（2）处理商激励生产商努力研发的契约设计。出于自身利益考虑，处理商设计了
在信息对称与信息不对称两种情形下激励生产商研发的契约，并比较在不同情形下二者
期望效用的变化，以及给处理商代理成本与监督成本带来的影响。在此基础上制定拆解
处理标准，引入产品研发质量因子，通过设置奖惩机制进一步激励生产商提高研发努力
程度，运用最优化原理分析线性分成机制与奖惩机制两种契约下的最优激励参数及其影
响因素，得出线性分成机制与奖惩机制在激励作用上存在互补性
（3）考虑政府补贴对生产商与处理商协调合作的影响研究。在现实的企业合作过
程中，需要政府适时提供支持和引导，考虑政府补贴因素对处理商及生产商行为决策的
影响，分别就政府不提供补贴、政府对处理商实施补贴、政府对生产商实施补贴以及政
府对处理商和生产商都实施补贴四种情形进行对比分析，在不同情形下为处理商选择最
优契约提供方法借鉴，也为政府更好地对企业进行指导提供理论参考
关键词：正规处理商，合作，研发III
ABSTRACT
Electronic waste containing lead, cadmium and other heavy metals, improper handling is very easy to
pollute the soil and water, thereby causing serious environmental and social problems. Therefore, how to
guide the reverse supply chain cooperation, from the source control of electronic waste pollution has very
important practical significance. However, previous researches on development of recycling and treatment
of electronic waste recycling are mostly concentrated in the channel selection and pricing strategies on how
to guide the research on the handling of electronic wastes of enterprise in supply chain is rare. Therefore,
on the basis of previous research, starting from the electronic products manufacturers and professional
manufacturers of electronic waste processing perspective on the following aspects:
Decision making research and manufacture of electronic products and processing business
cooperation for new technology research and development. The government imposed treatment fund,
decision model and manufacture of electronic products based on traditional mode of production, R & D
cooperation situation and cooperate with the treatment of business research and development situation,
using the method of inverse optimal decision behavior under the different situations of producers and
processors and the best products to improve the level of green degree, and through the analysis of
equilibrium the results under different conditions, compare the change of both profit and pricing decisions.
Found that the electronic products manufacturers, products of new technology research and development to
improve the degree of green products, and indirectly reduce dismantling processing business, improve the
utilization rate of resource recycling, new product R & D process's willingness to participate in the
producer's.
Processing business incentive contract design manufacturers R & D efforts. Taking treatment for
their own interests to encourage producers to efforts to develop the contract design of the information
symmetry and asymmetry, changes between the two expected utility in different situations and taking effect
on the agency cost and supervision cost. Make the dismantling process based on this standard, the
manufacturer's product development quality factor, by setting up incentive mechanism to encourage
producers to further improve research effort, use the optimization principle of linear analysis into the
optimal incentive mechanism and incentive mechanism and the influence parameters of two kinds ofIV
contract factors, the linear separation mechanism and punishment mechanism in the incentive effect are
complementary of.
(3) The government subsidies for processing operators and manufacturers of coordination and
cooperation. In the process of cooperation in the reality of the business, the need for government to provide
support and guidance, considering the influencing factors of the treatment of government subsidies and
producers taking the decision-making behavior, the government does not give subsidies to producers,
processors and government subsidies, the government of the implementation of business and government
subsidies only to analyze business processing and production all four cases of the implementation of
subsidies to producers, to choose the optimal method provides reference in different situations, but also
provide a theoretical reference for the government to better guide for the enterprise.
KEYWORDS:The formal dismantling business , cooperation, process developmentV
目 录
摘 要.......I
ABSTRACT ..... III
目 录.....V
第一章 绪 论....1
1.1 研究背景 . 1
1.1.1 电子废弃物的特性... 1
1.1.2 我国电子废弃物回收处理的主要渠道....... 2
1.1.3 相关政策与法律法规........... 2
1.2 研究意义 . 3
1.3 研究内容与研究方法 ..... 4
1.3.1 研究内容....... 4
1.3.2 研究方法....... 5
1.4 本文的主要创新点 ......... 5
1.5 本文框架 .. 6
第二章 理论基础与文献综述..7
2.1 逆向供应链的理论研究 . 7
2.1.1 逆向供应链的内涵... 7
2.1.2 逆向供应链处理模式........... 7
2.2 博弈论概述 ......... 9
2.2.1 博弈论的内涵........... 9
2.2.2 博弈论的分类........... 9
2.3 委托代理理论 ... 10
2.3.1 委托代理理论的内涵......... 10
2.3.2 基本的委托代理模型......... 10
2.5 国内外电子废弃物回收处理研究现状与综述 ........... 11
2.5.1 电子废弃物回收处理参与主体相关实践研究..... 11 VI
2.5.2 政府引导下电子废弃物回收处理激励机制研究. 12
2.5.3 供应链参与主体相关合作问题研究......... 13
2.5.4 文献评述..... 14
第三章 电子产品生产商与处理商的合作决策........17
3.1 背景 ....... 17
3.2 模型描述与基本假设 ... 18
3.3 电子产品生产商与处理商不合作时的行为决策 ....... 19
3.3.1 生产商不进行新工艺研发下的最优行为决策..... 19
3.3.2 电子产品生产商进行研发但处理商不分担费用的最优行为决策......... 20
3.3.3 生产商不同决策模式下的处理商利润分析......... 22
3.4 电子产品生产商与处理商合作时的行为决策 ........... 23
3.4.1 生产商进行产品新工艺研发并与处理商合作时的最优行为决策......... 23
3.4.2 均衡结果分析......... 25
3.5 算例分析 ........... 27
3.6 本章小结 ........... 29
第四章 处理商激励生产商努力研发的契约设计....31
4.1 背景及基本假设 ........... 31
4.1.1 背景. 31
4.1.2 基本假设..... 31
4.2 不同信息条件下处理商激励生产商努力研发的契约设计 ... 33
4.2.1 信息对称条件下处理商激励生产商努力研发的契约设计......... 33
4.2.2 信息不对称条件下处理商激励生产商研发的契约设计. 34
4.2.3 不同信息条件的比较分析. 36
4.2.4 处理商监督成本与代理成本的比较分析. 37
4.3 奖惩机制下处理商激励生产商努力研发的契约设计 ........... 38
4.3.1 处理商设置拆解标准时激励生产商努力研发的契约设计......... 38
4.3.2 有无奖惩机制下的比较静态分析. 39
4.4 本章小结 ........... 41
第五章 基于政府补贴的生产商与处理商协调合作研究....43 VII
5.1 背景及基本假设 ........... 43
5.1.1 背景. 43
5.1.2 基本假设..... 43
5.2 政府采取不同补贴策略时处理商激励生产商研发的契约设计 ....... 44
5.2.1 政府不提供补贴时处理商激励生产商研发的契约设计. 45
5.2.2 政府只对处理商补贴时处理商激励生产商研发的契约设计.....
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