I 摘要 自 20 世纪 80 年代起，随着政经体制的一系列改革，农村集体经济开始迅速发展壮 大，农村集体经济组织在政治和社会上的重要性更加突出，从政府到基层村民都对农村 集体经济管理和监管提出更高要求。政府在农村集体经济的管理也有所变革，浙江省于 2015 年已完成农村集体资产股份合作制改革，将农村集体资产以股权形式分配给全体集 体经济成员。同时也推广实施农村集体“三资”（资源、资产、资金）管理制度，各县 区在本级农业部门下设农村集体“三资”管理办公室，在乡镇（街道）设置“三资办” 和“三资服务中心”，具体负责指导辖区内农村“三资”管理工作，包括农村集体“三 资”的会计核算和财务管理工作，并对集体“三资”管理情况、集体经营情况和其他收 支情况进行定期的审计。此外，财政部门、审计部门和社会中介机构也不同程度地参与 到了农村集体经济审计，共同构成了浙江省农村集体经济审计模式。 本文的分析研究对象是浙江省现行农村集体经济审计模式，以委托代理理论为理论 基础和方法，分析浙江省现行农村集体经济审计模式中的审计委托代理关系，探究该审 计委托代理关系中存在的问题，并应用委托代理理论中的分析模型提出完善的具体措 施。 在委托代理视角下，浙江省现行农村集体经济审计模式是两层审计委托代理关系。 第一层为农村股份合作社股民，社会审计中介机构和农村股份合作社构成的三角审计委 托代理关系。第二层是政府、职能部门和农村股份合作社董事会构成的三角审计委托代 理关系。在这两层关系中，占主导的是第二层审计委托代理关系，第一层审计委托代理 关系作用发挥极少。这样的审计模式因审计委托代理关系不合理且缺少对应的激励约束 机制，存在委托代理理论中代理问题。对此文章提出建立四方审计委托代理关系的农村 集体经济审计模式，在委托人、审计人、代理人三者关系中引入一个“第四方”，在政 府审计部门下成立一个“农村集体经济审计管理中心”，用于协调原先农村股份合作社 股民和政府两个委托人的关系，整合原有审计资源，组织审计人独立高效地实施对经营 人的审计。以此为基础，应用委托代理理论中的多任务委托代理模型，引入代理人能力 的变量，进行参数化分析，将分析结论作为设计委托人和经营人之间，委托人和审计人 之间的激励机制的参考依据。 关键词，委托代理；农村集体经济；审计模式Abstract II Abstract Since the 1980s, with a series of reforms in the political and economic system, The rural collective economy began to develop rapidly, and the political and social importance of the rural collective economic organization became more prominent. From the government to the grass-roots villagers, the rural collective economic management and supervision has been put forward higher requirements.The Government has also made changes in the management of the rural collective economy. Zhejiang Province completed a shareholding cooperative reform of rural collective assets in 2015, allocating rural collective assets to all collective economic members in the form of equity. At the same time, the management system of rural collective three kinds of capital (resources, assets and funds) will be extended to all counties and districts, and the rural collective three kinds of capital management offices will be set up under the agricultural department at the corresponding level, Establishment of Three Capital Management Offices and Three Capital Service Centers in the townships (sub-districts), which are specifically responsible for directing the administration of Three Capital Managements in the rural areas under their jurisdiction, Including the accounting and financial management of rural collective three kinds of capital, and conducting regular audit on collective three kinds of capital management, collective operation and other income and expenditure. In addition, the financial department, the audit department and the social intermediary institutions also participated in the rural collective economic audit in varying degrees, which together constituted the rural collective economic audit model in Zhejiang Province. The research object of this paper is the current rural collective economic audit model in Zhejiang Province, which is based on the principal-agent theory and method, This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship in the current rural collective economic audit mode in Zhejiang Province, probes into the problems existing in the principal-agent relationship, and puts forward the perfect concrete measures by using the analytical model in the principal-agent theory. In the perspective of principal-agent, the current rural collective economic audit model in Zhejiang Province is a two-tiered audit principal-agent relationship. The first level is the principal-agent relationship of triangular audit, which is composed of rural stock cooperative, social audit intermediary and rural stock cooperative. The second layer is the principal agency relationship of triangular audit, which is composed of government, functional departments and rural stock cooperative board. In these two relations, the second-level audit principal-agent relationship is the dominant one, and the first-level audit principal-agent relationship plays very little role. Because of the unreasonable principal-agent relationship and the lack of corresponding incentive and restraint mechanism, there exists agency problem in the principal-agent theory.This paper proposes to establish a rural collective economic auditAbstract III model based on the principal-agent relationship, and to introduce a fourth party in the relationship among principal, auditor and agent. A Rural Collective Economic Audit Management Center has been set up under the Government Audit Department to coordinate the relationship between the shareholders of the original rural stock cooperative and the two principal clients of the Government, to organize the auditors to independently and efficiently audit the operators. On this basis, the multi-task principal-agent model in principal-agent theory is used to introduce the variable of agent's ability, and then parametric analysis is carried out. The conclusion is taken as the reference for the incentive mechanism between the design client and manager, between the principal and the auditor. Key Words: Principal agent; Rural collective economy;Audit mode目录 IV 目录 第 1 章 绪论.............................................................................................................................1 1.1 研究背景及意义........................................................................................................1 1.1.1 研究背景.........................................................................................................1 1.1.2 研究意义.........................................................................................................1 1.2 文献综述....................................................................................................................2 1.2.1 委托代理理论研究现状...................................................................................2 1.2.2 农村集体经济审计模式的研究现状.............................................................3 1.2.3 研究现状述评...................................................................................................5 1.3 研究方法与内容........................................................................................................5 1.3.1 研究方法...........................................................................................................5 1.3.2 研究内容...........................................................................................................6 第 2 章 理论基础及相关概念.................................................................................................7 2.1 委托代理理论..............................................................................................................7 2.1.1 委托代理理论中的审计委托代理关系...........................................................7 2.1.2 委托代理理论中的代理问题...........................................................................8 2.1.3 委托代理理论中的基本模型...........................................................................8 2.1.4 委托代理理论中的模型扩展...........................................................................9 2.2 审计独立性的概念.......................................