学校代码：10730
分类号：密级：公开
论文题目（中文） 产品众筹机制设计动态优化研究
DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION
论文题目（外文）OF PRODUCT CROWDFUNDING
MECHANISM DESIGN
作 者 姓 名 李小蝶
学 科 专 业工商管理
研 究 方 向互联网金融
教 育 类 型学历教育
指 导 教 师 史青春 副教授
合 作 导 师
论文工作时段2020 年 12 月至 2022 年 3 月
论文答辩日期2022 年 5 月
校址：甘肃省兰州市城关区天水南路222 号
产品众筹机制设计动态优化研究
摘要
在中小型创意企业的发展过程中，一直没有克服融资的这一难点。随着互联
网和大数据加速渗透，众筹作为众包和微型金融相结合的新型商业模式，具备成
本低、大众化、效率高等优势，与传统融资方式形成互补，逐渐成为中小型创意
企业进行外部融资的有效途径之一。然而，自 2011 年引入中国市场，众筹经历
了萌芽、暴增及削减等多个阶段，行业大洗牌后，目前呈现出互联网巨头垄断的
现状，由粗放式向精细化转型，而此次转型的关键是众筹机制设计优化的成功与
否，直接决定了众筹各参与方的收益分配是否合理，决定了众筹模式的存亡。
产品众筹占据众筹市场的主导地位，然而此模式在中国市场处于监管空白的
状态，发起人的经验、能力不足以及模仿者竞争带来的冲击，成为急需解决的问
题。当前学者研究众筹的绩效影响因素与发起人定价策略的文章较为丰富·，但
大多没能展现出绩效影响因素之间的内在关联，并且采用静态实证方法进行，忽
视了众筹过程的连续性、动态性。除此之外，诸多研究先入为主地排除了知识产
权保护对发起人定价的影响。
本文通过构建数学模型，考虑多因素关联影响作用，探究众筹机制动态优化
设计方案，以及在知识产权保护情境下，模仿者竞争对众筹发起人两阶段定价的
动态影响。研究发现：（1）众筹项目融资期限的设定应该在一定范围内，存在上
限，且融资期限与产品定价、生产成本均有关联，即产品定价越高，融资期限越
短；生产成本越高，融资期限越长。（2）众筹产品的生产存在规模化经济；项目
发起人的最优努力水平受众筹平台知名度、网络效应和项目歧视性定价的影响。
（3）知识产权保护力度正向影响众筹项目发起人两阶段和模仿者在正常销售阶
段定价；知识产权保护力度越高，创意产品市场越小。（4）众筹社区福利是众筹
发起人设定两阶段定价差的关键影响因素；在众筹社区福利和模仿品质量不同的
条件下，两种方式的收益高低有区分。
关键词：产品众筹，动态优化，机制设计，变分法
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DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION OF PRODUCT
CROWDFUNDING MECHANISM DESIGN
Abstract
In the development process of small and medium-sized creative enterprises,
financing has not overcome this difficulty. With the accelerated penetration of the
Internet and big data, crowdfunding, as a new business model combining
crowdsourcing and microfinance, has the advantages of low cost, mass popularity and
high efficiency. It is complementary to traditional financing methods and has gradually
become one of the effective ways for small and medium-sized creative enterprises to
conduct external financing. However, the introduction of the Chinese market since 2011,
the raise has experienced germination, explosion and cuts in multiple stages, such as
industry reshuffle, the current situation of present Internet giant monopoly, from the
extensive to the subtle transformation, and transformation in the raise mechanism is the
key to the design optimization of success, of raising the parties directly determines the
income distribution is reasonable, Determines the survival of the crowdfunding model.
Product crowdfunding occupies a dominant position in the crowdfunding market.
However, this mode is in a state of regulatory blank in the Chinese market. The lack of
experience and ability of the promoters and the impact brought by the competition of
imitators have become an urgent problem to be solved. At present, there are abundant
researches on the performance influencing factors of crowdfunding and the pricing
strategy of sponsors, but most of them fail to show the internal correlation between the
performance influencing factors and adopt static empirical methods, ignoring the
continuity and dynamics of the crowdfunding process. In addition, many studies
preemptively exclude the influence of intellectual property protection on promoter
pricing.
By constructing a mathematical model and considering the associative effects of
multiple factors, this paper explores the dynamic optimization design scheme of
crowdfunding mechanism and the dynamic impact of copycat competition on the two-
stage pricing of crowdfunding sponsors in the environment of intellectual property
protection. The results show that: (1) the financing term of crowdfunding projects
should be set within a certain range with an upper limit, and the financing term is related
to product pricing and production cost, namely, the higher the product pricing, the
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shorter the financing term; The higher the cost of production, the longer the financing
term. (2) Scale economy exists in the production of crowdfunding products; The
influence of the optimal effort level of the project sponsor on audience platform
awareness, network effects and discriminatory pricing of the project. (3) The intensity
of intellectual property protection positively affects the two-stage pricing of
crowdfunding project sponsors and the pricing of imitators in the normal sales stage;
The stronger the protection of intellectual property, the smaller the market for creative
products. (4) Community welfare of crowdfunding is the key factor influencing the
two-stage pricing difference set by the crowdfunding sponsors; Under the condition that
the community welfare of crowdfunding and the quality of imitation products are
different, the income of the two methods is differentiated.
Keywords: product crowdfunding, dynamic optimization, mechanism design,
variational method
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