半个世纪前，欧美国家便开始利用股权激励作为公司治理的手段。股权激励 的本质就是通过对管理层授予股票，让管理者成为有权利索取公司剩余价值的所 有者，以此来激发管理层提高生产经营效率，降低管理层因为道德风险而产生逆 向选择的可能性，最大化公司的长期价值。 随着股权激励计划近年来在我国上市公司的广泛应用，其方案的设计是否会 改变管理层制定的财务政策，从而对公司的绩效产生影响也在越来越多地被学者 们研究讨论。在具体实践当中，股权激励计划虽然取得了一些成效，激发了员工 的工作热情，提升了公司业绩，但其中也存在着诸多问题：股权激励的考核指标 设置太高时往往起不到激励作用；行权门槛太低时，股权激励计划则会被认为是 在变相为管理层发放福利；行权较为集中时，很可能导致公司业绩的亏损；股权 激励有效期过短时，管理者很可能为了满足行权业绩条件而产生财务短视行为， 增加公司经营风险，损害股东利益等。2013 年我国披露的 158 套股权激励方案 中已经有 22 套方案在不到两年的时间内宣告终止。可见，股权激励方案在实践 中的广泛应用并不能保证股权激励方案实现预期的效果。 本文采用案例研究法，首先介绍国内外学者对于股权激励方案的披露与公司 绩效关系的研究现状，然后梳理股权激励的理论基础，以 2013 年索菲亚的股权 激励方案为研究对象，严格按照股权激励方案的披露会对公司的财务政策产生何 种影响，从而影响公司绩效的逻辑关系进行研究。本文将管理者采取的财务政策 分为长视化政策和短视化政策，将公司的绩效分为财务绩效和市场绩效两个方面 分别进行评价。最终得出结论，索菲亚 2013 年的股权激励方案显著提升了公司 的绩效，但是管理者还是采取了一些短视化的财务政策，这说明索菲亚的股权激 励方案依然存在改进的空间。 希望通过本文的研究，能够从股权激励方案的设计层面来提升股权激励方案 的合理性，使得股权激励能真正成为对企业长远发展有利的公司治理举措，并为 以后有通过股权激励方案提升绩效的上市公司提供一些可行性建议。 关键词：股权激励方案；公司治理；财务政策；公司绩效河南财经政法大学硕士学位报告 Abstract Half a century ago, European countries began to use equity incentives as a means of corporate governance. The essence of equity incentive is to grant stock to the management, so that managers have the right to share the remaining value of the company as the real company owner,in order to stimulate the manager to improve the production and operation efficiency, and reduce the possibility of manager's adverse selection because of moral hazard ,to achieve the maximize of the company's long-term value. With the equity incentive plan’s widely used in China's listed companies these years, the scholars are discussing whether the design of its programs will affect the management’s financial policy,and then have an effect on the company's performance. The equity incentive plan actually obtain some success in specific practice and stimulate the enthusiasm of the staff, improve the performance of the company, but there are also many problems such as: the assessment indicators of the equity incentive setting too high can hardly incentive the management, the assessment indicators of the equity incentive setting too low would be considered in disguise of the payment benefits for the management; when the exercise is more concentrated, it is likely to lead to a loss of performance of the company; when the valid of equity incentive is too short , managers are likely to generate short-sighted behavior in order to meet the financial performance agreement,this will increase the company's business risk,and harm the interests of shareholders. We made 158 sets of equity incentive program in 2013, but 22 sets of them has been terminated in less than two years .It shows that the widely use of equity incentive program does not guarantee the desired effect. The study method of this paper is case study, first introduce the current research scholars made on the relationship between equity incentive plan’s disclosure and its performance, then comb the theoretical basis of equity incentive,then made a study on Sofia's equity incentive program in 2013, strictly in accordance with the logic of what the management’s behavior will be affected by the impact of the equity incentive河南财经政法大学硕士学位报告 program, and how the company’s performance will be affected by the management’s behavior. This article divide the financial policy managers made to two aspects, long -sighted policy and short-sighted policy, and divide the performance of the company to financial performance and market performance,and then evaluation both of them. It can be ultimately concluded that Sofia’s equity incentive program significantly improved the company's performance in 2013, but the management still make some short-sighted financial policies, which suggested that there is still room for improvement on Sofia’s equity incentive plan. I hope that it can be possible to promote rationality on the design level of the equity incentive plan,and make equity incentive really become a favorable method on the long-term development for the company, finally provide some feasible suggestions for the companies which want to improve performance through equity incentive programs. Keywords: Equity Incentive Plan；Corporate Governance；Financial Policy; Corporate Performance.河南财经政法大学硕士学位报告 V 目录 摘要 .....................................................................................................................................I Abstract ............................................................................................................................. III 1.引言 ............................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 研究背景 .............................................................................................................1 1.2 研究意义 .............................................................................................................3 1.3 文献综述 ............................................................................................................4 1.3.1 国外文献综述 ......................................................................................... 4 1.3.2 国内文献综述 ......................................................................................... 5 1.3.3 文献述评 ................................................................................................. 6 1.4 研究内容及方法 ................................................................................................ 6 1.5 报告组织结构 .................................................................................................... 7 1.6 重点、难点及创新点 ........................................................................................ 9 2.股权激励基本理论和绩效评价方法 ....................................................................... 10 2.1 股权激励介绍 .................................................................................................. 10 2.1.1 股权激励的概念 ...................................................................................10 2.1.2 股权激励的常见模式 .......................................................................... 10 2.2 理论基础 .......................................................................................................... 11 2.2.1 委托代理理论 ....................................................................................... 11 2.2.2 信息不对称理论 ...................................................................................12 2.2.3 人力资本理论 ....................................................................................... 12 2.2.4 激励双因素理论 ...................................................................................13 2.3 财务政策和绩效评价方法 ............................................................................. 13 3.索菲亚股权激励方案研究评价 ............................................................................... 15 3.1 索菲亚简介 ...................................................................................................... 15 3.2 股权激励的动机 .............................................................................................