摘 要
本文从企业内部收入分配出发，引入了薪酬“尺蠖效应”这一概念。在理论
分析方面，先是建了一个简单的权力合作博弈模型，然后从三个方面综合分析了
企业的权力结构对于薪酬的影响：一是权力能够影响获取收益的机会与能力；二
是权力强势集团主导了制度变迁，通过制度变迁来影响收入分配；三是权力结构
能够通过影响寻租行为来影响收入分配，具体地存在以下三个方面：首先，是腐
败行为能够直接影响收入分配；其次，政府过度干预企业内部事务；会导致企业
高管的薪酬契约非市场化；第三，企业的管理层权力缺乏制约，权力强势集团可
以通过薪酬操纵行为来影响收入分配。在实证部分，先是借用模型对央企的数据
进行回归分析，实证了我国企业的确存在着不同程度的薪酬“尺蠖效应”，接着
通过对比央企和中小板企业的薪酬变动数据的差异，得出了央企的薪酬“尺蠖效
应”的程度比中小企业的薪酬“尺蠖效应”高的结论，然后用垄断型央企和非垄
断型央企的薪酬变动数据的差异进行对比，发现垄断型央企的薪酬“尺蠖效应”
更高。最后提出了四个方面的建议：一是完善企业治理的制度结构，形成对权力
强势集团的制约机制；二是完善激励考核办法，合理引导企业高管的行为；三是
强化企业高管信息披露，约束企业高管的利己行为；四是提升普通员工在企业内
部权力结构的地位，以保障他们的基本收入增长以及提高他们在薪酬博弈的能
力。

关键词：权力 权力结构 收入分配 尺蠖效应

III
ABSTRACT
In this paper, starting from the inside of the income distribution companies, the
introduction of a salary inchworm effect concept. In the theoretical analysis,First
built a simple power cooperative game model,Then from a comprehensive analysis
of three aspects of corporate power structure for the remuneration of the impact:
First, the power to influence the opportunities and the ability to earn money; Second,
the power of a strong group led institutional change through institutional change to
affect the distribution of income; Third, the power structure through rent-seeking
behavior to affect the distribution of income, Specifically, there are the following
three aspects: First, the corrupt behavior can directly affect the distribution of
income; Secondly, there is excessive government intervention in the internal
enterprise; would make business executives remuneration contract non-market;Third,
do not restrict the power of corporate management, power strong group can by
manipulating the salary by affected income distribution. In the empirical part,First,
by using the model of the central rate data regression analysis, Empirical Chinese
enterprises do exist in varying degrees of remuneration inchworm effect,Then by
comparing the central enterprises and small and medium enterprise board salary data,
Obtained Central rate of remuneration inchworm effect than the remuneration of
SMEs inchworm effect a higher degree of conclusion,Then compare salary data by
monopoly central enterprises and non-monopoly-type central enterprises, Got the
monopoly central enterprises pay inchworm effect higher conclusion. Concludes
with recommendations in four areas: First, improving the institutional structure of
corporate governance, strong constraints on the powers of the Group; Second,
improve the incentive assessment methods, a reasonable guide the behavior of
corporate executives; The third is to strengthen information disclosure corporate
executives, corporate executives constraints selfish behavior; Fourth, improve the
general staff of the power structure within the enterprise status,To ensure that their
basic revenue growth and improve their capabilities.
Key word: power Power structure Income distribution Inchworm effect