Our thanks go to Katharina Nachbar for guiding the production of the manuscriptand preparing the graphics as well as to Pierre Ortlieb for his editing support. AndrásDerzsi-Horváth, Mirko Hohmann, Mikko Huotari, Katrin Kinzelbach, Sabine Muscat,and Claudia Wessling provided valuable comments on earlier drafts. Jens Bastian andTamás Matura were kind with their time and insights during research trips to Athensand Budapest. GPPi gratefully acknowledges funding provided by Stiftung Mercatorthat supported parts of the research on which this paper is based. Participants at aworkshop on “European Democracies and the Politics of Authoritarian Infuencing”(in cooperation with Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oxford), which was hosted by StiftungMercator in Berlin on May 22, 2017, provided constructive comments that also guidedthe research for this paper. 2GPPi & MERICSChina’s rapidly increasing political infuencing eforts in Europe and the self-confdentpromotion of its authoritarian ideals pose a signifcant challenge to liberal democracyas well as Europe’s values and interests. While Beijing’s eforts have received much lessscrutiny than the eforts of Putin’s Russia, Europe neglects China’s increasing infuenceat its own peril. Drawing on its economic strength and a Chinese Communist Party(CCP) apparatus that is geared towards strategically building stocks of infuence acrossthe globe, Beijing’s political infuencing eforts in Europe are bound to be much moreconsequential in the medium- to long-term future than those of the Kremlin.China commands a comprehensive and fexible infuencing toolset, ranging fromthe overt to the covert, primarily deployed across three arenas: political and economicelites, media and public opinion, and civil society and academia. In expanding itspolitical infuence, China takes advantage of the one-sided openness of Europe.Europe’s gates are wide open whereas China seeks to tightly restrict access of foreignideas, actors and capital.The efects of this asymmetric political relationship are beginning to show withinEurope. European states increasingly tend to adjust their policies in fts of “preemptiveobedience” to curry favor with the Chinese side. Political elites within the EuropeanUnion (EU) and in the European neighborhood have started to embrace Chineserhetoric and interests, including where they contradict national and/or Europeaninterests. EU unity has sufered from Chinese divide and rule tactics, especially wherethe protection and projection of liberal values and human rights are concerned. Beijingalso benefts from the ‘services’ of willing enablers among European political andprofessional classes who are happy to promote Chinese values and interests. Ratherthan only China trying to actively build up political capital, there is also much infuencecourting on the part of those political elites in EU member states who seek to attractChinese money or to attain greater recognition on the global plane.The Chinese leadership’s political infuence-seeking in Europe is driven bytwo interlocking motivations. First and foremost, it seeks to secure regime stabilityat home. Second, Beijing aims to present its political concepts as a competitive, andultimately superior, political and economic model. Driven by these motivations,Beijing pursues three related goals. First, it aims to build global support on specifcissues and policy agendas. This includes fostering solid networks among Europeanpoliticians, businesses, media, think tanks, and universities, thereby creating layersof active support for Chinese interests. Second, China seeks to weaken Western unity,both within Europe, and across the Atlantic. Third, Beijing pushes hard to create amore positive global perception of China’s political and economic system as a viablealternative to liberal democracies.In the debate on Beijing’s infuencing, Chinese ofcials have complained aboutWestern actors questioning “normal economic co-operation and cultural exchangeswith other countries.” This negates the fact that, from the perspective of liberaldemocracies, all areas of interaction with China are potentially problematic and deserveExecutive Summary 3Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing Political Inuence in Europe scrutiny. After all, China’s political model is based on an authoritarian regime intent onstrengthening a deeply illiberal surveillance state at home while also exporting – or atleast trying to popularize – its political and economic development model abroad. Thus,today, all areas of Europe’s interaction with China have strong political undertones.If Europe intends to stop the momentum of Chinese infuencing eforts, it needsto act swiftly and decisively. In responding to China’s advance, European governmentsneed to make sure that the liberal DNA of their countries’ political and economicsystems stay intact. Some restrictions will be necessary, but Europe should not copyChina’s illiberalism. While staying as open as possible, Europe needs to address criticalvulnerabilities to Chinese authoritarian infuencing through a multi-pronged strategythat integrates diferent branches of government, businesses, media, civil society,culture/arts as well as academia:Europe needs to better leverage the collective weight of EU member states.Larger member states like Germany and France need to take serious stepstowards putting their privileged bilateral relations with China in the service ofcommon European interests. Complaining about the 16+1 format China uses tointeract with smaller EU members in Central and Eastern Europe while engagingin 1+1 formats with Beijing will not help to come up with a collective EU responseon issues where Chinese action fails to resonate with shared European interests. European governments need to invest in high-caliber, independentChina expertise. Raising awareness about and responding to China’s politicalinfuencing eforts in Europe can only succeed if there is sufcient impartialexpertise on China in think tanks, universities, NGOs, and media across Europe.This will also help to keep out ‘unwanted’ Chinese money in those institutions.The EU needs to continue providing alternatives to (the promises of)Chinese investments in European countries. Brussels can point to the factthat by far the most investment within the EU and its periphery still comes fromwithin Europe. In the vast majority of instances, EU funding still is much moreattractive for EU member states than Chinese money. However, the EU alsoneeds to implement measures to align BRI investments in its neighborhood withEuropean interests. This includes enabling third countries to properly evaluate,monitor, and prepare large-scale infrastructure projects, including thosefnanced by China. The EU and its members need to bolster a fexible set of investmentscreening tools. Europe must be able to stop state-driven takeovers ofcompanies that are of signifcant public interest. In addition to high-tech sectorsas well as key parts of public infrastructure, this notably includes the media asan institution of critical importance to liberal democracies. In addition, foreignfunding of political parties from outside Europe, including from China, should bebanned across the EU.。。。。。。