公司治理问题是伴随着现代公司制度的建立而产生的，其核心在于所有权和 经营权分离而产生的委托代理关系。从公司治理的角度而言，当管理者不是企业 的完全所有者时就产生了代理成本，出于利已的动机、由于信息不对称和契约不 完全，必然会出现代理人控制的“道德风险”和“逆向选择”。这种代理人风险 控制问题成为公司治理的核心，其他公司治理问题都可以归结为这一问题的原因 或必然结果。 随着企业的发展，代理人风险控制也已成为不可回避的问题。建立并完善一 系列根植于企业公司治理现状的公司治理机制以控制代理人风险，具有相当的现 实性和迫切性。本文认为，全盘照搬任何一种公司治理理论或公司治理模式，都 无法保证其适用性和有效性。控制代理人风险问题，必须基于企业实际情况，制 定有针对性的、切实可行的公司治理方案。 本文基于委托代理、信息不对称、契约不完全和公司治理理论，采用问卷模 型分析法、问卷调查法和案例分析法,对案例公司的代理人风险问题进行细致深 入的分析与研究，针对性地提出了实施股权激励、加强董事会建设、合理发挥监 事会职能、建立科学授权审批体系和推行企业文化治理等解决措施，具有现实性 和可操作性。希望本文对类似民营企业公司治理中代理人风险控制起到借鉴作 用。 关键词：公司治理；代理人；风险；控制；研究 LISTOFABBREVIATIONS OECD=OrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment SEC=USSecuritiesRegulatoryCommission ACGA=AsianCorporateGovernanceAssociation ESG=Environmental,Social,andGovernance CEO=ChiefExecutiveOfficer CFO=ChiefFinancialOfficer COO=ChiefOperatingOfficer PARTA=RealEstateDeveloper PARTB=ConstructionCompany PARTC=SupervisionCompany GHMModel=Grossman-Hart-MooreModel XLGCGQ=XLGroupCorporateGovernanceQuestionnaire QAQB=22QuestionstoAssesstheQualityofBroad TABLEOFCONTENTS 1Introduction.................1 1.1Researchbackgroud........................1 1.2Researchpurposeandsignificance.1 1.2.1Researchpurpose.................1 1.2.2Researchsignificance...........2 1.3Researchcontentsandmethods......2 1.3.1Literatureresearchmethod..2 1.3.2Questionnairemodelanalysismethod................2 1.3.3Questionnairesurveymethod.............................3 1.3.4Caseanalysismethod...........3 2Literaturereview.........4 2.1Principal-agentproblem..................4 2.2Theoryofinformationasymmetryandincompletecontract.........................5 2.2.1TheoryofInformationAsymmetry.....................5 2.2.2TheoryofIncompleteContract...........................6 2.3TheoryofCorporateGovernance...7 2.3.1Theoriginofcorporategovernancethought.......7 2.3.2Externalcorporategovernancetheory................8 2.3.3Internalcorporategovernancetheory.................9 2.4Practicalexplorationandtheoreticalevolutionofcorporategovernanceon agentriskcontrol.....11 2.4.1Overviewandtrend............11 2.4.2Corporategovernancemode.............................11 2.4.3Convergenceofcorporategovernancemodel...14 2.4.4Americancorporategovernanceexperience.....14 2.4.5Progressofcorporategovernanceinchina.......16 2.5Summarycomments......................17 3Casedescription........20 3.1Theintroductionofcompanybackground...................20 3.2Thedevelopmentstatusofthecompany......................20 3.3Thecurrentcorporategovernancemodelanditsagentrisk.......................21 3.3.1Thecurrentsituationofcorporategovernance.21 3.3.2Theriskofthecompany'sagent........................24 4Caseanalysis.............26 4.1Researchandanalysisoncompensationandassessmentofmanagers.......26 4.1.1Unreasonablesalarystructureandinsufficientincentivepower amongmanagers.........................28 4.1.2Imperfectmanagementevaluationsystemandlowevaluation effectiveness31 4.1.3Summaryofcompensationandassessmentanalysisofmanagers..33 4.2ResearchandanalysisontheindependenteffectivenessoftheBoardof Directors..................34 4.2.1Imperfectboardconstruction............................38 4.2.2Non-standardrulesofprocedureoftheBoardofDirectors............42 4.2.3SummaryofindependenteffectivenessanalysisoftheBoardof Directors.......43 4.3ResearchandanalysisonthefunctionoftheBoardofSupervisors...........44 4.3.1Non-standardconstructionoftheBoardofSupervisors..................46 4.3.2NotfullyexercisedfunctionsandpowersoftheBoardof supervisors...47 4.3.3SummaryoffunctionanalysisoftheBoardofSupervisors............48 4.4Researchandanalysisonenterpriseauthorizationandapprovalsystem...49 4.4.1Non-standardconstructionofauthorizationexaminationand approvalsystem...........................50 4.4.2Imperfectsupervisionoftheauthorizationandapprovalsystem....52 4.4.3Summaryofauthorizationexaminationandapprovalsystem.........52 4.5Researchandanalysisoncorporateculture.................54 4.5.1Imperfectsystemconstructionandpoorsystemimplementation effect.............56 4.5.2Ineffectivecultivationofcommonvalues.........57 4.5.3Unsuccessfulconstructionofenterprisespirit..58 4.5.4Unsuccessfuldevelpomentofbusinessphilosophy.........................59 4.5.5Summaryofcorporatecultureresearch............59 5Countermeasuresofagentriskcontrolincorporategovernance...........................61 5.1Implementthecompany'sequityincentiveandstrengthenthelong-term incentivemechanismformanagers.....61 5.1.1Scientificimplementationoftheequityincentive...........................62 5.1.2Establishscientificandfeasiblebeneficiaryappraisalstandard......65 5.2StrengthentheindependenteffectivenessoftheBoardofDirectors..........66 5.2.1Strengthentheconstructionoftheboardofdirectorsandenhanceits independence67 5.2.2ImprovetherulesofprocedureoftheBoardofDirectorsandensure theeffectivenessoftheBoardofdirectors.................69 5.3ProperlyimplementthefunctionsoftheBoardofSupervisors..................70 5.3.1StrengthentheconstructionoftheBoardofSupervisorsand properlyimplementitsfunctions71 5.3.2ExercisethefunctionsandpowersoftheBoardofSupervisors.....72 5.4Buildascientificauthorizationandapprovalsystem..73 5.4.1Establishauthorizationmanagementrule.........74 5.4.2Clarifytheauthorityofthegoverningbody......74 5.4.3Optimizetheresponsibilityandauthorityofeachfunctional department....74 5.4.4Exploreandrefineauthorizationtoposition.....75 5.4.5Improvethelegalpersonlevelauthorization....75 5.5Implementthecorporateculturalgovernance..............75 5.5.1Implementtheinstitutionalconstructionandtheculturalgovernance andpromotetheconceptofcorporateculturalgovernance......................76 5.5.2Establishandcultivatecommoncorporatevalues...........................77 5.5.3Constructanddeveloptheenterprisespirit.......78 5.5.4Accumulateandrefinebusinessphilosophy.....79 6Conclusionandprospect..........................80 References....................83 Appendix......................86 目录 第一章绪论..............1 1.1研究背景..........1 1.2研究目的和意义............................1 1.2.1研究目的..............................1 1.2.2研究意义.............................2 1.3研究内容与方法............................2 1.3.1文献研究法.........................2 1.3.2问卷模型分析法.................2 1.3.3问卷调查法.........................3 1.3.4案例分析法.........................3 第二章文献综述....4 2.1委托-代理问题..............................4 2.2信息的不对称和契约的不完全....5 2.2.1信息不对称理论.................5 2.2.2不完全契约理论.................6 2.3公司治理理论.7 2.3.1公司治理思想渊源.............7 2.3.2国外公司治理理论.............8 2.3.3国内公司治理理论.............9 2.4公司治理对代理人风险控制的实践探索与理论演进............................11 2.4.1概况与趋势.......................11 2.4.2公司治理模式...................11 2.4.3公司治理模式的趋同性...14 2.4.4美国公司治理经验...........14 2.4.5中国公司治理进展...........16 2.5小结评述.......17 第三章案例描述..20 3.1公司背景介绍..............................20 3.2公司发展现状..............................20 3.3当前公司治理模式及其代理人风险问题.................21 3.3.1公司治理的现状...............21 3.3.2公司代理人风险问题.......24 第四章案例分析..26 4.1经理层薪酬和考核研究分析......26 4.1.1经理层薪酬结构不合理、激励动力不足......28 4.1.2经理层评价体系不完善、考核效用不高......31 4.1.3经理层薪酬和考核分析小结述评..................33 4.2董事会独立有效性研究分析......34 4.2.1董事会建设不完善...........38 4.2.2董事会议事规则不规范...42 4.2.3董事会独立