摘要
随着经济一体化的迅猛发展，激烈的市场竞争环境对企业提出了更高的要求如企
业抵御风险的能力以及企业受到经营规模的限制等。在此背景下，各种类型的企业需
要不断地合作，扩大经营规模，通过相互联盟、并购等方式形成了企业集团来实现共
担风险，同时共享收益。在企业集团中，由于每个成员企业是一个独立的盈利主体，
因此它们之间的利益冲突可能会影响整个集团的总的利益。公共收益分配结果的公平
与否直接影响企业集团运作的稳定性和集团中成员企业的积极性，由此公共收益的合
理分配是现代经济社会中常见且影响深远的现实问题。
本文提出一种分摊方法用于解决具有同类型成员的企业集团公共收益分配问题。
该方法以公共权重为分配基础并遵循两个分配原则即分摊前后成员企业间的公共权
重比值不变及效率比值不变。首先，在确定公共权重时提出一个以企业集团效率最大
化为目标函数的 DEA模型，通过求解该模型，得出使企业集团总体效率最大的权重。
该权重使得企业集团总体效率最大，能被大多数成员企业所接受，因此以该权重为公
共收益分摊的分配基础（公共权重）；其次，基于两个分配原则和公共权重推导出公
共收益的分摊公式；接下来在 DEA框架下，运用数理演绎的方式证明了所提的方法
的合理性；最后给出公共收益分摊方法的案例应用。基于现实的考量，具体应用该方
法时又分为集团总部参与公共收益分配以及不参与分配两种情形。
本文的主要工作及研究成果总结如下：
（1）首先系统总结了公共收益分摊方法国内外的研究现状，并梳理了利用 DEA
求解公共权重的方法，为论文的研究奠定了理论基础。
（2）提出公共收益分摊遵循的两个原则即分摊前后决策单元间的效率比值及公
共权重比值不变。在实际生活中，公共收益的分配与否不会影响决策单元间效率的相
对关系也不会影响决策单元间权重的相对关系，基于此提出两个高度契合现实的分配
原则。同时本文在 DEA的框架下运用数理演绎推导的方式证明了两个原则。
（3）构建公共权重模型。公共权重体现了决策单元间达成了较高的共识性，从
而保证了分配结果的公平性。在确定公共权重时，本文提出一个以企业集团效率最大
化为目标函数的 DEA模型，通过对虚拟权重（决策单元投入产出指标值与相应权重
的乘积）施加限制来避免公共权重为零的情况，同时提出第二目标函数解决模型多解
的问题，最后通过求解权重限制模型得到一组非零的公共权重。
（4）基于公共权重和两个分配原则推导出企业集团公共收益分摊的公式。公式
契合以下两个实际情况：当两个决策单元的效率值相同的情况下，决策单元的投入规
模越大，则其分摊的公共收益就越多；当两个决策单元投入规模一样的情况下，决策
单元的效率值越大，则其分摊的公共收益就越多。
（5）实例应用所提的方法。对企业集团总部参与公共收益分配以及不参与分配
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这两种情况进行应用。实例应用结果表明本文所提的分配方法高度契合现实，能够被
多数企业接受。
（6）公共收益的合理分配是企业集团管理的一项重要活动，直接影响到集团成
员企业的积极性，影响到企业集团的稳定运行。本文研究具有同类型成员的企业集团
公共收益分摊问题，结合实际提出了企业集团公共收益分摊方法。该分摊方法不仅基
于统一的分配基础（公共收益分摊的公共权重），且遵循公共收益分摊前后成员企业
间效率比值不变以及公共权重比值不变的原则。分配结果体现了公共收益分摊的公平
性，激励了集团中成员企业，也促进了企业集团的发展。
关键词：企业集团；公共收益；数据包络分析；公共权重；公共权重比值；效率比值
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ABSTRACT
With the rapid development of economic integration, the fierce market competition
environment puts forward higher requirements for enterprises, such as the ability of
enterprises to resist risks and the limitation of business scale. In this context, various types
of enterprises need to constantly cooperate, expand their business scale, and form enterprise
groups through mutual alliances, mergers and acquisitions to take risks and share benefits at
the same time. In an enterprise group, because each member enterprise is an independent
profit-making subject, the conflict of interest between them may affect the overall interests
of the whole group. Whether the result of common revenue distribution is fair or not
directly affects the stability of enterprise group operation and the enthusiasm of member
enterprises in the group. Therefore, the rational distribution of common revenue is a
common and far-reaching practical problem in modern economic society.
This paper proposes an allocation method to solve the problem of common revenue
distribution of enterprise groups with homogeneous members. This method takes the
common set of weights as the distribution basis and follows two distribution principles, that
is, the common weight ratios and efficiency ratios between member enterprises remain
unchanged before and after allocation. Firstly, when determining the common set of
weights, a DEA model with maximizing the efficiency of the enterprise group as the
objective function is proposed. By solving the model, the weights that maximizes the
overall efficiency of the enterprise group are obtained. This weights maximizes the overall
efficiency of the enterprise group and can be accepted by most member enterprises.
Therefore, this weights are used as the distribution basis of common revenue allocation (the
common set of weights); Secondly, based on the two distribution principles and the
common set of weights, the allocation formula of common revenue is derived; Next, under
the framework of DEA, the rationality of the proposed method is proved by mathematical
deduction; Finally, the case application of common revenue allocation method is given.
Based on practical considerations, the specific application of this method can be divided
into two cases: group headquarters participating in common revenue distribution and not
participating in distribution.
The main work and research results of this paper are summarized as follows:
(1) Firstly, it systematically summarizes the research status of common revenue
allocation methods at home and abroad, and combs the method of using DEA to solve the
common set of weights, which lays a theoretical foundation for the research of this paper.
(2) Two principles of common revenue allocation are put forward, that is, the
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