文本描述
# 以下为纯文本简介，不带文件格式；详细内容请下载文档查看；
供供供应应应链链链环环环境境境下下下的的的质质质保保保策策策略略略设设设计计计与与与优优优化化化研研研究究究
The Study on Warranty Policy Design and
Optimization in Supply Chain Environment
一级学科：工商管理
学科专业：工商管理
研究生：娄雅琦
指导教师：何曙光
天津大学管理与经济学部
二〇一九年十月二十七日独＊辦 明
§得的
交附的
II发表
fl中｜｜？外包
育賊证书
１１■s 果也钂舊 饈M鳥s
攸中作
脈mr与I｜綱宄臓＿贡１１
？｜雜m絲 示？５１，？
，
年月日
I＾I 签＆她M■娜＾r 〃
学＆i妓观用峨g
位t 特授
I 睹！＾保
容Lf．据并采
S将l．f ８４１
。s H家有
filll §Il １i
＾￡a ￡
１｜glp sk 。
l J
＿I？紋gl i臓＿）
＾＾
签＾心
報嫩B：J／４＾
Mr
—
口月４日日
年W日＝日＾M
齡棚Vf
．摘摘摘要要要
由于经济社会环境的变化和制造企业发展的自身需要，企业对质保策略的
重视度越来越高笠翟谥贫ㄖ时２呗允保唤鲆悸遣繁旧恚挂刈⒏吒?
加值的延保服务，注重质保服务水平和企业所处的市场环境。本文在对国内外相
关文献进行梳理总结的基础上，确定了在供应链环境下进行企业质保策略的设
计与优化研究，运用博弈论和最优化理论，从以下方面展开论述。
首先，对产品基础质保策略和延保服务定价策略进行联合决策谟芍圃焐?
主导，零售商和第三方服务商共同构成的供应链中，研究了无延保服务、制造商
提供延保服务、零售商提供延保服务、第三方提供延保服务四种腏较碌木饨?
果，并考虑将延保服务批发价格契约引入到制造商和零售商之间的情况。结果表
明，除了第三方服务商提供延保服务外，制造商均会适当缩短产品基础质盕冢?
且延保服务批发价格契约能有效提高制造商和零售商的企业利润，实现双赢。
接着，选择质保服务渠道和质保服务水平谟闪闶凵讨鞯迹圃焐毯偷谌?
方服务商共同构成的供应链中，对比零售商自己履行质保服务和将质保服务外包
的情景，并考虑将成本分摊合同引入到零售商和第三方之间的情况芯肯允荆?
零售商在前期所需投入很高的情况下会将质盡獍醋畲蠡陨砝螅侵时?
外包时服务水平会降低，制造商的利润下滑。成本分摊合同能提高质保服务质量
水平，提升制造商和零售商的企业利润，但是会损害第三方服务商的企业利润。
然后，考虑品牌声誉对质保传递产品质量效力强弱的影响谟闪礁鼍赫?
造商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链中，构建由产品价格、产品品牌声誉和产
品质盕诠餐龆ǖ男枨蠛p停治銎放粕戎刀愿鞣骄饩霾叩挠跋臁?
研究发现，产品间的品牌声誉比值影响着两种产品各均衡策略的大小，且当品牌
声誉比值在某一区间时，占优品牌产品定价更高却捆绑更短的产品质盕凇?
最后，在考虑品牌效应的基础上，探讨供应链领导结构对均衡决策及利润的
影响谟梢桓鲈忌杓浦圃焐毯土礁鼍赫放屏闶凵坦钩傻墓┯α粗薪⒅?
从博弈膒汀＝峁允荆放粕圆犯骶霾咭廊挥兄匾跋臁９┯α戳斓冀?
构没有对两种产品的零售价格、质盕诔ざ群凸┯α醋芴謇蟛跋臁６杂谥?
造商和零售商来说，争取到供应链的领导权能从供应链利润中分得更多利润。
关关关键键键词词词：：：供应链管理，质保策略设计和优化，延保服务，质保服务水平，品牌
声誉，供应链领导结构
I ABSTRACT
Facing the changing economic and social environment and the development needs
of manufacturing enterprises,enterprises attach more and more importance to the war-
ranty policy.When making the warranty decisions,the enterprises should pay attention
to the high value-added extended warranty,warranty service level and market environ-
ment besides the product itself.Motivated by making better decisions,this dissertation
focuses on warranty policy design and optimization in supply chain environment after
comprehensively reviewing the recent related literature.The main research are orga-
nized as the following.
First,the basic warranty period decision and extended warranty pricing strategy
are jointly considered.Amanufacturer-led supply chain consisting of one manufac-
turer,one retailer and one third-party service provider is studied.We analyze four
extended warranty channel scenarios including none providing extended service,the
manufacturer providing extended service,the retailer providing extended service and
the third party providing extended service,and further discuss the situation where the
manufacturer adopts wholesale price contract with the retailer in extended warranty
sales.The results show that the manufacturer should shorten the basic warranty period
when extended warranty is involved except for the third party providing the extended
service.Adjustment of pricing decisions depends on the parameter relationship.When
wholesale price contract is adopted,both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off
and reach a win-win situation.
Then,the optimal warranty service level is designed.We study a retailer-led supply
chain consisting of one manufacturer,one retailer and one third-party service performer.
Two scenarios are analyzed where the retailer performs the warranty service and the re-
tailer outsources the warranty service to the third party.We also discuss the role of a
cost-sharing contract between the retailer and the third party.Results show that when
the initial investment of performing warranty service is relatively high,the retailer find
it more profitable to outsource the warranty service to the third party.However,the
optimal service level and the profit of the manufacturer decrease if the retailer choose to
outsource the warranty service.Acost-sharing contract does improve the optimal ser-
vice level and bring benefits to both the retailer and the manufacturer.But this contract
III 天津大学博士学位论文
injures the interests of the third party.
Next,we consider the impact of the brand reputation on warranty’s conveying
product quality information.In a manufacturer-led supply chain consisting of two com-
peting manufacturers and one retailer,the demand of products depends on price,brand
and warranty period.Amodel for this problem is proposed when the manufacturers
decide the warranty periods and the wholesale prices meanwhile the retailer decides the
retail prices.We find that brand reputations influence all the optimal decisions of each
party.Under certain condition,the strong brand manufacturer realises his profit max-
imisation by providing a shorter warranty compared to the weaker brand manufacturer,
while charging a higher price.
Last,optimal strategies under two different supply chain power structures are dis-
cussed after considering the impact of the brand reputation on warranty’s conveying
product quality information.Models are built in the supply chain consisting of one o-
riginal design manufacturer and two competing brand retailers.We find that there exists
a brand ratio interval in which the product named by the high-brand retailer will not get
a better warranty from the manufacturer.Supply chain power structures don’t affect
the manufacturer’s warranty decisions,the retailers’pricing strategies and the profit of
the whole supply chain.Both the manufacturer and the two retailers are eager for the
supply chain leadership which helps one get a higher proportion of the supply chain
profits.
KEYWORDS：：：Supply chain management,Warranty policy design and optimiza-
tion,Extended warranty,Warranty service level,Brand reputation,Supply chain power
structure
IV 。。。以下略
==>> 点击下载文档
