Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RANDintellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publicationonline is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as itis unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any ofits research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit /pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help makecommunities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit,nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at /giving/contributeFor more information on this publication, visit /t/RR2567 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0083-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R is a registered trademark. iiiPrefaceSince March 2015, China has conducted a series of long-range strategic bomber flightsthroughout the Asia-Pacific region, including over the South China Sea, near Japan, and aroundTaiwan. These flights have unsettled China’s neighbors and have amplified questions overBeijing’s strategy for handling sovereignty disputes. Chinese president Xi Jinping, newlyemboldened by the elimination of term limits, has prioritized development of the People’sLiberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) to transform it into a “world-class” and “strategic air force”capable of executing multiple strategic-level missions far from Chinese shores. Recent bomberflights are an actualization of Xi’s intent, with important consequences for U.S. interests in theregion. The research reported here was commissioned by the United States Air Force and conductedwithin the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of an FY2017project on the growing reach of Chinese aerospace power. RAND Project AIR FORCERAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. AirForce’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF providesthe Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development,employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces.Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower,Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The researchreported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000.Additional information about PAF is available on our website:/paf/This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force in December 2017.The draft report, issued on January 18, 2018, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S.Air Force subject-matter experts. ivContentsPreface ....... iii Figures ......... v Summary ..... vi Acknowledgments ... x Abbreviations ......... xi 1. Introduction ......... 1 Methodology and Sources ........... 6 2. Cataloging PLAAF Bomber Flights in the Asia-Pacific . 7 Flights into the Western Pacific13 Flights into the South China Sea ........... 17 Flights Around Taiwan .. 20 Flights near Japan .......... 25 3. Drivers of Chinese Bomber Flights ....... 27 Bombers in the Context of China’s Pursuit of a “Strategic Air Force” . 27 Taking a Cue from Russian and U.S. Models ... 31 Win-Win Flights: Deterrence Flights Also Serve as Training Opportunity ...... 35 Flight Evolution Suggests Planned Rollout ....... 37 PLAAF Use of Social Media for Internal and External Consumption .. 38 4. Regional Reactions to Chinese Bombers .......... 45 Japanese Reactions ........ 45 Taiwanese Reactions ..... 47 Other Regional Reactions .......... 48 5. China Developing a Next-Generation Bomber . 50 Potential H-20 Capabilities ........ 50 A Stepping Stone: An Air-Refuelable H-6 ........ 52 Implications of the H-20 Strategic Bomber ....... 54 6. Implications and Recommendations for the United States ........ 55 Appendix A. A Full List of PLA H-6 Long-Range Bomber Flights over Water .. 60 References . 67 vFiguresFigure 2.1. PLAAF Long-Distance H-6K Flights over Water Since 2015 . 9 Figure 2.2. Notional PLAAF Bomber over Water Flight Routes .. 10 Figure 2.3. Chinese Conception of First and Second Island Chains ......... 11 Figure 2.4. South China Sea and Chinese Territorial Claims ........ 12 Figure 2.5. PLAAF H-6K with Missile near Japan ........... 16 Figure 2.6. Taiwan IDF Fighter Intercepting PLAAF H-6K near Taiwan22 Figure 3.1. PLAAF Bomber Long-Range Training Cycle36 Figure 3.2. PLAAF Weibo Post of H-6K Flying over Scarborough Shoal ........... 40 Figure 3.3. SCIO Twitter Post on H-6K Flying over Scarborough Shoal . 41 Figure 3.4. PLAAF Weibo Post of H-6K Flying Around Taiwan with Missile ... 43 。。。。。。