摘要
摘 要
当前，国际产业分工和竞争格局发生重大调整，我国经济发展向以国内大
循环为主体的方向转变，市场竞争激烈。顶层设计在规范公司治理上发挥着重
要的作用。2020年 3月开始实施的新《证券法》是我国对资本市场进行规范监
督的新举措，其中的部分条款旨在强化上市公司董监高的责任义务。由此可
见，现阶段加强我国上市公司内部治理依然十分重要。
众所周知，委托代理问题对公司治理十分重要，而上市公司代理成本主要
受公司内部治理机制的影响。高管作为公司的决策层和执行层，其个人的人力
资本素质会影响到公司内部控制机制的运行效果，进而影响公司绩效。本文在
以往专家学者研究的理论基础和研究结果上，通过从高管人力资本和代理成本
两条路径对过往文献进行梳理，深刻了解到上市公司的代理成本在公司内部会
受到高管人力资本素质、股权结构、资本结构和激励计划等的影响，而公司绩
效则会受到代理成本的抑制作用。
之后，本文使用 2008-2019年沪深两市 A股的面板数据，通过固定效应模
型分析高管人力资本素质的各类指标对上市公司绩效的影响，并对代理成本在两
者之间所发挥的机制作用进行检验。随后本文按照是否为国有企业、公司规模大
小和研发支出比重的高低进行分组异质性分析。结尾处运用 Heckman二阶段回
归对内生性问题进行补救。研究结果表明：（1）高管人力资本素质对公司绩效
具有显著的正向影响；（2）高管的人力资本素质通过抑制代理成本从而在一定
程度上提升公司绩效；（3）国有企业、大规模企业和研发支出比重较低的企业
高管人力资本对公司绩效的影响相对较小。基于以上结论，本文提出了加强高管
教育培训、职业培训和校企合作等建议，从而更好地发挥管理者在公司治理上的
作用。
关键词：高管特征、公司绩效、代理成本、人力资本素质
I

Abstract
Abstract
At present, the international industrial division of labor and the pattern of
competition have undergone a major adjustment, China's economic development
has changed to the direction of domestic circulation as the main body, and the market
competition is fierce. Top level design plays an important role in standardizing
corporate governance. The new securities law, which have been implemented in
March 2020, is a new measure to regulate and supervise the capital market in China.
Some of its provisions are aimed at strengthening the responsibilities and obligations
of directors, supervisors and senior executives of listed companies. Therefore, it is
still very important to strengthen the internal governance of listed companies at this
stage.
As we all know, the principal-agent problem is very important to corporate
governance, and the agency cost of listed companies is mainly affected by the
internal governance mechanism. As the decision-making level and executive level
of a company, the human capital quality of the management will affect the operation
effect of the internal control mechanism of the company, and then affect the
performance of the company. Based on the previous theoretical basis and research
results of experts and scholars, this paper combs the past literature from two paths
of executive human capital and agency cost, and deeply understands that the agency
cost of listed companies is affected by the quality of executive human capital, equity
structure, capital structure and incentive plan, And corporate performance will be
inhibited by agency cost.
After that, this article uses the 2008-2019 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share
panel data to analyze the the impact of various indicators of executive human capital
quality on the performance of listed companies through a fixed-effect model, and
tests the mechanism role of agency cost between them. Then this paper makes a
III

高管特征、代理成本与公司绩效—基于人力资本视角的机制探究
group heterogeneity analysis according to whether it is a state-owned enterprise, the
size of the company and the proportion of R&D expenditure. At the end, two stage
regression of Heckman model is used to remedy the endogenous problem. The
research results show that: (1) The human capital quality of executives have a
significant positive impact on company performance; (2) The human capital quality
of executives affect company performance by restraining agency costs; (3) State-
owned enterprises, large-scale enterprises, and executives with a lower proportion
of R&D expenditure have a relatively small impact on corporate performance by the
quality of their executive human capital. Based on the above conclusions, this paper
puts forward some suggestions on strengthening executive education and training,
vocational training and school enterprise cooperation, so as to give better play to the
role of managers in corporate governance.
Keywords: Executive characteristics, Corporate performance, Agency cost, Human
capital quality
IV
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