） 专 业，经济法学 研究方向，商 法 作者姓名，朱 潇 指导教师，杨忠孝 教授 《我国创业板直接退市制度的可行性研究》一文是在我国创业板推出一年半的 背景下，以直接退市制度为研究对象，结合海外创业板市场的运作实践以及我国主 板、中小板市场的经验教训，探讨直接退市制度在我国创业板市场上的可行性问题。 监管机构早在2009 年10 月30 日创业板诞生之初就有意要实施直接退市制度。 对创业板来说，实施直接退市制度是基本的也是必要的，它有利于市场的健康发展， 加快退市流程，防止借壳上市。最近，深圳证券交易所向中国证券监督管理委员会 递交了两次报告，一稿中提出要在创业板上实施直接退市制度，二稿中则强调允许 退市企业进入股份代办系统，有意回避直接退市制度。笔者认为，创业板退市还是 应该选择直接退市方案，但应当是有条件地推行。本文分为四个部分， 第一章分析我国创业板实施直接退市制度的可行性。根据我国现有的市场和法 律基础，并参考海外实践经验，初步得出我国适合在创业板上构建直接退市制度。 接着又阐述了实施直接退市制度对创业板的重要意义。 第二章讨论我国创业板实施直接退市制度的前提。实施直接退市制度，需要有 四个前提条件。一是改革新股发行管制，只有市场化的上市，才能保证市场化的退 市。二是形成理性投资者氛围，只有市场中的投资者趋于理性，直接退市才能平稳 推出。三是加强创业板监管，逐步释放直接退市中的风险。四是建立有效的退市渠 道，须知缔造场外市场与发展创业板市场同等重要。 第三章指出创业板实施直接退市制度的难题及其克服。虽然直接退市方案早已 2 提出，但是要在现实中实施似乎还有点难度。面对当前存在的各方利益难以协调、 违规违法现象严重、缺乏主动退市制度等问题，应有针对性地采取措施，减小退市 阻力，克服退市难题。 第四章着眼于完善我国创业板直接退市后的救济制度。投资者是证券市场的基 石，一旦投资者对市场失去了信心，“证券大厦”就会轰然倒塌。明确实施直接退市 制度与保护投资者利益原则并不矛盾。通过完善直接退市后的救济制度，维护好中 小投资者的权益。 最后得出当前我国适合在创业板上构建直接退市制度，但相关的实施前提、难 题克服以及退市后如何救济也需要纳入考虑范围。否则，实施直接退市制度只能是 一句空话。 [关键词] 直接退市制度 中国创业板 可行性研究 投资者保护 1 Feasibility Study on a Direct Delisting Mechanism for the ChiNext Growth Board (Abstract) Major: Economic Law Specialty: Commercial Law Author: Zhu Xiao Tutor: Prof. Yang Zhongxiao In the context of establishing ChiNext growth board for one and a half year, this paper argues the feasibility of a direct delisting mechanism, taking a direct delisting mechanism as its research subject, and combining with operational practice of overseas the same kind market and some experiences drawing from the research of China main board as well as small and medium enterprise board market. Regulators have promised a direct delisting mechanism for the growth board even before it was launched Oct. 30 2009. A direct delisting system for the ChiNext growth board is fundamental and much needed, and the adoption of such a system will ensure the healthy development of the board, speed up the delisting process and prevent potential backdoor listings. Recently, The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) has submitted two improvement plans on a delisting mechanism to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The first is to launch a direct delisting system, and the second is to help transfer the delisted companies to the Agency Share Transfer System. The author thinks that launching a direct delisting mechanism for the ChiNext has its feasibility, but should be conditional. This paper can be divided into four parts as follows: Chapter I analyses the feasibility of a direct delisting mechanism of the ChiNext board. According to our country's present market and legal basis, making reference to overseas experience, we can conclude that our country can adopt a direct delisting mechanism. Then this chapter also shows some significances of the direct delisting 2 mechanism. Chapter II discusses the prerequisites of a direct delisting mechanism of the ChiNext board. It requires four prerequisites to launch a direct delisting mechanism. (1) to reform IPO market regulation. Marketization listing is the necessary condition of marketization delisting. (2) to form rational investors’ atmosphere. (3) to strengthen supervision and gradually release delisting risk. (4) to establish effective delisting channels. Creating the over-the-counter (OTC) market and developing the ChiNext board are equally important. Chapter III points out some difficulties arising from a direct delisting mechanism and the solutions thereof. Although a direct delisting mechanism has been proposed, there seems to have some difficulties in reality, such as existing conflicts of interests, serious violations of law and the lack of initiative delisting system. Effective measures should be taken to reduce delisting resistance and overcome delisting difficulties. Chapter IV is mainly to perfect the delisting relief mechanism after launching a direct delisting system. Investors are the cornerstone of the securities market. If investors lose market confidence, “securities building” will be collapsed. It is clear that protecting investors’ interests and launching a direct delisting mechanism are not contradictory. The interests of retail investors can be protected well through improving the delisting relief mechanism. Therefore, our country can adopt a direct delisting mechanism in the ChiNext board now, but some elements should be considered, including relevant prerequisites, difficulties to overcome and the delisting relief mechanism. Otherwise, launching a direct delisting mechanism is only empty words. [Key Words] Direct delisting mechanism ChiNext board Feasibility study Protection of the investors 1 目 录 导言......................................................1 第一节 选题的缘起 ...............................................1 第二节 本文的研究背景 ...........................................2 第三节 现有文献综述 .............................................4 第四节 本文的研究方法及拟创新之处 ...............................5 第一章 我国创业板实施直接退市制度的可行性分析.............7 第一节 我国创业板实施直接退市制度的现有条件 .....................7 一、现有市场基础.............................................7 二、现有法律基础.............................................8 三、海外实践基础.............................................9 第二节 兼论我国创业板实施直接退市制度的重要意义 ................10 一、严控创业板的市场风险....................................10 二、严惩创业板的违规违法行为................................11 三、严肃创业板的交易环境....................................11 四、严整创业板的信息披露....................................12 第二章 我国创业板实施直接退市制度的前提条件..............13 第一节 改革新股发行管制 ........................................13 第二节 培育合格投资者 ..........................................14 第三节 加强创业板监管 ..........................................16 一、监管核心当为信息披露....................................16 二、明确监管主客体及权限....................................17 三、退市标准反映监管理念....................................18 第四节 建立有效的退市渠道 ......................................18 一、参考海外创业板市场经验..................................19 二、加快我国场外市场建设....................................20 2 第三章 我国创业板实施直接退市制度的难题克服..............23 第一节 利益博弈——各方协调 ....................................23 一、地方政府，退市阻力变助力................................23 二、上市公司，退市阻力变动力................................24 三、市场，退市阻力变活力....................................25 第二节 违规违法——退市问责制 ..................................26 一、问责主体................................................26 二、问责对象................................................27 三、法律责任类型............................................27 第三节 强退压力——主动退市 ....................................28 第四章 我国创业板直接退市后的救济制度....................30 第一节 创业板直接退市中的投资者利益保护 ........................30 一、直接退市与保护投资者利益之辩............................30 二、加强创业板中小投资者保护