在当前中国的许多上市公司中，大股东通过间接持股等方式，利用 占据董事会和关键管理位置控制上市公司的决策与运营，攫取上市公司 资产，侵害中小股东权益。大股东的利益输送的手法繁复隐蔽，对大股 东利益输送的案例研究，对于小股东如何鉴别此类公司，以及监管层弥 补此类监管和政策的短板，具有重要的现实意义。 本文以上市公司高升控股为例，对其经营历史，以及控股股东如何 获得上市公司的股权经过进行分析，分析出由于控制权和现金流权背离， 大股东有很强的动机实施利益输送。通过分析其在股权结构上隐含的风 险入手，对大股东操纵上市公司利用业务转型为契机，通过处置资产、 收购资产等过程中的利益输送行为进行了具体地分析。然后继续分析大 股东如何通过利用对上市公司的控制权和信息先发优势，通过利用评估 报告折价处置资产，定向增发折价发行、虚增资产价格、质押股票给大 股东方提供贷款，擅自利用上市公司给大股东提供担保，大股东甚至直 接转移公司资产等方法以侵害中小股东利益为代价在资本市场获得丰厚 得利。 作为又一上市公司经营层面和资本运作利益输送案例，可以丰富相 关研究，深化对代理理论的理解，并为监管部门进一步完善定向增发细 则、以及完善上市公司治理结构和信息披露相关法律法规提供借鉴。同 时，也给投资者予以提示，股票投资必须深入研究公司治理与资本运作 目的，得出自己独立的结论，从而进行更理智的投资。 关键词:资产购买，定向增发，质押，违规担保，大股东利益输送 A CASE STUDY ON THE TUNNELING BEHAVIOR OF THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS OF GOSUN HOLDING ABSTRACT In many listed companies in China, controlling shareholders control the decision-making and operation of listed companies through indirect shareholding and other means by occupying the board of directors and key management positions, seize the assets of listed companies and infringe on the rights and interests of minority shareholders. The methods of transferring the interests by the controlling shareholders are complicated and hidden. The case study of interest transferring by controlling shareholders is of practical importance to the identification of such companies by minority shareholders and for the amendment of related regulation and policy omissions to authorities. This paper takes a listed company, Gosun Holding, as an example, analyzes its operation history, how the controlling shareholders obtained the equity of listed company, as a result of the deviation of control rights and cash- flow rights, the controlling shareholders have strong motive to carry out the interest transmission. Starting with the analysis of the risks implied in the ownership structure, this paper does a concrete analysis of the controlling shareholders manipulating the listed companies by using the business transformation as an opportunity, through the disposal of assets, acquisition of assets and other ways of interest transmission. And then it continues to analyze how the controlling shareholders use the control rights and information pre-emptive advantages, to transfer interest to controlling shareholders in the process of disposing assets through manipulating the evaluation reports, private placement of additional discounts to controlling shareholders, exaggerated asset prices, pledged shares to provide loans and unauthorized loan guarantees to the controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders even directly transfer company assets to themselves. While all these are at the cost of infringing the interests of minority shareholders and the only purpose is to enrich controlling shareholders. As another case of listed companies' tunneling behavior, it can provide more information on the relevant research, deepen the understanding of agency theory, and provide reference for regulatory departments to further improve the detailed regulations of private placement, and improve the governance structure of listed companies and relevant laws and regulations on disclosure requirements. At the same time, it also reminds investors that they need to make research and study by themselves as well, draw their own independent conclusions, so as to make rational investment decisions. KEY WORDS: Merge and acquisition, Private placement, Pledge, Unauthorized guarantee, Tunneling 目录 第一章 绪论 ................................................................. 1 1.1 研究背景 ............................................................... 1 1.2 研究内容和方法 ....................................................... 2 1.2.1 研究内容 ........................................................... 2 1.2.2 研究方法 ........................................................... 2 1.3 主要发现和创新点 ..................................................... 3 1.3.1 主要发现 ........................................................... 3 1.3.2 研究创新点 ......................................................... 3 1.4 论文结构 ............................................................... 4 第2章 制度背景和理论基础 ................................................... 6 2.1 定向增发的制度背景 ..................................................... 6 2.2 大股东利益输送的理论分析 ............................................... 6 2.2.1 委托代理理论 ....................................................... 6 2.2.2 信息不对称理论 ..................................................... 7 2.2.3 利益输送方式 ....................................................... 7 2.2.4 通过定向增发融资以购买资产中的大股东利益输送主要手段 ............... 9 2.3 资产评估价格方式 ...................................................... 10 第3章 高升控股基本情况及大股东利益输送的动因分析 .......................... 12 3.1 高升控股公司简介 ...................................................... 12 3.2 高升控股公司发展历史 .................................................. 12 3.3 高升控股股权结构 ...................................................... 13 3.4高升控股财务分析 ...................................................... 14 3.4.1 市值分析和资本运作背景分析 ........................................ 14 3.4.2 成长能力分析 ...................................................... 15 3.4.3 偿债能力分析 ...................................................... 17 3.4.4 运营能力分析 ...................................................... 18 3.4.5 现金流量分析 ...................................................... 19 3.4.6 高升控股财务分析小结 .............................................. 20 第4章 高升控股处置资产，并购及定向增发的过程分析 .......................... 21 4.1高升控股处置上市公司资产过程 .......................................... 21 4.1.1 剥离主营业务资产的基本情况 ........................................ 21 4.1.2 被剥离资产的估值疑团 .............................................. 21 4.1.3 实控人及其家族企业的关系 .......................................... 23 4.2高升控股收购高升科技及第一次定向增发 .................................. 24 4.2.1 第一次定向增发基本情况 ............................................ 24 4.2.2 被收购的高升科技基本情况 .......................................... 25 4.2.3 参与第一次定增各方的关系 .......................................... 26 4.2.4 第一次定向增发前后参与各方的持股比例 .............................. 27 4.3高升控股收购莹悦网络及第二次定向增发 .................................. 27 4.3.1 第二次定向增发基本情况 ............................................ 27 4.3.2 被收购的莹悦网络基本情况 .......................................... 28 4.3.3 参与第二次定增并购各方的关联关系 .................................. 30 4.3.4 第一次定向增发前后参与各方的持股比例 .............................. 31 4.4高升控股拟收购华麒通信及拟第三次定向增发 .............................. 31 4.4.1 第三次定向增发基本情况 ............................................ 31 4.4.2 被收购的华麒通信基本情况 .......................................... 32 4.4.3 参与定增并购各方的关系 ............................................ 34 第5章 高升控股大股东利益输送的过程分析 .................................... 35 5.1 处置资产过程中的利益输送 .............................................. 35 5.2 被收购公司资产评估过程中的利益输送 .................................... 35 5.2.1 虚增资产评估价格以掏空上市公司 .................................... 35 5.2.2 收购后