随着经济全球化的不断发展,金融风险问题也日益突出,公司治理也显得越来
越重要。因此,研究公司治理对银行风险承担行为的影响对我国商业银行的发
展有着重要的理论意义和现实意义

本文以公司治理对银行风险承担行为的影响为研究对象。理论方面,从股
权结构、薪酬激励、董事会特征、监事会治理这四个方面出发,结合相关文献
理论分析公司治理对银行风险承担行为的影响。实证方面,本文以我国16家上
市银行2008-2015年的数据为样本,实证分析公司治理对上市银行风险承担行
为的影响

实证主要分为三个部分,第一部分基于数据包络分析方法(DEA),以53
家商业银行2008-2015年数据为样本,度量出我国商业银行的成本效率和技术
效率。第二部分区别于现有研究中银行风险承担行为的度量方法,本文基于结
构方程模型,结合骆驼评级体系(CAMEL)以53家商业银行2008-2015年数
据为样本,衡量出我国商业银行的风险承担行为。第三部分基于面板数据回归
分析方法,以16家上市银行2008-2015年数据为样本,研究公司治理对银行风
险承担行为的影响。第一部分实证结果表明,2008-2015年我国商业银行的成
本效率和技术效率的整体水平还是很高的,特别是技术效率。第二部分实证结
果表明:银行风险承担行为得分越高,风险承担越小。第三部分实证结果表明:
股权集中度(第一大股东持股比例与上市银行风险承担行为呈显著的正相关关
系,前十大股东持股比例与上市银行风险承担行为呈显著的正相关关系)与上
市银行风险承担行为之间呈显著正相关,股权制衡度则与上市银行风险承担行
为呈显著负相关;高管薪酬与上市银行风险承担行为呈显著倒U型关系;董事
会规模与上市银行风险承担行为呈显著正相关,独立董事占比与上市银行风险
承担行为呈显著负相关,而年度内董事会会议次数与上市银行风险承担行为呈
I 正相关关系,但不显著;监事会规模与上市银行风险承担行为呈显著负相关关
系,年度内监事会会议次数与上市银行风险承担行为呈不显著负相关关系;资
产规模与上市银行风险承担行为呈显著负相关关系,不存在loo-big-to-fail”现
象。基于实证结果分析的基础上,本文提出了降低股权集中度,提高股权制衡
度;完善高管薪酬激励机制;控制好董事会、监事会的规模,降低独立董事占
比;提高董事会会议、监事会会议的质量这四条对策建议

关键词:上市商业银行;公司治理;数据包络分析;结构方程模型;
风险承担行为
II Abstract
Finance is the core component of China’s economy,which plays an important
role in China&39;s economic stability. With the development of economic globalization,
the problem of financial risk is becoming more and more serious. Therefore,it is of
great theoretical and practical significance to study the impact of corporate
governance on the risk-taking behavior of banks.
In this paper, the impact of corporate governance on the risk-taking behavior of
banks is studied. In theory, from the four aspects of ownership structure, salary
incentive, the characteristics of the board of directors and the board of supervisors,
the paper analyzes the impact of corporate governance on the risk-taking behavior of
banks. In the empirical aspect, this paper takes the data of 16 listed banks in China
from 2008 to 2015 as the sample, and empirically analyzes the impact of corporate
governance on the risk-taking behavior of listed banks.
The empirical analysis is divided into three parts. The first part is based on the
data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, taking the data of the 53 commercial
banks in 2008-2015 as the sample to measure the cost eflBciency and technical
efficiency of China’s commercial banks. Methods to measure the second part
different from the existing research of bank risk-taking behavior, based on the
structural equation model, combined with the camels rating system (CAMEL) to 53
commercial banks from 2008 to 2015 data as the sample, measure the risk of China&39;s
commercial banks taking behavior. In the third part, based on the panel data
regression analysis method, taking the data of the 16 listed banks from 2008 to 2015
as the sample,this paper studies the influence of corporate governance on the
risk-taking behavior of banks. The first part of the empirical results show that, the
overall level of China’s commercial banks’ cost efficiency and technical efficiency
m from 2008 to 2015 is still high, especially technical efficiency. The second part of
the empirical results show that: bank risk-taking behavior score is higher, the smaller
the risk commitment. The third part of the empirical results show that ownership
concentration (the first big shareholder ownership and listed banks risk-taking
behavior is significantly positive correlation, the former top ten shareholders
ownership and listed banks risk-taking behavior is significantly positive correlation)
is positively correlated with the listed banks risk-taking behavior, equity balance
degree and listed banks risk the behavior is negatively correlated; executive
compensation and listed bank risk taking behavior is significantly reversed U; the
size of the board of directors and listed bank risk taking behavior is positively
related to the proportion of independent directors and listed bank risk to bear is
negatively correlated, while the annual number of board meetings and listed bank
risk taking behavior are positively correlated, but not significant; the size of the
board of supervisors and listed bank risk-taking behavior has a significant negative
correlation relationship, in the annual number of meetings of the board of
supervisors and listed bank risk-taking behavior has not significant negative
correlation relationship; bank assets and listed bank risk-taking behavior has a
significant negative correlation relationship, there is no Mtoo-big-to-failn
phenomenon. Based on based on the analysis of the empirical results, this paper puts
forward four countermeasures and suggestions: reduce the concentration of
ownership, raise equity balance degree; improve the executive compensation
incentive mechanism; control the board of directors and board of supervisors scale,
reduce the proportion of independent directors; improve the quality of the board of
directors meeting and the board meeting.
Key words: listed commercial bank; corporate governance; data envelopment
analysis; structural equation model; risk taking behavior
IV
第一章绪论
第一章绪论
随着经济全球化的加快,金融风险的日益突出,银行风险承担行为也逐渐
成为公众关注的焦点。本章分别从研究背景、研宄意义、研究综述、研究方法
等方面展开说明,并对本文的创新点和不足点进行了详细的阐述

1.1研宄背景与意义
1丄1研究背景
银行是主要的金融机构,我们生活中接触到的银行多为商业银行。我国商
业银行在我国的经济发展中有着举足轻重的地位,在一定程度上,不仅能够推
动我国金融业的发展,同时也能够影响我国经济体系的完善以及发展。在我国,
随着经济的不断发展,商业银行也在不断地进行自我完善和发展,目前我国的
上市银行已经发展到了 16家,这16家上市银行在商业银行中占有很大的比重

银行的发展必然伴随着一定的风险承担,近年来,伴随着经济全球化趋势的快
速发展,金融行业也处于迅速发展的阶段,随之而来的金融风险问题也成为了
公众关注的焦点。2008年全球金融危机爆发后,人们开始意识到公司治理对金
融机构风险影响的重要性(Kirkpatri
。。。以上简介无排版格式，详细内容请下载查看