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POLICY BRIEF
PB 17-15
G-7 Economic
Cooperation in the
Trump Era
C. Fred Bergsten, Edwin M. Truman, and
Jeromin Zettelmeyer
May 2017
C. Fred Bergsten
is senior fellow and director emeritus of the
Peterson Institute for International Economics. He was assistant
secretary of the US Treasury for international affairs (1977¨C81)
and assistant for international economic affairs to the National
Security Council (1969¨C71).
Edwin M. Truman
is nonresident
senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics
and has served at the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve System.
Jeromin Zettelmeyer
is senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics and former director general for economic
policy at the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Energy.
Authorsˉ note: This paper is a slightly revised and updated version
of a paper presented at a conference on Major Challenges for Global
Macroeconomic Stability: The Role of the G-7, organized by the
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome, Italy, on March
27¨C28, 2017. We are grateful to Adam Posen, Jason Furman,
Simone Romano, and Nathan Sheets for helpful comments and
suggestions.
All rights reserved.
The G-7 countries have used economic cooperation to
pursue three main objectives: macroeconomic policy coor-
dination (either in response to global shocks or to reduce
large external imbalances among its members); the promo-
tion of an open, rules-based multilateral trading system; and
the promotion of global financial stability through common
regulatory standards and common institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).1 The views of US
President Donald J. Trump appear to conflict with all three
1.The G-7 countries are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
objectives. His °America First± philosophy and apparent
belief that current account imbalances must be addressed by
renegotiating trade agreements rather than through macro-
economic policies appear to leave little room for macroeco-
nomic coordination with other members of the G-7. His
trade views directly contradict the G-7 agenda so far, and
his intention to roll back financial regulation in the United
States seems difficult to reconcile with regulatory coopera-
tion. Furthermore, key congressional Republicans have been
highly critical of US participation in the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) and have also opposed °IMF bailouts± and IMF quota
increases.
At the same time, it is not yet clear to what extentaand
howaPresident Trumpˉs views will translate into policies of
the new US administration. For example, Treasury Secretary
Stev
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