摘要
随着社会的发展，企业与企业之间的竞争越来越激烈，其中一项重要的竞争点便是
知识，企业是否拥有一定的知识储备，是否掌握大量的知识型员工越来越成为企业间竞
争的着力点。因此，本文鉴于知识本身的特性与员工本身的特性，基于激励视角，运用
演化博弈模型对企业员工知识共享行为的过程以及影响进行分析，对提升员工的知识共
享行为积极性与改进企业的知识管理水平有着重要意义。
本文首先对关于知识共享、员工激励以及演化博弈等国内外相关文献进行梳理和探
讨，发现已有的文献存在以下不足：第一，对于知识共享的演化机制、过程的研究较少，
第二，很少有相关文献立足于知识共享激励机制的动态设计思维，第三，现有的研究很
少考虑企业员工是有限理性而非完全理性的。第四，现有的研究往往只考虑知识共享所
带来的收益，并未考虑由于知识共享所带来的成本，更没有考虑如何在成本与收益之间
协调、取舍。因而本文通过设定员工有限理性假设，利用演化博弈模型探究员工知识共
享行为的演化机制，并试图寻找促进员工知识共享的合理激励机制。研究分为两阶段，
第一阶段是对静态激励模型的探讨，第二阶段为动态激励模型的探讨。在第一阶段中，
本文先模拟现实生活的情况，设定一系列假设，然后构建演化博弈模型，随后对其演化
博弈的演化稳定策略进行分析后，求解企业最优激励系数。在第二阶段中，本文首先提
出静态激励模型的几个问题，并由此引出动态激励设计思维，将激励系数与企业员工知
识共享的联动关系嵌入演化博弈模型中，并求解企业最优激励系数水平。同时，该阶段
还考虑到由于企业经营是一个长期的过程，那么在这个条件下，对激励成本约束假设进
行适当放宽，结合演化博弈动态激励模型，从而得到了一个理想的决策结果。最后，本
文举出一个算例对理论模型进行仿真分析，验证了本文理论的正确性。
本文研究结论如下：(1)在考虑激励收益和成本的情况下，提出了确定知识共享激励
水平的量化方法。(2)相较于静态激励，动态激励具有更好的收益和更低的成本，但代价
是员工知识共享氛围的改善速度会减慢。(3)利用参数敏感性分析对企业员工知识共享行
为进行进一步探究，发现了影响企业员工知识共享行为的几个关键要素。(4)促进一个企
业内员工采取知识共享行为的关键在塑造一个良好的知识共享氛围，而企业对员工的激
励手段只是次要的、辅助性的。
关键词：知识管理，动态激励，机会主义，演化博弈
I
Abstract
Withthedevelopmentofsociety,competitionamongenterpriseshasbecome
increasingly fierce. One of the important points of competition is knowledge, and the amount
of knowledge reserves and the number of knowledge employees of enterprises are becoming
the focus of competition among enterprises. This is especially true for knowledge-intensive
enterprises.Therefore,inviewofthecharacteristicsofknowledgeitselfandthe
characteristics of employees, this paper analyzes the process and influence of knowledge
sharing behavior of employees in enterprises by using evolutionary game model from the
perspective of incentive, which is of great significance to enhancing employees' enthusiasm in
knowledge sharing behavior and improving enterprises' knowledge management level.
The paper first sorts out, discusses relevant domestic and foreign literature on knowledge
sharing, employee incentives, and evolutionary games, and finds that the existing literature
has the following shortcomings. First, there are few researches on the evolution mechanism
and process of knowledge sharing. Second, few relevant documents based on the dynamic
design thinks of the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism. Third, the existing research
rarely considers that the employees are bounded rational rather than completely rational.
Fourth, the existing research often only considers the benefits brought by knowledge sharing,
and does not consider the costs due to knowledge sharing, let alone how to coordinate and
choose between costs and benefits. Therefore, this paper sets up the assumption of bounded
rationality ofemployees, usesthe evolutionarygame modelto explorethe evolution
mechanism of employee knowledge sharing behavior, and tries to find a reasonable incentive
mechanism to promote employee knowledge sharing. This paper is divided into two phases,
the first phase is the discussion of the static excitation model, and the second phase is the
discussion of the dynamic excitation model.
In thefirst phase,this paperfirst simulatesreal lifesituations, sets aseries of
assumptions, andthen constructsan evolutionary gamemodel, andthen analyzes the
evolutionary stability strategyof the evolutionarygame to solve theoptimal incentive
coefficient of the enterprise. In the second phase, this paper first raises several questions about
the static incentive model, from this leads to dynamic incentive design thinking, embeds the
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