2 rative of humiliation—if not for a century, at least for 20 years— with its interests disregarded, its aspirations denigrated, its suferingignored, and its rightful place as a nation of the frst rank usurped. Given this context, this Perspective presents an argumentabout how to confront potential Russian aggression in the Balticregion, drawing on years of expertise analyzing the region andon the results of numerous wargames conducted by the RANDCorporation. We articulate that argument by answering a series ofquestions. What Does Russia Want Russia is a great power by any relevant defnition.1 It wants whatany great power wants:internal stabilitysecure borders, meaning, inter alia, a preponderance of infu- ence in the areas along its peripherya favorable balance of power with other states it recognizes aspeersgeneral acceptance that it has a legitimate say in any issuetouching on its self-defned interests. Tese goals are similar to U.S. goals—consider, for example,the Monroe Doctrine’s insistence that the United States wouldnot tolerate other great powers’ interference in the Western hemi- sphere. However, Russian goals are problematic from the U.S. pointof view—frst, because Russia’s border regions include multiplecountries with which the United States has treaty commitmentsand that have no desire to live in a Russian sphere of infuence.Second, many of Russia’s neighbors are discomfted by some ofits approaches to securing its localdroit de regard —which haveincluded direct imperial expansion, the acquisition of clients or sat- ellite states, or attempted subversion. Te Kremlin’s recent behaviorhas done nothing to assuage the concerns of those who fnd them- selves ensconced on its borders. A third reason Russia’s goals are problematic has less to do withRussia per se and more to do with the nature of the internationalorder, the dynamics of which doom great powers to some degree ofcompetition. Tis competition can be exacerbated or mitigated bya variety of factors, but empirically we fnd that a great power willseek to maintain a favorable balance of power with other actors inthe system. Tis tends toward the creation of “security dilemmas”:In this case, Russian actions to increase its own perceived safety areseen by others as increasing the threat to them, compelling coun- tervailing actions, which in turn motivate further Russian steps toprotect itself. Unchecked, a security dilemma can devolve into anarms race and crisis-ridden competitions—and ultimately, into war. Ameliorating these pressures is why the United States andits allies are pursuing a two-part strategy of dialogue and deter- rence toward Moscow. Tis approach seeks to reduce incentives forany Russian military action by bolstering NATO’s posture alongRussia’s vulnerable eastern frontiers while striving to reopen chan- Russian goals are problematic from the U.S. point of view, frst, because Russia’sborder regions include multiple countrieswith which the United States has treatycommitments and that have no desire to live in a Russian sphere of infuence. 3 nels of communication with an eye toward reducing tensions andidentifying opportunities for cooperation with Russia. Te perni- cious logic of the security dilemma is that neither party is inclinedto credit the nonhostile intentions of the other; however, couplingactions that maximize defensive benefts with ongoing dialogueaimed at reducing overall distrust may mitigate the most-dangerousconsequences and avoid a spiral toward war. In any event, giventhat security dilemma dynamics are almost inevitable features ofgreat power competition, eschewing prudent deterrent measures inthe hope of avoiding such dilemmas would seem unwise. Why Would Russia Attack NATO On any given day, Russia almost certainly has no intention ofattacking NATO outright. Countries by and large do not go to warwith one another on whims. But the challenge for NATO is notto deter Russia on any given day; it is to deter Russia on the oneday that war seems, to Moscow, a viable option given the choicesavailable.Broadly speaking, a country can go to war—or at least chooserationally to go to war—for one of only two reasons.2 Te frst isbecause it feels compelled to—war appears to be the least awfuloption among the array of bad options available. Tis was the situ- ation that Japan saw itself in relative to the United States in 1941.Japan viewed all the other choices as unacceptable; thus, war— even one that Tokyo understood to be potentially disastrous—wasthe only alternative that ofered even a prospect of achieving Japan’sobjectives.3 Te second reason a great power will go to war is because itsees an opportunity to achieve a strategic goal—usually quickly— at a price that it is willing to pay. In the past, these were the wars— inevitably expected to be “over by Christmas”—to which countriessent their soldiers with parades and thrown fowers. We do not have to reach back too far into history or try toidentify with alien mindsets to fnd an example of why a countrychooses war as a means to a desired end. In 2003, the United Statesinvaded Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein—but also, perhaps moreimportantly, to begin an imagined remaking of the Arab MiddleEast.As this example demonstrates, and perhaps it is needless to say,a war that begins out of perceptions of either necessity or opportu- nity often does not go the way the initiator expects. Russia could at some juncture see itself in either of these twosituations—and, importantly, it is the perception of the actor thatmatters, not the reality. In terms of the frst scenario, Russia’s nar- rative of victimization describes Russia as bordered—indeed, nearlysurrounded—by an implacably hostile NATO alliance that hasadvanced to its very frontiers, repeatedly broken promises, ignoredMoscow’s interests at every turn, actively sought to overthrowregimes friendly to Russia (and indeed has tried to destabilize Rus- sia’s own government), and uses a fctitious “Russian threat” to jus- tify an ever more aggressive foreign policy and arms buildup. Tiscertainly sets the preconditions for a scenario where the Kremlin,faced with some series of unfortunate events, domestic or interna- tional, could convince itself that military action against NATOrepresented the least bad of a range of terrible options, just as theJapanese leadership did in 1941. Like Japan, Russia might well beOn any given day, Russia almost certainlyhas no intention of attacking NATO outright. 4 proven wrong, but the process of establishing that proof would bedangerous and costly. Paradoxically, in some unforeseen future circumstances, theRussian leadership could also convince themselves that they werein the opposite position—that an opportunity existed to infict acatastrophic defeat on the threatening NATO alliance by crushingits underprepared defenders in the Baltic states. Taking advantageof this opportunity would demonstrate via a shattering tactical vic- tory NATO’s strategic inability to fulfll its primary, foundationalmission: guaranteeing the territorial integrity and political indepen- dence of its member states. In so doing, Russia would seek to dividethe alliance to the point of dissolving it, break the transatlanticsecurity link, and reestablish itself as the dominant power in East- ern and Central Europe. Although this strategy appears alien tocurrent Russian thinking, the chance of inficting such a devastat- ing strategic blow on its longtime nemesis—and nearly three yearsof RAND wargaming and analysis strongly indicate that Russiacould impose just such a defeat on NATO’s eastern fank in thespace of tens of hours—could, one fateful day, be seen in Moscowas justifying the profound attendant risks.4 However, the key thing to recognize here is that it is theconsequencesof failing to deter a Russian attack that make this acompelling problem, not necessarily its raw likelihood. Russia is theonly country in the world that maintains the c