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摘要
I
摘要
财务报告是上市公司对外披露信息的关键方式。盈余管理行为将会直接损害披露信
息的质量，对利益相关者做出正确决策带来了很大的障碍。这不但会有损企业外部利益
相关者的合法权益，而且在很大程度上还会给企业自身带来额外的成本负担，并最终对
资本市场的运行效率造成不良的影响。对于盈余管理动机的研究是寻觅抑制此行为的有
效途径，为建立盈余管理监督体系稳定了根基。近年来，盈余管理话题广受关注。已有
的研究倾向于认为，以原则为导向与以规则为导向的会计规范相对比而言，更容易产生
一系列的诱导性作用，致使盈余管理方式转换向更具隐蔽性的真实盈余管理。公司股东
通常根据企业业绩成果的好坏来确定高管的薪酬水平，而对于经营业绩状况的判断主要
取决于财务报告结果的好坏，因此，薪酬水平的提高也就成为了高管实施盈余管理行为
的一大主要动机。并且，上市公司百万、千万年薪等的陆续曝光，逐步将薪酬分配的公
平性问题推到了风口浪尖。基于公平理论的相关阐述，组织内的成员在获取自己应得的
奖励之后，会对最后的分配结果的公平与否实施比较，对比的结果将会对其今后的工作
态度和工作积极性产生直接作用效果。这种比较除了包含组织内部的之外，还包含与外
部同行业的对比。因此本文从高管薪酬结构，即高管薪酬水平与高管薪酬差距两个角度
出发，深入探讨其对真实盈余管理的相关影响，并且考虑到我国的特殊国情，进一步探
究了不同产权性质是否会对结果产生作用。本文选择我国2009-2016年沪深A股上市公
司为研究样本，选取相关变量，首先对变量做了描述性统计，然后做了Pearson及Spearson
检验，最后做了多元回归分析和稳健性检验
本文发现：第一，薪酬契约的确构成我国上市公司盈余管理行为的一大动机，高管
货币薪酬水平、股权激励行为、高管持股比例均对真实盈余管理有显著的促进作用，并
且，国有产权性质会削弱高管货币薪酬水平对真实盈余管理的正向影响，而对股权激励
行为及高管持股比例与真实盈余管理之间的关系并未产生显著影响；第二，高管内部薪
酬差距会对高管实施真实盈余管理行为产生作用，且两者呈现出“倒U型”关系 ；第
三，高管外部薪酬差距的扩大会诱使高管真实盈余管理行为的发生，并且，国有产权性
质会抑制高管外部薪酬差距与真实盈余管理之间的这种正相关关系
关键词：高管薪酬；高管薪酬差距；盈余管理；产权性质
Abstract
II
Abstract
Financial reporting is a key way for listed companies to disclose information externally.
Earnings management behavior will directly damage the quality of information disclosure,
and bring great obstacles to stakeholders' decision making. This will not only damage the
legitimate rights and interests of the external stakeholders, but also to a large extent, bring the
additional cost burden to the enterprise itself, and ultimately the operation efficiency of the
capital market has a bad effect. The study of earnings management motivation is an effective
way to curb this behavior, and has established a solid foundation for the establishment of
earnings management and supervision system. In recent years, the topic of earnings
management has attracted much attention. The existing research tends to think that the
principle - oriented and rule - oriented accounting standards are relatively more likely to
produce a series of inducible effects, resulting in the conversion of earnings management to a
more concealed real earnings management. The shareholders of a company usually determine
the level of the executive's salary according to the performance results of the enterprise, and
the judgment of the performance of the company depends mainly on the results of the
financial report. Therefore, the improvement of the salary level is also a major motive for the
executives to implement the earnings management behavior. And the exposure of millions,
tens of millions of annual salaries of listed companies has gradually pushed the issue of
fairness of salary distribution to the cusp of the storm. Based on the theory of fairness, the
members of the organization will compare the fairness of the final distribution results after
obtaining their own rewards. The results of the comparison will have a direct effect on their
future work attitude and work enthusiasm. This comparison includes not only the inside of the
organization, but also the comparison with the outside industry. Therefore, from the two
angles of executive compensation structure, that is, executive compensation level and
executive compensation gap, this paper probes into the related influence on real earnings
management, and takes into account the special national conditions of our country, and
further explores whether the nature of different property rights will make use of the results. In
this paper, I choose the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2016
as the research samples and select related variables. First, I make descriptive statistics on the
variables, then do Pearson and Spearson tests, and finally I do multiple regression analysis
and robustness tests.
This paper found that: First, the compensation contract of listed companies does
constitute a motivation of earnings management, level of executive monetary compensation
and equity incentive behavior, managerial ownership of real earnings management has a
Abstract
III
significant role in promoting, and the nature of property rights will weaken the level of
executive monetary compensation to the real earnings management role, and to equity
incentive did not have a significant role in the relationship between behavior and managerial
ownership and real earnings management. Second, the internal compensation gap will affect
the real earnings management behavior, and it has a inverted U relationship with the real
earnings management. Third, the pay gap between executives and external real earnings
management is positively relationship, namely external salary gap will induce executives real
earnings management behavior, and the nature of property rights will dampen the positive
relationship between the pay gap outside executives and real earnings management.
Keywords: executive compensation; executive compensation gap; earnings management;
nature of property right。