Hybrid Warfare
in the Baltics
Threats and Potential Responses
Andrew Radin
CORPORATION
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iii
Preface
This report documents research performed by RAND Project AIR FORCE in the spring and
summer of 2015. The report examines the specific challenges associated with Russian hybrid
warfare in the Baltics—defining the issue, understanding the threat, and conceptualizing how to
respond. It finds that Russia will have difficulty using nonviolent or covert action to subvert the
Baltics absent the use of conventional force, and hence that the main vulnerability stems from
Russia’s local superiority in conventional forces. Addressing the Russian irregular threat remains
important nevertheless, since effective defense and deterrence in the Baltics depend on adopting
policies to reduce the likelihood of Russian aggression across the conflict spectrum.
The research described in this report was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine
Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a Fiscal Year 2015 project “U.S. Airpower
and Moscow’s Emerging Strategy in the Near Abroad.” The project was sponsored by the
Director, Plans, Programs, and Analyses, Headquarters United States Air Forces, Europe. Its goal
was to help inform choices by U.S. Air Force leaders regarding ways—activities, posture, and
capability development—in which the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense, and the
NATO alliance more broadly might respond to and anticipate challenges posed by a more
assertive and bellicose Russian Federation.
Human Subject Protections (HSP) protocols were used in this report, in accordance with the
appropriate statutes and Department of Defense regulations governing HSP. The views of
individuals cited anonymously (as well as the views of the author) are their own, and do not
represent the official position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or other
organization.
RAND Project AIR FORCE
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force’s
federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air
Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment,
combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is
conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and
Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The research reported here was
prepared under contract number FA7014-06-C-0001.
Additional information about PAF is available on our website:
rand/paf
iv
This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force on September 20,
2015. The draft report, issued on October 19, 2015, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and
U.S. Air Force subject-matter experts.
v
Contents
Preface ........ iiiSummary ... viiAcknowledgments .. ix1. Introduction ......... 12. What Is Hybrid Warfare53. Hybrid Scenarios ........... 13Nonviolent Subversion ... 14Covert Violent Action .... 23Conventional Aggression Supported by Political Subversion .... 284. Policy Implications ....... 31Integration of Russians ... 31Countering Covert Action .......... 33Avoiding the Risk of Conventional Deterrence Initiatives Fomenting Irregular Provocation ... 34References . 37。。。以上简介无排版格式，详细内容请下载查看