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MBA论文_数字人民币国际化竞争策略研究基于演化博弈视角

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更新时间:2023/1/16(发布于广东)

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摘要
2008年金融危机以来,美国利用美元霸权地位频频对其他国家发起金融制
裁,加剧世界金融波动,造成全球货币体系不稳定,这种大背景下国际货币体
系多元化成为必然趋势。随着全球央行数字货币技术不断进步,越来越多的国
家认为央行数字货币能够推动国际货币体系格局变革,中国央行数字货币—数
字人民币已经经历理论研究-试点实验-跨境探索的阶段,在当下国际货币体
系不稳定的背景下,数字人民币将会赋予人民币国际化的新动能。全文围绕数
字人民币如何赋能人民币国际化这一主题,构造数字人民币国际化福利水平函
数,进行一次博弈分析,并在此基础上构建演化博弈模型,通过稳定性分析和
敏感性分析得出结论如下:博弈双方均选择合作模型为博弈的帕累托最优选择,
一次博弈模型中选择竞争策略为博弈双方的占优策略;稳定性分析得出在演化
博弈过程中竞争策略是稳定均衡策略,敏感性分析结果认为对本国国际货币收
益、跨境资产投资和贸易收益、跨境支付体系收益以及长市场预期收益越看重
则越不利于合作策略的形成,但是会提高本国央行数字货币体系国际货币替代
率,并且博弈方初始选择合作的概率如果大于 0.5会更快地转变为选择竞争策略。
在演化博弈结果的基础上,中国数字人民币国际化路径应选择为“贸易投资本
币化—货币区域化合作—依托离岸人民币中心形成境外人民币循环体系”,应
该坚持合作共赢的原则寻求帕累托最优结果,在国内利用数字人民币技术优势
强化金融市场稳定性,在国际层面促进区域金融合作优先实现数字人民币区域
化发展,积极搭建数字人民币跨境支付体系平台。数字人民币国际化是一个复
杂且漫长的过程,在这个过程中强化自身经济发展硬实力,积极参与国际规则
标准制定,在国际货币体系重塑的过程中谋求主动地位。
关键词:央行数字货币;人民币国际化;演化博弈

Abstract
Since 2008, the United States has repeatedly imposed monetary penalties on
other countries by exploiting the US dollar's hegemony, increasing financial risks in
other countries, and directly generating instability in the global monetary system.
When compared to the diversification of the Jamaica system, internationalization has
become a trend.With the advancement of global central bank digital currency
technology in recent years, an increasing number of nations feel that central bank
digital currency may help change the international monetary system. It will open up
new chances for the internationalization of the RMB, given the existing state of the
international monetary system.Aiming at the theme of how the E-CNY can empower
the internationalization of the renminbi, the E-CNY internationalization welfare level
function is constructed, and a game evolution is carried out. On this basis, an
evolutionary game model is constructed. Through stability analysis and sensitivity
analysis, the following conclusions are drawn: Both sides of the game choose the
cooperation model as the Pareto optimal choice of the game, and in the one-time
game model, the competitive strategy is chosen as the dominant strategy of both sides
of the game; stability analysis shows that the competitive strategy is a stable
equilibrium strategy in the evolutionary game process, and the sensitivity The
analysis results believe that the more attention paid to the domestic international
currency income, cross-border asset investment and trade income, cross-border
payment system income and long-term market expected income, it is not conducive to
the formation of cooperation strategies, but it will increase the international currency
substitution rate of the central bank's digital currency system. , and if the initial
probability of the player choosing to cooperate is greater than 0.5, it will switch to a
competitive strategy more quickly. On the basis of the results of the evolutionary
game, the internationalization path of China's digital RMB should be selected as
"Trade and Investment localization + Currency Regional Cooperation + Relying on
。。。以下略