而处于知识经济时代的今天，高层管理团队所拥有的知识资产以及其结构特征直
接影响着企业的经营管理模式。进而为了促使高层管理者以企业管家的身份充分
发挥其知识资本的作用避免个人机会主义行为的发生，就要求企业管理机制的制
定可以恰到好处的激励和约束高层管理团队

基于此为研究背景，本文以高阶梯理论为基础，从代理理论视角出发分析了高
管知识对R&D投入对企业绩效关系的影响。本文采用中国上市制造企业2011-2014
年的数据为研究样本，从管理机制视角出发，论证出高管知识如何影响 R&D 投入
与企业绩效之间的关系，得出以下结论：（1）技术知识资产在 R&D 投入与企业
绩效之间起到部分中介作用，进一步完善了企业创新理论。（2）高管知识对 R&D
投入转化为技术知识资产的过程中起到显著的正向调节作用并且强化了技术知识
资产商业化的过程。（3）在企业的管理机制中，激励机制对高管知识起到显著的
正向调节作用；监管机制中外部股东比例对高管知识起到正向显著的调节作用，
两职分离则起到负向的调节作用，此处调节作用的不对称性为我国企业管理机制
提出了新的要求

本文的研究结论从理论上深化了对技术知识资产与管理机制关系的认识；将高
阶理论与代理理论有机的结合起来，从管理机制视角出发，全面揭示了高管知识
对 R&D 投入与企业绩效关系的影响，进一步完善了企业绩效配置理论同时对企业
绩效的提升具有重要的实践意义

关键词：技术知识资产；高管知识；管理机制；调节作用哈尔滨工业大学管理学硕士学位论文
II
Abstract
In China, owners and managers are often not the same person, the executive power
of an enterprise is transferred to the top management, then top management teams
become the main target. And in the era of knowledge economy, the knowledge assets of
senior management team and their structural characteristics directly affect their
management. However, how to make the top managers give full play to their knowledge
capital and avoid individual opportunism in the status of enterprise housekeeper, which
puts forward new requirements for the enterprise management mechanism.
This paper is based on the Upper Echelons Theory, from the perspective of agency
theory, analyzes the impact of executive knowledge on R&D investment and firm
performance. In this paper, we examine top management knowledge in the relationship
between R&D input and firm market performance based on the sample of Chinese listed
companies during 2011-2014. Draw the following conclusions:(1)Technology
knowledge assets play a partial intermediary role between R&D investment and
enterprise market performance, and improve and perfect the theory of enterprise
innovation.(2) Executive knowledge plays a significant positive regulatory role in the
process of R&D input into technical knowledge assets, and reinforces the process of
commercializing technology knowledge assets.(3) In the management mechanism of an
enterprise, incentive mechanism plays a significant positive adjustment to the regulation
of executive knowledge ； the proportion of domestic and foreign shareholders of
regulatory mechanism plays a positive role in regulating the knowledge of executives.
The separation of the two posts plays a negative regulatory role. Here, the asymmetry of
regulation plays a new role in the management mechanism of enterprises in China.
The research conclusion of this paper deepens the understanding of the relationship
between technological knowledge assets and management mechanism theoretically. The
Upper Echelons Theory and the agent theory are combined organically, from the point
of view of TMT knowledge, this paper comprehensively reveals the impact of R&D
investment on firm performance, and further improves the theory of enterprise
performance allocation. Meanwhile, the promotion of performance also has important
practical significance.
Key words：technological knowledge assets, executive knowledge, management
mechanism, moderating effects哈尔滨工业大学管理学硕士学位论文
III
目录
摘要........I
ABSTRACT..........II
第1章问题的提出及研究背景和意义.1
1.1问题的提出..........1
1.2课题研究的背景和意义..2
1.2.1研究的背景2
1.2.2本文研究的意义....2
1.3文献综述...3
1.3.1高管团队的理论及发展....3
1.3.2高管知识的研究现状.......5
1.3.3高管知识与企业绩效........7
1.3.4文献述评....8
1.4研究内容和方法..8
1.4.1研究内容....8
1.4.2研究方法....9
第2章高管知识与研发投入对企业绩效关系分析的理论模型构建...........11
2.1高管团队与高管知识特概念...11
2.1.1高管团队.11
2.1.2高管知识.12
2.2高管知识的特点...........13
2.2.1高管知识的知识点.........13
2.2.2高管知识的知识链.........14
2.2.3高管知识的知识网.........14
2.3高管知识对 R&D 投入与企业绩效关系的影响..........15
2.3.1企业资源基础理论视角..15
2.3.2企业资源依赖理论视角..17
2.4管理机制的作用...........18
2.4.1管理机制的概念.18
2.4.2管理机制的影响.19
2.5本章小结...........20
第3章高管知识对 R&D 投入与企业绩效关系影响的理论分析.....21哈尔滨工业大学管理学硕士学位论文
IV
3.1 R&D 投入对企业绩效的影响...21
3.1.1 R&D 投入与企业绩效的假设.....21
3.1.2 R&D 投入与技术知识资产的假设.........21
3.1.3技术知识资产与企业绩效的假设..........22
3.1.4技术知识资产的中介效应..........22
3.2高管知识对 R&D 投入与企业绩效的影响......23
3.2.1高管知识对 R&D 投入与技术知识资产关系的影响....23
3.2.2高管知识对技术知识资产与企业绩效关系的影响......24
3.3管理机制对高管知识的调节作用......
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