在经济高速发展的当今社会，企业之间为各自利益往往会展开激烈的斗争，高级 管理人员、创新效率、高管团队稳定性成为企业核心竞争要素。高管人员关乎企业资 源利用、人员配备、未来发展战略以及创新效率等，被誉为企业的关键人物，他们的 知识水平、管理能力、做事效率影响着一个企业的发展前景；创新效率是企业整合有 限资源、创造最大盈利的关键因素，提升创新效率是当下所有企业的最大任务；高管 团队稳定性则决定着企业组织架构的完整性，决定着企业发展的长期稳定性。我国创 业板企业创立于 2009 年，又称二板市场，主要是中小企业和新兴公司，具有主业明 显、新兴产业突出、市盈率高等特点，自创业板企业设立以来，监管部门对于上市公 司高管激励方面制定了诸多政策，研究创业板上市公司高管激励、团队稳定性与企业 创新效率内在关系具有重要意义。企业对于高管进行激励、如何激励是否有利于企业 创新效率的提升？企业团队稳定是否能够促进企业创新效率？团队稳定性对于高管 薪酬激励和股权激励是否具有调节作用？对于上述问题的探讨将对创业板上市公司 企业创新效率的提高具有重要引导意义。 基于此，本研究在引入最优契约理论、代理理论、权力理论和激励理论的基础上 选取 2014-2018 年在创业板上市的公司为研究样本，运用 SPSS22.0 软件研究创业板 上市公司高管激励、团队稳定性与企业创新效率内在关系，最后亦尝试用博弈手段进 行分析思考，主要得出以下结论：（1）企业实行高管薪酬激励能够提升企业的创新 效率；（2）企业对高管进行股权激励亦能够促进企业创新效率；（3）高管薪酬激励 与股权激励之间存在互补效应，组合激励模式有利于企业创新效率的强化；（4）团 队稳定性不利于企业创新效率的提升；（5）团队稳定性对企业薪酬激励、股权激励 都具有负向调节作用；（6）制造业创业板企业团队稳定性对于“薪酬激励-企业创新 效率”具有负向调节作用，而对于“股权激励-企业创新效率”具有正向调节作用， 非制造业创业板企业与原回归分析检验结果相同；（7）创业板企业高管激励与团队 稳定性在利益争端中能够达成“企业激励、高管团队不稳定”均衡。最后在全文理论 与实证双重验证下，提出对创业板上市公司企业创新效率提升具有战略前瞻性的建议 决策。 关键词：创业板；高管激励；团队稳定性；企业创新效率；博弈分析高管激励，团队稳定性与企业创新效率内在关系研究—基于创业板企业数据 V ABSTRACT In today's society with rapid economic development, enterprises often fight fiercely for their own interests. Senior management, innovation efficiency and stability of senior management team become the core competitive elements of enterprises. Senior executives are regarded as the key figures of an enterprise because they are related to the utilization of enterprise resources, staffing, future development strategy and innovation efficiency. Their knowledge level, management ability and work efficiency affect the development prospect of an enterprise. Innovation efficiency is the key factor for enterprises to integrate limited resources and create maximum profits. Improving innovation efficiency is the biggest task for all enterprises at present. The stability of the senior management team determines the integrity of the organizational structure of the enterprise and the long-term stability of the development of the enterprise. China's Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) was founded in 2009, also known as the second board market. It is mainly small and medium-sized enterprises and emerging companies. It has obvious main business, prominent emerging industries and high price-earnings ratio. Since the establishment of GEM enterprises, the regulatory authorities have formulated many policies on the incentive of executives of listed companies. It is of great significance to study the internal relationship between the incentive of executives, team stability and innovation efficiency of listed companies on GEM. How to motivate senior managers and whether it is conducive to the improvement of innovation efficiency? Can the stability of enterprise team promote the efficiency of enterprise innovation? Does team stability have a moderating effect on executive compensation incentives and equity incentives? The discussion of the above-mentioned problems will have important guiding significance for the improvement of innovation efficiency of GEM listed companies. Based on this, on the basis of introducing the optimal contract theory, agency theory, power theory and incentive theory, this study selects companies listed on the Growth Enterprise Market from 2014 to 2018 as research samples, and uses SPSS22.0 software to study the internal relationship between executive incentive, team stability and innovation efficiency of companies listed on the Growth Enterprise Market. Finally, it also attempts to analyze and think through the game method. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) The implementation of executive compensation incentive in enterprises can improve the innovation efficiency of enterprises; (2) Enterprises' equity incentive to senior executives can also promote the innovation efficiency of enterprises; (3) There is a complementary高管激励，团队稳定性与企业创新效率内在关系研究—基于创业板企业数据 VI effect between executive compensation incentive and equity incentive, and the combination incentive mode is conducive to strengthening the innovation efficiency of enterprises; (4) team stability is not conducive to the improvement of enterprise innovation efficiency; (5) Team stability has a negative moderating effect on corporate compensation incentives and equity incentives; (6) The team stability of manufacturing GEM enterprises has a negative moderating effect on "salary incentive-enterprise innovation efficiency" and a positive moderating effect on "equity incentive-enterprise innovation efficiency". Non-manufacturing GEM enterprises have the same test results as the original regression analysis. (7) Top management incentive and team stability in GEM enterprises can reach a balance of "enterprise incentive and unstable top management team" in interest disputes. Finally, based on the theoretical and empirical verification of the full text, this paper puts forward some strategic and forward-looking suggestions and decisions on improving the innovation efficiency of GEM listed companies. KEYWORDS:growth enterprise market;executive incentives;team stability;enterprise innovation efficiency;game analysis高管激励，团队稳定性与企业创新效率内在关系研究—基于创业板企业数据 1 目 录 第一章 绪论....... 4 第一节 研究背景和意义....4 一、研究背景...................4 二、研究意义...................4 第二节 研究内容与结构框架............................ 5 第三节 研究方法................. 6 第四节 论文可能的创新点. 7 第二章 概念界定和文献综述..........7 第一节 概念界定................7 一、创业板企业...............7 二、高级管理人员...........8 三、高管激励...................8 四、高管团队稳定性.......8 五、企业创新效率...........9 第二节 文献综述................9 一、高管激励与企业创新效率相关研究....10 二、团队稳定性与企业创新效率相关研究11 三、高管激励与团队稳定性的相关研究....11 四、高管激励与企业创新效率的调节效应12 第三节 研究述评..............13 第三章 理论基础与研究假设........14 第一节 理论基础..............14 一、代理理论.................14 二、最优契约理论.........14 三、管理层权力理论.....15 四、激励理论.................16 五、专用化人力资本理论............................16 第二节 研究假设............... 17高管激励，团队稳定性与企业创新效率内在关系研究—基于创业板企业数据 2 一、高管激励与企业创新效率....................17 二、团队稳定性与企业创新效率................18 三、高管激励、团队稳定性和企业创新效率...........................18 第四章 研究设计............................19 第一节 变量设计原则......19 第二节 数据选取与来源解释.........................20 第三节 变量定义..............20 一、被解释变量.............20 二、解释变量.................21 三、调节变量.................21 四、控制变量.................21 第四节 模型构建..............22 第五章 实证分析............................23 第一节 描述性统计..........23 第二节 相关性分析..........24 第三节 样本行业及区域分析.......................... 25 第四节 回归结果分析......26 一、多重共线性检验.....26 二、回归结果分析.........26 第五节 稳健性检验........... 29 本章小结.............................30 第六章 拓展性检验....................