当前经济环境下，互联网、电子标签、条码技术以及各种应用软件组合起 来的信息网络，已经使得供应链成员之间的实时信息共享成为了可能。但是技 术上的可行性并不意味着供应链成员之间的信息共享会畅通无阻，企业之间进 行信息共享还需要解决一个激励机制的设计问题。本文针对供应链成员企业间 存在的需求信息不对称问题，考虑供应链的实际运作，在零售通道竞争环境下 研究供应链需求信息共享模型。本文关注到，随着产品销售通道的不断增加， 企业面临的竞争除了传统的零售商与零售商之间的竞争，还包括线上通道与线 下通道之间的竞争。此外，零售通道竞争包含了价格竞争和数量竞争等多种形 式。目前，很多学者关注了零售通道竞争环境下供应链成员之间的竞争决策与 供应链协调问题，但大部分的研究是在信息对称情形下展开的，在信息不对称 领域仍然存在着很大的研究空间。本文在已有研究的基础上，考虑产品质量提 升、决策者风险态度等实际问题，研究零售通道竞争环境下供应链成员之间的 需求信息共享模型，具有重要的现实意义和理论价值。本文的研究主要从以下 三方面展开： （1）关注供应链成员具有风险规避态度的实际情况，选择合理的风险量 化工具反映决策者的风险态度，基于此分析供应链成员的竞争决策，研究零售 商需求信息共享的价值。构建考虑供应链成员风险态度的信息共享模型，分析 以下三种情形：①供应链成员风险中性；②零售商风险规避；③供应商风险规 避。同时，为分析零售商竞争带来的影响，分别在以上三种情形的基础上构建 一个供应商对一个零售商和一个供应商对两个零售商这两种供应链运行结构。 通过竞争分析，求解上述六个模型中供应链成员的最优决策，最终分析了不同 模型中零售商的需求信息共享策略。研究发现，考虑供应链成员风险规避态度 时，若供应商能够有效提升产品质量，零售商愿意与供应商进行信息共享。此 外，当零售商不愿意与供应商进行信息共享时，在一定条件下供应商仍然可以 浙江工业大学博士学位论文 II 通过转移支付来激励零售商进行信息共享。本研究内容进一步分析零售商竞争、 风险规避程度、信息精确度对零售商需求信息共享策略的影响，并得到了多样 化的结论。 （2）考虑产品可以通过线下实体店和电商平台等多种零售通道进行销售 的实际情况，构建由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的双通道供应链。假设供应 商的线下通道和零售商的线上通道进行价格竞争，且零售商掌握私有的需求信 息。在此基础上，根据供应商先决定销售价格还是零售商先决定销售价格的不 同决策顺序，分别构建了信号传递模型和信息甄别模型。在信号传递模型中， 分析了分离均衡和混同均衡中供应链成员的最优决策及相应的利润。特别地， 通过直观标准（intuitive criterion）对均衡进行了精炼，并得到分离均衡为精炼 贝叶斯均衡。此外，通过与信息对称情形下的决策进行比较，研究发现需求信 息不对称会降低供应链性能。在信息甄别模型中，引入契约清单，构建委托代 理模型，并求解了能够实现信息甄别的最优契约清单。进一步通过与信息对称 情形下的决策进行比较，研究发现虽然需求信息不对称下供应链性能始终低于 集成供应链，但相对于需求信息对称情形而言，供应链性能反而有所增加。因 此，在信息甄别模型中，通过契约清单的合理设计，供应商不仅可以获得零售 商的私有需求信息，还能促进供应链成员之间进行紧密的合作。 （3）考虑供应商拥有私有需求信息的实际情况，构建了一个双通道供应链。 假设供应商决定产品质量，且由于市场需求的不确定性，供应商的产品质量和 直销通道库存量是不可立约的，因此零售商需要通过契约方案的设计来甄别供 应商的私有信息。特别地，由于在不同类型的供应链中，供应商和零售商的决 策顺序是不同的，因此考虑了以下两种情形：①供应商先决定直销通道库存量， 零售商再决定产品订购量；②零售商先决定产品订购量，供应商再决定直销通 道库存量。通过引入两部定价契约清单，构建委托代理模型，分别求解了两种 决策情形中最优的契约方案，实现了信息共享。本研究内容进一步通过比较两 种情形中供应链成员最优决策和期望利润，分析了需求信息不对称对供应链产 生的影响。 总体而言，本文通过实际案例分析，基于零售通道竞争环境，针对供应链 成员企业之间存在的需求信息不对称问题，并结合多样化的供应链运行结构， 设计合理的契约方案，实现供应链需求信息共享，进一步促进供应链成员之间 的高效合作，为企业的发展提供现实指导意义。 关键词：零售通道竞争，需求信息共享，风险规避，产品质量，契约设计 零售通道竞争环境下供应链需求信息共享研究 III RESEARCH ON DEMAND INFORMATION-SHARING IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH COMPETING RETAIL CHANNELS ABSTRACT The advance of the information network consisting of Internet, electronic data interchange, bar code, and various application soft-wares, has enabled real-time information sharing among the supply chain members. However, technical feasibility does not mean that information sharing between the supply chain members is unobstructed. Effective incentive mechanisms need to be designed to realize information sharing. In this paper, we focus on demand information asymmetry among the supply chain members. Based on the actual operations of different supply chains, diverse information-sharing models under are proposed. Since the suppliers can sell products through various channels, retail channel competition does not only include the traditional competition between retailers, but also include the online-offline competition. In addition, the form of retail channel competition includes price competition and quantity competition. Nowadays, many researchers have concentrated on the supply chain management under retail channel competition and proposed diverse contracts to improve the supply chain performance, but there are still many problems are unsolved under information asymmetry. In this study, we relate quality improvement, players’ risk attitudes and other issues into the information-sharing models. In general, this study includes the following three aspects. (1) Face the fact that supply chain members may have risk-averse attitudes, adopt an appropriate method to measure the players’ risk attitudes, and study the value of the retailers’ demand information sharing. Considering the supplier’s 浙江工业大学博士学位论文 IV product quality improvement, we mainly examine the following three situations: ① all supply chain members are risk-neutral; ② the retailers are risk-averse; ③ the supplier is risk-averse. We propose the supply chain information-sharing models without retail competition and with retail competition under three situations, respectively. Hence, we develop six models and analyze the supply chain members’ optimal decisions under each model. Through model development, we find that the retailers are willing to share information when the supplier is efficient in improving product quality. Furthermore, when the retailers are not willing to share information, the supplier can induce the retailers to share information by side payments under specific conditions. Finally, sensitivity analyses are conducted, and the impacts of retail competition, risk aversion, and information accuracy on the retailers’ information-sharing decisions are examined. (2) Considering that the supplier can sell products not only through the offline channel, but also through e-commerce platforms, we develop a dual-channel supply chain with one supplier and one retailer which possesses private demand information. Assuming the two members compete on retail price, we propose a signaling model and a screening model based on whether the supplier makes retail price decision first or the retailer makes retail price decision first. In the signaling model, we analyze the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium, respectively. Specially, intuitive criterion is adopted to refine multiple equilibria. In the screening model, we introduce a menu of contracts and develop the principle-agent model to realize information sharing in the supply chain. By model development, we find that in the signaling model, demand information asymmetry may lower the supply chain performance. But in the screening model, through optimal contract design, the supply chain performance can be improved comparing with the situation under demand information symmetry. (3) Develop a dual-channel supply chain, and consider the situation when the supplier makes effort to improve product quality and possesses private demand information. Because of demand uncertainty, the supplier’s product quality and inventory decisions are noncontractible, thus the retailer cannot infer the supplier’s demand information through the supplier’s decisions. Hence, we propose the optimal menu of contracts to realize information sharing in the supply chain. Specially, because the sequences