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高新技术企业避税与银行信贷融资的关系研究_MBA毕业论文DOC

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文本描述
摘要
税收规避能够降低企业税负,增加现金,是企业普遍存在的一种行为。但是这种
行为将本应分配给政府的利润留存下来,增加企业税后现金流的同时也带来了各种显
性或隐性的税收成本及非税成本。近年来,许多学者都发现企业高避税会产生种种的
负效应。那么这样的负效应会造成怎样的经济后果?其作用机制会是什么?又该如何
缓解?本文将围绕这些问题展开研究

本文选取 2008-2014 年我国高新技术企业为研究样本,对企业避税和银行信贷融
资间的关系及其作用机制进行理论分析和实证探究。本文首先从信号传递理论出发,
重点考察在信息不对称的情况下,避税的负效应是否会增加企业获得银行信贷融资的
难度,如果避税负效应对银行信贷融资的抑制作用确实存在,那么这种作用在避税程
度不同时是否会存在差异;其次,考察企业避税影响银行信贷融资的作用机制,检验
会计信息质量和内部代理成本是否是避税影响银行信贷融资的两条路径,并且基于委
托代理理论,引入实际控制人直接持股数据,探讨直接持股的持股方式对会计信息质
量和代理成本的影响,能否有效缓解企业高避税对银行信贷融资的负作用;最后,考
虑到经济政策不确定性因素的作用,去考察政策频繁变动引发的不确定性会对企业避
税行为及其银行信贷产生怎样的影响

研究结果显示:(1)企业避税行为会作为一种信号传递给银行,影响企业的银
行信贷融资水平,而且在信息不对称的情况下,避税程度越高,信号作用越强,企业
获得银行信贷融资的难度越大,而避税程度低时,这种负向作用则不明显;(2)企
业避税程度高,会引起会计信息质量的下降和内部代理成本的上升,进而引发企业获
得银行贷款的难度增加的问题,由此可以看出会计信息质量和内部代理成本是企业避
税行为影响银行信贷融资的传导机制;(3)实际控制人直接持股对会计信息质量低
和内部代理成本高存在治理作用,实际控制人直接持股会使得企业会计信息质量提高、
内部代理成本下降,从而减轻企业高避税对银行信贷融资的负向作用,从侧面反映出
会计信息质量和内部代理成本是企业避税影响银行信贷的具体机制;(4)经济政策II
不确定性高会提高企业的避税程度,从而对银行信贷产生更强的负向作用;并且进一
步的研究发现,实际控制人直接持股对企业避税和银行信贷间负向关系的抑制作用在
经济政策不确定性高时表现更明显,而在经济政策不确定性低时作用不明显,这表明
实际控制人直接持股在经济政策不确定性高时发挥了替代效应

本文首次将企业避税、会计信息质量、内部代理成本以及银行贷款四个变量整合
到一个理论框架下,有助于更好地认识避税行为影响企业价值的中介传导机制,拓展
了以往的研究,并深化了我们对企业避税的经济后果以及信贷融资影响因素的认识,
对企业的财务决策有重要启示,也对未来上市公司的股权安排和资本市场监管提供了
参考,具有重要的理论及现实意义

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关键词:避税负效应银行信贷 公司治理 经济政策不确定性
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作者:孙舟天洋
指导教师:罗正英
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III
Research on the Relationship between Tax Avoidance
and Bank Credit Financing of High Tech Enterprises
----Based on the Negative Influence of Tax Avoidance
Abstract
Tax evasion can reduce the corporate tax burden, increase cash, is a common behavior
of enterprises. But this kind of behavior will be distributed to the government&39;s profits
retained, increase the cash flow after tax, but also brought a variety of explicit or implicit
tax costs and non tax costs. Based on the framework of principal-agent, the article finds
that the high tax avoidance of enterprises will produce various negative effects. So what is
the negative effect of high tax avoidance What kind of economic consequences will be
caused by such negative effects What is the mechanism This paper will focus on these
issues.
In this paper, we choose the high-tech enterprises in 2008-2014 as the sample, and
analyze the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and bank credit financing. This
paper summarizes the related theories, and reviews the existing literature; secondly, based
on theoretical literature on the research of enterprises tax avoidance behavior, focusing on
enterprise tax avoidance will decrease the quality of accounting information and cause the
high rise of internal agency costs, and whether it will affect bank credit financing through
the two paths. And through the introduction of the actual controller directly collects data by
way of holding, useing the new alternative instead of the quality of accounting information
and agency cost, discuss the specific mechanism of enterprise tax avoidance high curbing
bank lending; at the same time taking into account the economic policy uncertainty factors,
to explore the policy frequent changes in the uncertainty will cause what the impact on
behavior the enterprise tax avoidance and bank credit financing
The research results show that: (1) the tax avoidance degree is high, will decrease the
quality of accounting information and cause a rise of the internal agency costs, and lead
enterprises to obtain bank loans to increase the difficulty of the problem, it can be seen that
the quality of accounting information and the internal agent cost of enterprises tax
avoidance affect the transmission mechanism of bank credit financing; (2) the actualIV
control of direct holdings have governance function on the quality of accounting
information and internal agency costs, the actual control of direct ownership can
increasethe quality of accounting information and decreaseinternal agency costs, thereby
reducing the enterprise tax on bank credit financing negative effect, reflects the quality of
accounting information and the internal agent cost is the tax avoidance mechanism of bank
specific effects credit; (3) economic policy uncertainty will increase the level of tax
avoidance of enterprises, and thus the bank The negative effect of credit produced stronger;
and this negative effect will be more obvious when the quality of accounting information is
low, and the internal agency costs is high, further confirmed the quality of accounting
information and the internal agency costs is an important channel for tax avoidance affect
bank credit.
This is the first time to the enterprise tax avoidance, the quality of accounting
information (internal agency costs) and bank loans three variables into a theoretical
framework, it contributes to a better understanding to the intermediary transmission
mechanism of the impact of corporate tax avoidance value, extend previous research, and
deepen us the influence factors of the knowledge of the economic consequences of
corporate t