市场竞争环境中谋求更大的利益，如何降低股权资本成本成为 企业当前亟待解决的问题之一。目前，学术界关于股权资本成本的研究 主要集中于 计量方式和影响因素上，有关影响因素的研究以信息披露为主，部分学者从公司内 部治理的视角考察了高管股权激励的影响，但尚未形成统一结论，也鲜有学者探究 其他管理层激励方式和公司外部环境因素的影响。而产品市场竞争作为公司外部治 理机制的重要组成部分，无疑会对企业面临的风险造成影响，且作为公司实际经营 者和控制人 的管理层，他们的行为也会对投资者的预期风险水平产生重要作用，进 而影响公司的股权资本成本。 本文以2012-2018年A股上市公司为研究对象，基于产品市场竞争的调节作用 ， 探究管理层激励对股权资本成本的影响。研究内容主要包括以下5个部分：第一部 分，理论研究。对管理层激励、产品市场竞争和股权资本成本的概念进行界定，并 介绍相关 理论。第二部分，现状分析。从薪酬激励、股权激励和晋升激励三个方面 分析我国上市公司的管理层激励实施现状，并通过单变量t检验考察不同产品市场 竞争程度下的管理层激 励水平是否具有差异性。第三部分，管理层激励对股权资本 成本影响的研究设计。提出研究假设，确定相关变量，并根据假设构建回归模型。 第四部分，管理层激励对股权资本 成本影响的实证分析。基于LSDV检验和豪斯曼 检验的结果，选取采用稳健标准误的固定效应模型考察产品市场竞争对股权资本成 本的作用；为避免可能存在的严重内生性问题对 检验结果造成影响，本文对管理层 激励相关变量构建合理的工具变量，采用两阶段最小二乘法（2SLS）进行回归检验， 探究管理层激励对股权资本成本的影响及产品市场竞争在 二者关系间的调节作用。 研究结果表明：（1）管理层激励对股权资本成本的影响各不相同。其中，管理层薪 酬激励与晋升激励均对股权资本成本具有抑制作用，而股权激励却能 显著提高股权 资本成本；（2）产品市场竞争对股权资本成本具有抑制作用；（3）产品市场竞争 负向调节管理层激励与股权资本成本的相关性。在激烈的产品市场竞争中，管理 层 薪酬激励和晋升激励对股权资本成本的抑制作用减弱，股权激励提高股权资本成本 的问题得以缓解。 II 本文的主要创新点：（1）基于产品市场竞争的调节作用，从薪酬激励 、股权激 励和晋升激励三个方面全面探讨了管理层激励对股权资本成本的影响，丰富了股权 资本成本影响因素的相关研究；（2）采用IV-2SLS法构建合理的工具变量进行实证 研 究，克服了管理层激励相关变量与股权资本成本之间严重的内生性问题，增强了 检验结果的可靠性。 关键词：管理层激励，产品市场竞争，股权资本成本，IV-2SLS III Abstract In order to obtain greater benefits in an increasingly fierce market competition environment, how to reduce the cost of equity capital has become one of the issues that enterprises need to solve. Nowadays, research on the cost of equity capital of companies in academia is mainly focused on measurement methods and influencing factors. The research on influencing factors is mainly on information disclosure. Some scholars have examined the impact of executive equity incentive from the perspective of corporate governance, but there is no consensus. And few scholars have explored the influence of other management incentives and external environmental factors of the company. Product market competition, as one of the important external governance mechanisms of the company, will undoubtedly have an impact on companies’ risks. As companies’ actual operators and controllers, their actions will affect investors’ expected level of risk, which will finally have an impact on the cost of equity capital. This thesis takes A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2018 as the research object, and explores the impact of management incentives on the cost of equity capital based on the product market competition. The research content mainly includes the following five parts: The first part is theoretical research. The concepts of management incentives, product market competition, and cost of equity capital are defined, and related theories are introduced. The second part is the status quo analysis. This chapter analyzes the implementation status of management incentives in China’s listed companies from three aspects: compensation incentives, equity incentives and promotion incentives, and examines whether the levels of management incentives under different product market competition levels are different through univariate T tests. The third part is the research design of the influence of management incentives on the cost of equity capital. Propose research hypotheses, determine relevant variables, and build regression models based on the hypotheses. The fourth part is the empirical research on the influence of management incentives on the cost of equity capital. Based on the results of the LSDV test and the Hausman test, a fixed-effect model using a robust standard error is selected to investigate IV the impact of product market competition on the cost of equity capital. In order to avoid possible serious endogenous problems that may affect the test results, this chapter constructs reasonable instrumental variables for the related variables of management incentives, and adopts the two-stage least square method (2SLS) to explore the impact of management incentives on the cost of equity capital and the moderating role of product market competition between the two. The results show that: (1) The impact of management incentives on the cost of equity capital varies. Among them, management compensation incentives and promotion incentives both have an inhibitory effect on the cost of equity capital, while equity incentives can significantly increase the cost of equity capital; (2) Product market competition has an inhibitory effect on the cost of equity capital; (3) Product market competition negatively regulates the correlation between management incentives and the cost of equity capital. In the fierce competition of the product market, the suppression effect of management compensation incentives and promotion incentives on the cost of equity capital has been weakened, and the problem of equity incentives increasing the cost of equity capital has been alleviated. The main innovations of this thesis are as follows: (1) Based on the regulatory role of product market competition, it comprehensively explores the impact of management incentives on the cost of equity capital from three aspects: compensation incentives, equity incentives and promotion incentives, which enrich relevant researches on the influencing factors of the cost of equity capital; (2) The IV-2SLS method is used to construct reasonable instrumental variables for empirical research, which overcomes the endogenous problem between the variables related to management incentives and the cost of equity capital, enhancing the reliability of the test results. Key words: Management Incentives, Product Market Competition, Cost of Equity Capital, IV-2SLS V 目 录 摘要 ..... I Abstract ............................. III 第1章 导 论 ....................... 1 1.1 研究目 的与意义 ......... 1 1.1.1 研究背景 .............. 1 1.1.2 研究目的 .............. 4 1.1.3 研究意义 .............. 4 1.2 国内外研究现状 ......... 5 1.2.1 关 于管理层激励的研究 ..................... 5 1.2.2 关于产品市场竞争的研究 ................. 7 1.2.3 关于股权资本成本的研究 ................. 8 1.2.4 研究述评 ............ 11 1.3 研究内容与方法 ....... 12 1.3.1 研究内容 ............ 12 1.3.2 研究方法 ............ 13 第2章 相关概念及理论基础 .......................... 15 2.1 相关概念界定 ........... 15 2.1.1 管理层激励的内涵 ........................... 15 2.1.2 产品市场竞争的内涵 ....................... 15 2.1.3 股权资本成本的内涵 ....................... 16 2.2 管理层激励相关理论 .............................. 17 2.2.1 委托代理理论 .... 17 2.2.2 最优契约理论 .... 17 VI 2.2.3 管理权力理论 .... 18 2.2.4 锦标赛理论 ........ 18 2.2.5 信息不对称理论 19 2.3 产品市场竞争理论 ... 20 第3章 管理 层激励实施现状分析 .................. 21 3.1 薪酬激励的实施现状 .............................. 21 3.1.1 管理层薪酬水平总体普遍提高 ....... 21 3.1.2 不同行业 管理层薪酬水平差异显著 .............................. 22 3.2 股权激励的实施现状 .............................. 24 3.2.1 实施管理层股权激励的公司数量日益增