本文在 L&S 专利劫持模型的禁令制度因素基础上，引入后发企业与外国领先
企业的技术差距和成本优势两个因素，构建起后发企业视角下的专利劫持模型，
进而研究了技术差距、成本优势变化对专利劫持程度的动态影响，以及后发企业
的策略选择。随后，打开主体结构“黑箱”，首先研究外部创新情形下，一个领
先企业与多个后发企业专利许可费谈判模型，验证主体结构是否对专利劫持程度
有影响，以及主体结构由一个变为多个时后发企业的反专利劫持应对策略。随着
时间的推移，后发企业的技术能力增长，领先企业被内部化由外部创新者变成内
部创新者。其次研究内部创新情形下，主体结构从一到多的专利劫持程度以及应
对策略。最后，以华为近 30 年来发展历程作为分析对象，研究实际上专利劫持产
生背景、形成原因以及华为的反专利劫持过程中所运用的策略，进而对本文的理
论研究进行验证和阐释
研究结果表明：技术差距、成本优势和主体结构对专利劫持程度有影响，随
着技术差距的缩小、成本优势的降低，专利劫持程度随之下降。主体结构对专利
劫持程度的影响较为复杂：（1）领先企业作为外部创新者时，后发企业技术追赶
初期，专利劫持程度随后发企业的增多而增加；后发企业技术追赶中后期，专利
劫持程度随后发企业的增多而降低。（2）领先企业作为内部创新者时，专利劫持
程度随后发企业数量的增多而增加。为降低专利劫持程度、获得更高收益，后发
企业可选择策略：（1）技术追赶初期，选择模仿策略，一经发现，积极应诉。被
发现时间早，后发企业刚刚具备重新设计能力时，后发企业在诉讼期间选择重新
设计产品绕开专利技术可以降低专利劫持程度；若发现时间晚，后发企业技术能
力较为成熟，即使具备重新设计能力，选择达成许可更优。（2）随着技术能力的
增长、成本优势的减小，后发企业可以通过联盟和交叉许可的方式达到共赢
关键词：后发企业，专利许可，专利劫持，策略ABSTRACT
II
ABSTRACT
Patent licensing is an important way for latecomer firms (LCFs) in the process of
catching up foreign frontier firms (FFFs). Today internationality becomes the trend,
patent strength directly determines the right of speaking. Through the review of the
literatures and reality, we know that LCF is indeed in a weak position at the initial stage
of the technological catch-up. In order to stand on the shoulders of the giant, LCFs
had to pay a high patent license fees. The high patent license fee is treated by the
academy as a patent holdup.
Based on the research of Lemly-Shapiro Model of patent holdup, this paper
develops a modified patent holdup model between a FFF and a LCF by introducing
technology gap and cost advantage, then discusses the dynamic influences of
technology gap, cost advantage. Then open the blackbox of licensing parties to analyze
what LCFs should do to balance the benefits between FFFs and LCFs in different
contexts. First of all, build a patent licensing fees negotiation model between a FFF and
a number of LCFs to verify whether the main structure has an impact on the degree of
patent holdup under the external innovation situation and the anti-patent holdup strategy.
With the technical capabilities of the LCF increasing, and the FFF has been internalized
by external innovators into internal innovators. Followed by the study of internal
innovation, verify whether the main structure has an impact on the degree of patent
holdup and the anti-patent holdup strategy. Finally, we study the history of Huawei, the
cause of the formation of patent holdup and the strategy used in Huawei&39;s anti-patent
holdup process. And then verify and explain the theoretical research of this paper.
The results prove that patent hold-up degree between the FFF and the LCF is
monotone increasing function of technology gap and cost advantage. 1)With narrowing
of technology gap and weakening of cost advantage, patent hold-up degree will
decrease accordingly. However, the change of the relationship depends on taking the
appropriate strategy in different stages and making an effort to achieve. 2) When the
FFF as an internal innovator, the degree of patent holdup increases with the number of
LCFs. To reduce the degree of patent holdup and to obtain higher returns, the LCF can
choose strategy: 1) At the initial stage of the technological catch-up, LCFs taking
technology imitation strategy is more advantageous to reduce the degree of patentABSTRACT
III
holdup than ex ante licensing strategy. In the situation of technical imitation, LCFs
choosing litigation strategy is more advantageous to reduce the degree of patent holdup
degree than the first successful negotiation. Suppose that technology gap is narrowing to
some extent, the strategy to redesign products for LCFs is better. 2) With the increase in
technical capacity, the cost advantage of the reduction, the LCF can choose the Union
and cross-licensing to achieve win-win situation.
Keywords: latecomer firm, patent licensing, anti-patent holdup, strategy目录
IV
目 录
第一章 绪论....1
1.1 选题背景及研究意义 ........... 1
1.1.1 选题背景 ........ 1
1.1.2 研究意义 ........ 1
1.2 研究内容与框架 ....... 2
1.3 主要创新点 ... 3
第二章 相关文献综述..4
2.1 专利许可的相关研究 ........... 4
2.1.1 专利许可的概念 ........ 4
2.1.2 专利许可的价值 ........ 5
2.1.3 影响专利许可费的因素 ........ 6
2.2 专利劫持的相关研究 ........... 8
2.2.1 专利劫持的概念 ........ 8
2.2.2 专利劫持的形成原因 .......... 10
2.2.3 专利劫持的解决办法 .......... 12
2.3 后发企业的相关研究 ......... 13
2.4 总结与借鉴 . 14
第三章 技术差距和成本优势对反专利劫持策略的影响....15
3.1 假设的提出 . 15
3.2 参数的选取 . 16
3.3 技术追赶初期后发企业反专利劫持策略 . 17
3.4 技术差距变化对反专利劫持策略的影响 . 24
3.5 本章小节 ..... 27
第四章 主体结构对反专利劫持策略的影响28
4.1 外部创新情形下后发企业反专利劫持策略 .
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