III
ABSTRACT
The dual pressure of environmental pollution and waste of resources has led people to pay more
attention to the recycling and reuse of electronic waste. Many countries have successively issued laws and
policies on the recycling of electronic waste, so as to standardize the recycling of electronic waste and
promote the development of circular economy. However, we do not have a set of effective laws to restrict
the behavior of recyclers, and the recovery system is not complete and the recycling market is disordered.
Formal recyclers can only recover one or two percent of electronic waste on the market. Most of the
electronic waste flows into informal recyclers and eventually flows into informal dismantling channels.
Non-formal dismantling operators have caused serious damage to the social environment through informal
dismantling. How to guide the recovery behavior of informal recyclers and formal recyclers, promote the
standardized recycling and recycling of electronic waste, and reduce environmental pollution and waste of
resources are urgent issues .
Firstly, using evolutionary game to analyze the recycling strategy selection of informal recyclers
with bounded rationality, and the boundless rationality of the formal recycler's decision based on the
informal recycler's choice. The analysis of the two recycling groups show that: in the fierce competitive
market environment, informal recyclers pursue the maximization of personal interests. From the long-term
development trend, their evolutionary stabilization strategies tend to be “Non-cooperative”. When formal
recycler face the “Non-cooperative” strategy of informal recyclers, the “Boycott” benefits outweigh the
costs, the regular stable recycler’s evolutionary stabilization strategy is “Resist” and vice versa “Do not
resist”.
Secondly, construct the profit function under formal recycler and informal recycler under
different cooperation conditions, and compare the profit differences under these conditions through
numerical simulation. The results show that: in a competitive environment, recyclers' competition is
IV
proportional to the recycling price, and it is inversely proportional to recovery and recovery profit.
Excessive competition is not conducive to long-term development among recyclers. From the perspective
of cooperation, the profit obtained by recyclers when both parties take cooperation is the largest, and
cooperation is beneficial to the increase of profits of recyclers. Therefore, it is necessary to supervise the
uncooperative behavior of the recycler group and promote the cooperation between the formal recycler and
the informal recycler.
Finally, the government play an important role in the supervision of the ecological environment.
In order to guide formal recyclers and informal recyclers to choose “Cooperation” strategies to promote
cooperation between them, considering the cooperation between formal recyclers and informal recyclers
under the government’s supervision by evolutionary game. Based on the profits of recyclers calculated in
this paper, an evolutionary game model of recyclers' groups under government awards and penalties is
constructed. Through the analysis of evolutionary stability, the evolutionary stabilization strategy for formal
recyclers and informal recyclers under government supervision is “Cooperation”, indicating that
government incentives and penalties are effective for promoting cooperation between recycler groups.
KEY WORDS: E-waste, Recycler, Evolutionary Game
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目 录
摘 要 ......... I
ABSTRACT ..... III
目 录 ..... V
第一章 绪论 ...... 1
1.1 研究背景及意义 .......... 1
1.1.1 研究背景1
1.1.2 研究意义3
1.2 研究目的 .......... 4
1.3 研究内容、方法及研究框架 .. 4
1.3.1 研究内容4
1.3.2 研究方法5
1.3.3 研究技术路线 .... 6
1.4 创新之处 .......... 6
第二章 理论基础与国内外文献综述 .. 9
2.1 理论基础 .......... 9
2.1.1 循环经济理论 .... 9
2.1.2 逆向供应链 ........ 9
2.1.3 演化博弈理论 .. 10
2.2 国内外文献综述 ........ 10
2.2.1 电子废弃物的相关主体与回收模式研究 ...... 10
2.2.2 供应链的演化博弈研究 .......... 12
2.2.3 政府在逆向供应链中的作用研究 ...... 13
第三章 正规回收商与非正规回收商回收决策的演化博弈研究 .... 17
3.1 问题描述及模型假设17
3.1.1 问题描述 .......... 17
3.1.2 模型假设 .......... 18
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3.2 演化博弈模型建立 .... 19
3.3 演化博弈稳定性分析20
3.3.1 非正规电子废弃物回收商策略的稳定性分析 .......... 20
3.3.2 正规电子废弃物回收商策略的稳定性分析 .. 21
3.3.3 电子废弃物正规与非正规回收商混合策略的稳定性分析 .. 22
3.4 结论及建议 ......... 25
第四章 正规与非正规回收商在不同合作模式下的利润分析 ........ 27
4.1 参数设定及说明 ........ 27
4.2 竞争博弈模型28
4.2.1正规回收商与非正规回收商均不采用合作策略时的利润 ... 28
4.2.2 正规回收商与非正规回收商均采用合作策略时的利润 ...... 29
4.2.3 正规回收商于非正规回收商仅有一方采取合作策略时的利润 ...... 30
4.3 数值仿真 ........ 31
4.4 建议 .... 36
第五章 政府监督下正规回收商与非正规回收商的合作策略选择38
5.1 模型假设 ........ 38
5.2 模型建立 ........ 39
5.3 演化稳定性分析 ........ 40
5.3.1 正规电子废弃物回收商行为策略的稳定性分析 ...... 40
5.3.2 非正规电子废弃物回收商行为策略的稳定性分析 .. 41
5.3.3 正规回收商与非正规回收商在混合策略下的稳定性分析 .. 43
第六章 总结与展望 .... 45
6.1 研究结论 ........ 45
6.2 研究局限和展望 ........ 46
参考文献 .......... 49
致 谢 .... 53
攻读学位期间发表的学术论文目录 .. 55
独 创 性 声 明 .......... 57
关于论文使用授权的说明 ...... 57。