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研究生学号：_1319115932_研究生签名：_____________日期：2022.5.14
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日期： 2022.5.14
摘要
自 2018年以来，资本市场频繁出现上市公司集中计提巨额商誉减值损失导致业绩暴雷的
事件，而商誉减值往往与盈余管理行为密不可分，管理层往往会采取不计提、少计提或延迟
计提商誉减值损失等盈余管理手段达到粉饰利润或集中释放亏损的目的。在此背景下，本文
通过对上市公司商誉减值与盈余管理行为进行研究，旨在为投资者敲响警钟，同时为我国资
本市场的监管和商誉准则的完善提供一些建议。
基于上述背景，本文采用案例研究法、事件研究法及数据分析法，针对 A公司商誉减值
和盈余管理行为做重点分析，并得出相关结论如下：（1）A公司商誉初始确认存在高度溢价，
巨额商誉减值问题突出表现在业绩承诺到期后的 1至 2年内，商誉减值的计提受管理层主观
影响较大，偏离其经济实质；（2）从 A公司业绩承诺期间及业绩承诺期后的真实盈余质量可
以看出 A公司很大程度上存在盈余管理行为；（3）A公司管理层在商誉的后续计量和信息披
露方面存在较强的盈余管理动机，包括“洗大澡”动机和大股东减持动机；（4）A公司利用
商誉减值进行盈余管理的行为在资本市场中的长期反应是消极的，对公司自身发展和中小投
资者均会造成一定的不良后果。
最后，本文根据研究得出的结论提出了具体建议：（1）监管机构应加强对高溢价并购交
易的监管；（2）相关部门需完善与商誉后续计量和信息披露相关会计准则；（3）中小投资者
应提高风险防范意识。
关键词:商誉；商誉减值；盈余管理；业绩承诺
I
Abstract
Since 2018, listed companies have frequently accrued huge goodwill impairment losses in the
capital market, resulting in performance thunderstorms. Goodwill impairment is often inseparable
from earnings management behavior. The management often adopts earnings management means
such as no provision, less provision or delayed provision of goodwill impairment losses, so as to
whitewash profits or release losses in a centralized manner. In this context, this paper studies the
goodwill impairment and earnings management behavior of listed companies, in order to sound the
alarm for investors, and provide some suggestions for the supervision of China's capital market and
the improvement of goodwill standards.
Based on the above background, this paper focuses on the goodwill impairment and earnings
management behavior of company a by using the methods of case study, event study and data
analysis, and draws the relevant conclusions as follows: (1) there is a high premium in the initial
recognition of company a's goodwill, and the problem of huge goodwill impairment is prominent in
the one to two years after the expiration of performance commitment. The provision of goodwill
impairment is greatly affected by the subjective influence of the management and deviates from its
economic essence; (2) From the real earnings quality during and after the performance commitment
period of company a, we can see that company a has earnings management behavior to a great
extent; (3) The management of company a has strong earnings management motivation in the
follow-up measurement and information disclosure of goodwill, including the motivation of "taking
a big bath" and the motivation of reducing the holdings of major shareholders; (4) The long-term
reaction of company a's earnings management using goodwill impairment in the capital market is
negative, which will have certain adverse consequences for the company's own development and
small and medium-sized investors.
Finally, according to the conclusions of the study, this paper puts forward specific suggestions:
(1) regulators should strengthen the supervision of high premium M & A transactions; (2)
Relevant departments need to improve the accounting standards related to the subsequent
measurement and information disclosure of goodwill; (3) Small and medium-sized investors should
improve their awareness of risk prevention.
Key words: goodwill; Impairment of goodwill; Earnings management; Performance
commitment
II