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Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at /giving/contributeLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0054-3 For more information on this publication, visit /t/RR2472 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R is a registered trademark. iiiPrefaceIn September 2016, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen David Goldfein announced aninitiative to strengthen joint leaders and teams. This initiative is looking, in part, at how toimprove joint warfighting proficiency so airmen can better integrate into, influence, and leadjoint teams. Differences between Air Force and joint doctrine could contribute to airmenspeaking a different language than their joint counterparts or being unfamiliar with the processesand principles employed in a joint setting. The Air Force asked RAND to describe the currentdifferences and similarities between Air Force and joint doctrine and identify ways to increasedoctrinal alignment. This report also considers how airmen currently encounter joint doctrine toanswer two questions. First, to what extent could greater alignment of Air Force and jointdoctrine help airmen gain greater joint proficiency Second, would changes to the way Air Forceofficers learn or use doctrine help to promote joint proficiencyThe research reported here was commissioned by Maj Gen Brian M. Killough, director ofStrategic Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements,Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program ofRAND Project AIR FORCE as part of the project “Air Force and Joint Doctrine Gap Analysis.”RAND Project AIR FORCERAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. AirForce’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAFprovides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting thedevelopment, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, andcyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Strategy and Doctrine; ForceModernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; and ResourceManagement. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: /paf/This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force on November 15,2017. The draft report, issued on December 12, 2017, was reviewed by formal peer reviewersand U.S. Air Force subject-matter experts. ivContentsPreface .. iii Figures and Table v Summary ........... vi Acknowledgments ......... xi Abbreviations....xii 1. Introduction .... 1 Operational Doctrine and Doctrine Development ......... 3 2. Joint Language and Mindset in Air Force Doctrine ...... 6 Doctrine Comparison Methodology ..... 6 Doctrine Comparison Findings .......... 12 Summary ....... 41 3. Current Challenges to Promoting Joint Warfighting Proficiency ........ 43 Challenges to Using Doctrine to Promote Joint Warfighting Proficiency ........ 43 Limited Opportunities to Use Joint Doctrine and Constructs .. 53 Summary ....... 58 4. Recommendations to Promote Joint Warfighting Proficiency59 Recommendations for Doctrine Content and Development .... 59 Increase Exposure to and Experience with Joint Doctrine and Constructs ....... 66 Conclusion .... 67 References ........ 69 vFiguresFigure 2.1. Substantive Alignment Scale ........... 10 Figure 2.2. Tone Scale .. 11 Figure 2.3. Air Force Doctrine Alignment with Joint Doctrine .. 14 Figure 2.4. Relationship Between the Joint Targeting Cycle and the Air Tasking Cycle17 Figure 2.5. Joint and Air Force Counterair and IAMD Frameworks ...... 22 Figure 2.6. Air Force and Joint Intelligence Principles .. 23 Figure 2.7. Sample Joint Operational Approach26 Figure 2.8. Sample Air Force Operational Approach ..... 27 Figure 2.9. Differences in Air Force and Joint Intelligence Doctrine Organization ........ 32 Figure 2.10. Air Force Doctrine Tone.... 34 Figure 3.1. Personnel for the Air Force Doctrine Center48 Figure 3.2. Number of Articles on Doctrine inASPJover Time50 Figure 3.3. Services of Service Leaders Referenced in Joint Doctrine Callout Boxes ..... 53 TableTable 2.1. Joint and Air Force Doctrine Publication Comparisons ........... 7 。。。。。。